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 'All political opinions have a similar right to publication, 
and these different opinions are to be treated 
equally and fairly by the media.'
- Olaf Jandura rephrasing the media paragraph of the Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany, (Kleinparteien in der Mediendemokratie, p. 42) -
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Contemporary European right-wing populism: A multifaceted phenomenon
All across Europe, right-wing populist parties have been on the rise for the past decade. Under the
phenomenon of this new party family, political scientists and media alike have labeled relatively
different  groups  in  various  countries.1 Regardless  of  some  ideological  variations  among  these
parties, the concept of the enemy and the overall-populist rhetoric tie them in substance together. 
    A firm stance on national immigration policies, closely interwoven with an Anti-Islam-agenda,
and  a  deep  EU-Skepticism are  characteristic  of  all  those  parties.  In  addition  to  that,  an  anti-
establishment-rhetoric  and  the  self-image  of  representing  the  'silent  majority'  are  crucial  for
identifying populist movements. In practical terms, the existence of a charismatic figurehead, who
the people´s and media´s attention can be focused on, is also a decisive factor for such movements.2 
     As the aforementioned political focal points of these parties indicate, their logic is fundamentally
confrontational.  This  is  especially so as  the actors  deliberately place themselves  outside of the
establishment system. Consequently,  one can argue that circulating Anti-Islam and Anti-Europe-
rhetoric are reinforcing a significant conflict potential in our societies, that might very well spin out
of control. It is exactly therefore that right-wing populism's increasing appeal to voters all over the
continent  needs  to  be addressed by researchers,  scientists,  politicians and the media alike.  The
question remains, however, in which way this should be done. 
   Arguably,  there  are  cases  where  right-wing  populist  parties  are  openly  opposed  by  the
aforementioned groups, and constant attempts are made to marginalize them – the treatment of
Sweden's Sverigedemokraterna is a good example of that practice.3 In other countries, such parties
have been more or less accepted by established parties in order to get a back-up for their power, for
example in minority governments. As a result, certain right-wing populist parties did succeed in
impacting national immigration policies significantly (such as Denmark's Dansk Folkeparti4 and the
1 Von Deggerich, Markus; Ertel, Manfred; Mittelstaedt, Juliane von; Rohr, Mathieu von; Schlamp, Hans-Jürgen; 
Simons, Stefan: Kontinent der Angst. In: DER SPIEGEL 39/2010 
2 Lewandowsky, Marcel; Decker, Frank: 'Populismus. Erscheinungsformen, Enstehungshintergrunde und Folgen eines
politischen Phänomens'. In: Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung. 
http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/41192/was-ist-rechtspopulismus, last accessed on 9.1. 
2014
3 Bossetta, Michael: 'Cultural Racism without a Race – An explanatory insight into the discrimination and self-
perception of the Sweden Democrats', Master Thesis, Lund University, 2012. 
4 Henningsen, Bernd: 'Wo Westergaard zu Hause ist', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 14.10. 2010.  
      http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/rechtspopulisten-in-skandinavien-wo-westergaard-zu-hause-ist-1.999386, last 
accessed on 14.1. 2014
8
Netherlands's PVV). Not only the acceptance of such parties varies a great deal, depending on the
political culture in question, also do the parties' ideological leanings and initial backgrounds differ
(and, hence, their constitutional, democratic character). 
    When trying to tackle  right-wing populism in analytic terms, it is reasonable to  look at its
variants in the affected countries individually in order to dismantle and understand the different
types of that phenomenon better. I have decided to deal with the case of one of the few Western
European countries where the movement has not gained significance in the party landscape yet:
Germany. In the year 2015, no right-wing populist party is currently part of the national parliament
(Bundestag).  Hence,  Germany  is  an  exception  with  regard  to  right-wing  populist  parties
establishing  themselves  nation-wide  and  impacting  national  politics.  Given  that  Germany
appears to be 'the-odd-one-out' in within the context of the rise of European right-wing populism,
the question arises: Why? Various scholars have sought to answer this question, and the work of one
in particular, the German political scientist Frank Decker, marks the point of departure for my study.
1.2 The case of Germany
     Challenging framework conditions due to 'Hitler's shadow'
Decker  has  formulated  the  concept  of  'Hitler's  shadow' and  'a  historically  contaminated
environment'  that  pose  fundamental  challenges  to  the  rise  of  right-wing  parties  in  Germany.5
National Socialism, the specifically German variant of  fascism, was a  right-wing extremist mass
movement – and brought havoc over an entire continent and has to be held accountable for one of
the worst  crimes in the history of humanity,  the Holocaust. Naturally,  the ideological legacy of
right-wing groups is thereby highly problematic by default in the Federal Republic.
    In a broader historical sense, this thesis gets backed up by the Finnish scholar Lauri Karvonen
who argues that our perspective on fascism is 'post-Auschwitz'.  Therefore, he continues, the term
fascism is subject to strong normative (negative) judgments.6 
   This mindset of demonizing the ideologies of Nazism/ fascism/ right-wing extremism (that can all
be used as synonyms) which the two scholars portray as predominant among citizens of Western
liberal  democracies,  is  particularly  strong  in  Germany,  after  all  one  of  the  'core-countries'  of
5 Decker, Frank: Wenn die Populisten kommen, p. 17
6 Karvonen, Lauri: Fascismen i Europa,  p. 11
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European fascism between the two World Wars.7
   By referring to this obviously contaminated historical context in Germany in particular, Decker
seeks to explain the phenomenon of the mainstream media's 'anti-fascist-reflexes' that, according
to his interpretation,  easily occur towards new-founded right-wing parties in Germany. In other
words: New-founded German right-wing parties are constantly in danger of being labeled and
stigmatized as fascists/ Nazis – no matter if that is justifiable through their party program or
not.8 This sounds like a reasonable, valid argument. Let alone, it has not been tested sufficiently in
recent  years  and  cases.  Is  the  German  political  culture,  mirrored  in  and  voiced  through  the
mainstream media, hostile towards right-wing populism? Have parties with that political orientation
been fighting a lost cause in recent years? In stark contrast  to the developments in many other
European countries?
    For the purpose of this study, I will make a case by investigating the  media portrayal  of an
earlier, less prominent right-wing movement in Germany. The party that I chose as my study subject
made an attempt to mobilize an immigration-critical and anti-Islamic electorate between 2010 and
2013 and goes by the name 'Die Bürgerrechtspartei fur mehr Freiheit und Demokratie – Die
Freiheit' (Citizen rights party for more freedom and democracy – Freedom Party). 
    The party, which I will refer to as the Freedom Party in this paper, can be regarded as one piece
in  the  mosaic  of  anti-Islamism,  xenophobia  and  anti-establishment  sentiment  that  has  become
gradually more and more visible among the German public in recent years – even though the party
never reached its initial goal to have a 'determining influence on German politics during the decades
to come'.9 
     It is the objective of the study at hand to analyze the way the German mainstream media has
covered the party in the three years of its existence (the party leadership decided to no longer run
nationwide electoral campaigns in the autumn of 2013). Essentially, my research question can be
phrased like this:
How have leading German news publications (DER SPIEGEL, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Berliner
Zeitung, BILD) been portraying the Freedom Party, and what public image was shaped by
that?
By examining how the media has portrayed the Freedom Party I am making a case of how the
7 Ibid, p. 20 
8 Decker, Frank: Wenn die Populisten kommen, p. 17
9 'Neue Partei Die Freiheit in Berlin gegrundet', in: tagesspiegel.de, published on 29.10. 2010. 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/landespolitik/rene-stadtkewitz-neue-partei-die-freiheit-in-berlin-
gegruendet/1969872.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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media landscape in Germany has mirrored the phenomenon of right-wing populism during a certain
time period. This, in turn, will allow me to draw conclusions on how one significant element of the
political culture in Germany – the mainstream media in its role as the 'watchdog of society'  – has
reacted to a particular representative of right-wing populism between 2010 and 2013.
 
        Differentiation despite the 'post-Auschwitz'-perspective: A key point of this study
In fact, 'the media as the watchdog of society' is a concept that is highly relevant for what this study
seeks to address and raise awareness to – because dealing with right-wing parties is inevitably a
normative matter for certain individuals. This, however, is not limited to the realm of professional
politics and journalism – even scholars have shown contradictory approaches in addressing German
right-wing parties.
   The normative 'post-Auschwitz'-perspective can be observed in the ideas of Alexander Häusler,
who calls  the accuracy of  the  term 'right-wing populism'  into  doubt  altogether.  In  his  reading,
political movements with an immigration-critical and anti-Islamic agenda are 'extreme Right' per
definition.  Häusler considers 'right-wing populism'  simply as a 'new tactics from the far Right'.
Furthermore,  he claims that  anti-Islamic campaigns are  only the focal  point  of  a more general
xenophobia, and thereby are a perfect masquerade for racists. Accordingly, Häusler makes use of
the terms 'anti-Muslim racism' and 'culturalized racism'.10
     With reference to the aforementioned multifacetedness of modern right-wing populism and in
full  awareness  of  the  danger  of  walking  into  trap  of  the  'post-Auschwitz'-perspective  while
researching all kinds of different right-wing parties, I first want to declare my rejection of Häusler's
ideas and shed light on the mindset in which I am conducting this study.
     In fact, I consider a non-normative, differentiating take on the phenomenon as a necessity, and
essentially share Frank Decker's way of addressing right-wing populism in general, and its German
variants in particular:  Decker argues that the establishment of right-wing populism in the party
system can have a catalyst effect that frees public debates from taboos. Since these taboos (such as
expressing anti-Islamic sentiments or taking critical stance on multiculturalism) are, according to
Decker, still very strong in Germany, they are being covered up by the political elites and media
alike.  As  a  result,  immigration-critics'  protest  against  what  they  perceive  as  an  enforced
10 Häusler, Alexander: 'Die PRO-Bewegung und der antimuslimische Kulturrassismus von Rechtsaussen', in 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/08253.pdf, last accessed on 25.3. 2015
11
'voicelessness', can get channeled through political violence, in the absence of a 'proper political
voice' within the party system.11 Therefore,  right-wing populist parties can provide a corrective
function within the German party system, and be a legitimate player in the political arena, voicing
a particular electorate's concerns.
   Decker's stance on modern right-wing populist parties necessarily involves freeing one's
mind from 'Hitler's shadow', and requires a differentiation between the ideological variants of
right-wing parties. In other words: In such an approach as shown by Decker (and shared by the
author of this thesis), right-wing  as such is not bearing a negative connotation already, only the
radical, extremist variants of a right-wing attitude are to be demonized and opposed (concretely:
Nazism/ fascism/ right-wing extremism). 
     The bottom line is: If I shared Häusler's mindset of deeming all German right-wing populist
parties per definition 'far Right', 'racist' and anti-democratic, I would have no interest in finding out
whether or not the media has portrayed such a party fairly. Moreover, I could not expect to generate
any relevant and refined knowledge with this study, because usually, the media abandons its attempt
to fair and balanced media coverage when it comes to proclaimed enemies of liberal-democratic
state  orders.  This  is  often  the  case  as  journalistic  accounts  on  such  groups  (e.g.  political  and
religious extremists) serve the purpose of defending democracy – by warning the readership about
those threatening it (and hence, playing the part of 'the watchdog of society'). In other words: There
would be no substantial point in, say, researching the possibility of the mainstream media portraying
an  explicit  Nazi  party  neutrally  or  even  favorably.  Yet  given  modern  right-wing  populism's
multifacetedness – and its increasing appeal to voters all over Europe – it would be intellectually
lazy to condemn all those parties as anti-democratic, and thereby justify a possible media bias .
Furthermore, this approach would be undifferentiated, and incapable of generating more refined
knowledge on the phenomenon of right-wing populism and its relationship with the mainstream
media.
    As a result of the deliberately non-normative approach I have chosen,  I incorporate a two-
typologies-differentiation between right-wing populism on the one hand, and Nazism/ fascism/
right-wing  extremism  on  the  other  at  all  times  in  my  research.  The  typology  has  been
formulated by Decker and Lewandowsky, and the differentiation it entails is vital for the mindset in
which I conduct this research, and, furthermore, it is key in the logic that is at play in my entire
thesis. 
    The crucial  aspect brought forward by Decker and Lewandowsky is  that  many right-wing
11 Decker: Wenn die Populisten kommen, p. 15
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populists are indeed not to be labeled as extremists or Nazis/ fascists, but rather as political
actors that have a certain appeal  to democratic,  conservative middle-class voters12.  Fascist
parties are naturally not appealing to a democratic electorate,  as several explicitly anti-democratic
features characterize the ideology of fascism. These characteristics include, among others, extreme
nationalism  that  is  downgrading  other  nations,  the  rejection  of  pluralism  and  therefore
parliamentary democracy, the ideologically legitimized use of violence, the attacking of particular
targets ( e.g. racial or sexual minorities) and the defense of discrimination in the light of rejecting
equal basic human rights13
    When examining where the demarcation line between right-wing populism and fascism goes, it is
essential  to  emphasize  that  right-wing  populism  is  commonly  located  within  the  democratic
framework.  While  right-wing  populists  might  very  well  challenge  the  established,  democratic
system (particularly through their criticism of the political elites), they do not seek to abolish it.
Where right-wing extremists want to achieve just that, in order to establish a fascist dictatorship that
implements the above-mentioned principles, right-wing populists merely try to strengthen direct-
democratic/  plebiscitarian  elements  in  the  political  system.  The  violence-oriented,  anti-
parliamentarian  concept  of  politics  that  fascism  represents  distinguishes  it  clearly  from  its
democratic counter-part. Both ideologies react with hostility towards sociocultural modernization
(which entails multiculturalism), but they choose different means to combat it,  as their ultimate
goals differ.14 
    However, Lewandowsky and Decker point out that the populist core-concept of 'us' (the 'good'
people)  and  'them'  is  a  vague  moral  category  that  can  take  many  forms.  In  terms  of  the
contemporary right-wing populist  movements  all  over  Europe,  this  concept  primarily manifests
itself in two ways. In the rhetoric against the political elites on both national and EU-level, the so-
called  horizontal othering takes place.  Vertical othering,  on the other hand, is directed against
immigrants, and particularly those from Muslim countries.15 
   Most importantly in this  typology,  however,  is  that  the violence of  right-wing populism is
merely rhetorical, whereas the violence of right-wing extremism is  literal. This should be taken
into account when analyzing and labeling right-wing groups in Germany – as pointed out already,
contemporary European right-wing populism is a truly heterogeneous phenomenon with parties that
embody different degrees of radical ideas. Painting them all with the same brush by letting the
12 Decker, Frank; Lewandowsky, Marcel: Rechtspopulismus als neue Strategie der politischen Rechten. In: Online 
Akademie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/akademie/online/08320.pdf, p.1
13 Harris Geoffrey: The dark side of Europe – the extreme Right today, p. 16
14 Decker; Lewandowksy, p.1
15 Ibid, p.3
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concept of 'Hitler's shadow' cloud our judgment would a) not do justice to multifaceted nature of the
phenomenon I am researching here and b) make it impossible to give particular cases of such parties
a fair hearing on their own terms.  In order to succeed in just that with regard to the Freedom Party
(following the logic of the differentiation  traditional right-wing extremism vs. modern right-wing
populism), the party needs to be located within the spectrum of German right-wing parties first. For
that purpose, historical contextualization is crucial, which will be executed next. 
       Right-wing parties in Germany prior to 2010: Mostly stigmatized as Nazis  
German political  scientists  agree on the fact  that  there are  five noteworthy German right-wing
parties that emerged after World War II and prior to 2010, the year the Freedom Party entered the
political  stage.  These  five  parties  are  The  National  Democratic  Party  (NPD),  the  Republicans
(Republikaner),  the  German  People´s  Union  (DVU),  the  Schill-Party  (Partei  rechtsstaatlicher
Offensive/ PRO) and PRO-Deutschland.
   The certainly most prominent and most extremist of these parties is the NPD which has been
monitored by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution16 for decades already. On top
of that, one effort to ban the party has been made already, and a second one, initiated by the federal
states of Germany, is currently ongoing.17 The NPD is essentially a Nazi-party, that is ideologically
not only akin to Hitler´s NSDAP, but can even be seen as its successor party. Being founded in
1964,  the  NPD almost  entered  the  parliament  in  1969,  but  then  soon  got  marginalized  in  the
political landscape. Only in the early 2000s did the NPD gain ground in two federal states that
formerly  belonged  to  the  GDR  (Saxony  and  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern),  yet  in  the  national
elections, the NPD managed only to mobilize a tiny electorate.
   During the 1990s, the NPD was facing two particularly firm competitors: The DVU and the
Republicans. The DVU was founded in 1971 already, but started running electoral campaigns no
earlier than in 1987 – with relative success, in certain federal states at least. In ideological terms, the
DVU appears  to  be very reminiscent  of  the NPD, as  the maintenance of  German identity and
defense of German national interests are the main concerns for the party. 
16 The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is Germany's domestic security agency. It is an institution 
that reports to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which makes the Minister of the Interior the minister responsible 
for the agency.
17 Hebel, Christina; Medick, Veit: Jetzt muss die NPD zittern. In: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 3.12. 2013. 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/zweites-npd-verbotsverfahren-jetzt-ist-wieder-karlsruhe-am-zug-a-
936805.html, last accessed on 15.1. 2015
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    Hints of anti-Semitic attitudes can easily be dismantled; for instance in the claim that the German
Chancellor makes policies not for the benefit of the people, but for the benefit of Israel and the
USA. Consequently, the DVU merged with the NPD in 2011 and thereby ceased to exist as an own
party.18 
   The NPD's second great competitor, the Republicans, got established in 1983 as a break-away
party of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian twin-party of Germany´s biggest catch-all
party  CDU.  The  Republican  share  such  main  themes  as  nationalistic  values,  a  law-and-order-
operational mode of society, and anti-immigration-policies with the NPD and the DVU. Whereas
those two have rather socialistic agendas on nationalistic terms, the Republicans show their kinship
to CDU/CSU in their orientation towards liberal economic policies. Their electoral successes took
place between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s in West-Berlin and Baden-Württemberg.19
   Despite the temporary successes gained in single federal states,  none of the aforementioned
parties has managed to gain political significance all over Germany. Lacardie highlights the fact,
that the NPD, DVU and Republicans alike are stigmatized as Nazis by the German media. 
   Only one German right-wing populist party prior to 2010 has succeeded in not being tied to this
kind of bad reputation: The Schill-Party. Founded by a former judge, Ronald Schill, in Hamburg in
2000,  the  party  entered  the  Landtag  in  the  Hanseatic  city  with  19,4%  of  the  votes  in
2001.According to Decker, the party was successful in the first place because Schill acted upon
bourgeois  resentment  against  foreigners  and  the  bourgeois  yearning  for  better  public  security,
without ever being associated with Nazism or any other kind of extremism. According to Decker,
the  incapability of the German media to demonize Schill as a Nazi, based on his respectable
reputation as a former judge, was a decisive factor in the ascent of his one-man-party.20 
   The last right-wing party prior to the Freedom Party that sought to reach out for a larger electorate
was Pro Deutschland, which emerged from the Cologne-based Anti-Islamic association 'Pro Köln'
in 2005, and is monitored by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution since 2011.21 
   As this brief outline indicates,  four out of five right-wing parties that got founded in post-
World-War-II-Germany,  got  labeled  as  Nazis  by  the  media.  Whereas  there  is  scholarly
18 Haus der Niederlande. 'Rechter Populismus in Deutschland', In: http://www.uni-
muenster.de/HausDerNiederlande/Zentrum/Projekte/Schulprojekt/Lernen/Populismus/70/rechterpopulismusbrd.htm,
last accessed on 15.1. 2015 
19 Ibid
20 Decker: Wenn die Populisten kommen, p. 307
21 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
     http://www.bpb.de/politik/wahlen/wer-steht-zur-wahl/bundestag-2013/165517/pro-deutschland, last accessed on 
12.3. 2015
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consensus on the rightfulness of this stigma in the cases of the NPD and the DVU, and the accuracy
in keeping that label off the Schill-Party, the Republicans and Pro-Deutschland are located in some
kind of ideological gray zone where it is difficult to measure their (potentially) anti-constitutional
character.  However,  the case of the Republicans in  particular should bring one more important
aspect to our attention: The ideological point of departure for new-founded right-wing parties.
   In this context, it must be noted that they can either originate from a fascist world view and try to
appear more moderate to attract mere middle-class voters (the 'sheep-in-wolves-clothing'-scenario),
or  they  are  slightly  radicalized  break-away  parties  from conservative  catch-all  parties  (as  the
Republicans were in relation to the CSU).
   Basically, the break-away-process from big catch-all parties can be interpreted as a rebellion of
the most right-wing members of such parties against the official party line. In other words: If there
is an ideological shift to be observed that certain members of the party cannot identify with, the
likelihood of a break-away-party being formed increases. In fact, this is exactly the phenomenon
that occurred in the case of the Freedom Party as well, as I will show next.
1.3  Right-wing populism in Germany 2010-2015: A brief outline 
       The 'Social-democratization' of the CDU (2008-)
One  of  the  reasons  that  kept  new-founded  right-wing  parties  on  the  margins  of  the  political
landscape in the old Federal Republic, is the remarkable and lasting capability of the Germany's
biggest  middle-of-the-road-party-tandem CDU/CSU (Christian  Democrats)22 to  absorb occurring
national-conservative movements into their electorate. Essentially, over many decades the party was
known for giving conservative, more nationalist-minded voters a political home. The party did so
by frequently implementing a rhetoric in its  public appearances that is  bordering on right-wing
populist statements – even prolific CDU-politicians in leadership-positions followed that pattern on
occasion. 
   For example, the former German chancellor Helmut Kohl insisted after German reunification,
when homes of asylum-seekers were torched by Neo-Nazis in the East German city of Rostock, that
Germany is no immigration country.23 On a similar note, the current German chancellor Angela
22  The CDU is electable in 15 out of 16 federal states, whereas its twin-party, the CSU, is only electable in the federal 
state of Bavaria. Despite this organizational demaracation line between the two parties and some small ideological 
differences, one can consider the CDU/CSU as one party-tandem, the Christian Democrats. 
23 Kohl, Helmut: 'Regierungserklärung zur 12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages', in: Konrad-Adenauer-
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Merkel declared in 2010 that 'multiculturalism has failed'.24 
    Against that background, it is remarkable which ideological shift the CDU has taken under the
leadership of Angela Merkel right after  she got elected as the German chancellor in 2005, and
brought the party back into the government after seven years as an opposition party. As a result of
her leadership, the CDU is widely considered to have lost vast parts of its conservative profile. The
German media has coined the phrase of the 'Social democratization of the CDU' in order to describe
the phenomenon that got started under Merkel´s leadership. The main objective of that strategy to
enter the leftist sphere of the political center is to attract former SPD-voters.25 Officially, this course
is meant to help the CDU regain its status as a big catch-all party that attracts voters even beyond
the conservative camp. As a result of the CDU´s apparent shift  to the center, the notion of the
'homeless conservatives' within the party has surfaced in public discourse. 
   In response to  this peculiar trend within the CDU, in 2010, various political scientists predicted
that a new right-wing populist party – a break-away party from the CDU – could pick up at least
20% of the votes.26. This assessment was a combination of this long-term-development within the
CDU, and two occasions in particular, that provoked lasting public discourses throughout the rest of
the year 2010. 
       
         The Sarrazin-Debate (2010)
   
     At  least  two controversial  nationwide  discourses  occurred that  year  which dismantled the
German public's disagreement on the Federal Republic's national immigration policies in general,
and the status it should grant Islam in its society in particular. 
    In the course of these up-heated debates, deep dividing lines between immigration-critical and
anti-Islamic segments of society on one hand, and advocates of multiculturalism on the other, have
been revealed. Hardened fronts can be observed as far as far as questions of Germany's national and
cultural  identity,  the  implementation  of  multiculturalism in  German society,  and,  most  notably,
Stiftung: Helmut Kohl.  http://helmut-kohl.kas.de/index.php?
menu_sel=17&menu_sel2=&menu_sel3=&menu_sel4=&msg=609, last accessed on 10.3. 2015
24  'Integration: Merkel erklärt Multikulti fur gescheitert', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 16.10. 2010, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-merkel-erklaert-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-a-723532.html, last
accessed on 10.3. 2015.
25 'Berliner Erklärung: Sozialdemokratische CDU.' In: sueddeutsche.de, published on 17.5. 2010, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/berliner-erklaerung-sozialdemokratische-cdu-1.73040, last accessed on 30.1. 
2014
26 '20 Prozent fur Rechtspartei möglich', in: RP online, published on 13.9. 2010. http://www.rp-
online.de/politik/deutschland/20-prozent-fuer-rechtspartei-moeglich-aid-1.2292654, last accessed on 16.1. 2014
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Islam's role in the country, are concerned.27 
    The first significant indication of the considerable existence of a 'right-wing populist electorate'
in Germany is the so-called 'Sarrazin-Debate' that took place in late summer/ early autumn 2010.
Essentially, the 'Sarrazin-Debate' was centered around topics that are identity-establishing for right-
wing-populists;  and the polls  implied that  a party picking up those issues would instantly gain
around 20% of the vote Following the book 'Deutschland schafft sich ab. Wie wir unser Land aufs
Spiel  setzen.'  (engl:  'Germany abolishes itself'.  How we put our country at stake') by the SPD
(Social  Democratic  Party)-member  Thilo  Sarrazin,  anti-Islamic,  immigration-critical  sentiments
were displayed publicly and discussed in an up-heated climate28. 
    The main thesis of the book (the best-selling factual book in Germany after World War II) is that
Germany´s immigration policies had failed dramatically, leading to countless parallel societies of
Turkish and Arabic immigrants who supposedly disrespect the German state, yet make a living out
of its benefits. In other words: The book primarily reinforced the image of the 'bad',  'lazy'  and
'economically useless' (Oriental) immigrants that are nothing but a burden to German society, and –
through their  unwillingness to integrate culturally – ultimately also a threat to German national
identity.29 The book became a bestseller, and the political climate clearly appeared to be in favor of
a new right-wing/immigration-critical party in Germany.
      Former Federal President Wulff's controversial Islam-statement (2010)
    The concern of a considerable amount of the German public about the country's cultural and
national identity, did not only get amplified in the Sarrazin-Debate, it also got reinforced all the
more through a highly controversial statement by the Federal President at the time, Christian Wulff
(CDU). In his anniversary speech on German unity day 2010, Wulff declared that 'Islam belongs to
Germany'30 – a statement which deepened the dividing lines between the modern-minded, rather
pragmatic and less ideological parts of the CDU and the nationalist-conservative ones even more. 
27 Schneiders, Thorsten Gerald (ed.): Verhärtete Fronten - Der schwere Weg zu einer vernünftigen Islamkritik, p.7
28 Ruf, Christoph: 'Studie zu deutschen Einstellungen: Wie gross Srrazins Basis wirklich ist', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, 
published on 13.10. 2010. 
      http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/studie-zu-deutschen-einstellungen-wie-gross-sarrazins-basis-wirklich-ist-
a-722789.html, last accessed on 16.3. 2015
29 Geyer, Christoph: 'So wird Deutschland dumm.' In: FAZ online,  published on 25.8. 2010. 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/buecher/rezensionen/sachbuch/thilo-sarrazin-deutschland-schafft-sich-ab-so-
wird-deutschland-dumm-1999085.html
30 Schlegel, Matthias: 'Wulff: Islam gehört zu Deutschland'. In: tagesspiegel.de, published on 3.10. 2010, 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/rede-zur-einheitsfeier-wulff-islam-gehoert-zu-deutschland/1948760.html, last 
accessed on 10.3. 2015
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    The latter, the prediction of various political scientists ran, would be easily be drawn to a new
right-wing populist party, if a new one was to be founded. Interestingly, this development correlates
exactly with the foundation of the subject of my study, the Freedom Party, which can be regarded as
an immediate response to both the 'Social-Democratization of the CDU' which, arguably started as
early as 2008, and the 'Sarrazin-Debate' and the 'Wulff-controversy', which both occurred in 2010.
    As my study will show in greater detail, the Freedom Party was incapable of mobilizing the
'homeless conservatives' and the nationalist-minded, immigration-critical electorate in the following
years, and it took three more years before another new party, did fill the 'gap' on the right-wing of
the political spectrum that Merkel's CDU had left open throughout the past decade.
        The AfD (2013-)
    In 2013, the currently relatively successful German nationalistic protest party Alternative für
Deutschland (AfD) was founded. Arguably, the AfD started out as a 'watered-down version' of the
three-years-older  Freedom Party,  for  they  were  not  touching  upon  the  taboo  of  Anti-Muslim-
sentiment. Instead, they were mostly portrayed as 'Euro-Skeptics' that have a rather elitist approach
due to their leaders being professors and former managers.31 
    After missing the chance to win seats in the German parliament (Bundestag) in September 2013,
it  succeeded in doing so for the European parliament  in  May 201432,  as  well  as in the federal
elections in the federal states of Brandenburg, Sachsen (Saxony) and Thuringia33. In the wake of
these electoral successes, the attitudes of the established parties and the media have become more
hostile towards the AfD, referring to them as a right-wing populist or nationalistic-conservative
party that is fueled by a latent xenophobia.34 
31 Wittrock, Philipp: 'Alternative fuer Deutschland – Partei der Besserwisser', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 
11.4. 2013. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/gruendungsparteitag-der-anti-euro-partei-alternative-fuer-
deutschland-a-893374.html, last accessed on 9.1. 2015
32 Amann, Melanie; Reinhold, Fabian: 'AfD-Erfolg: Lucke, Henkel und Co im Siegesrausch', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, 
published on 25.5. 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afd-chef-lucke-feiert-gutes-ergebnis-bei-
europawahl-a-971600.html, last accessed on 9.1. 2015
33  Amann, Melanie; Baumgärtner, Maik; Deggerich, Markus; Müller, Ann-Katrin; Röbel, Sven; Winter, Steffen: 
'Obenauf und unten durch', in: DER SPIEGEL 39/ 2014 
34 'Neue deutsche Welle' in: DER SPIEGEL 51/ 2014
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      PEGIDA (2014-)
    This increasing opposition to the AfD among the political elites and mainstream media alike is
tied to the fact that the various federal delegations of the party associated themselves quite openly
with a movement that probably marks the most significant outburst  and manifestation of right-
populism in recent German history: PEGIDA ('Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des
Abendlandes' – 'Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident'). 
    Starting in the autumn of 2014, this mass protest group has been making headlines nation-wide in
Germany for several months.35 At the peak of the movement, about 25.000 demonstrators were
voicing their anti-Islamic, xenophobic and anti-establishment sentiments in the streets of Dresden
and various other German cities. After a scandal around one of the leaders who had uttered racist
attitudes on a social media platform and had posed as Adolf Hitler on a photograph36, about half of
the leadership left the movement. As a consequence, the popularity of the movement died down,
and its exposure in the media ebbed away.37  
      A 'family tree' of German right-wing parties past and present 
    The ideological ties between the object of the study at hand, the Freedom Party, and the more
recent manifestations of German right-wing populism, AfD and PEGIDA, are quite obvious. The
Freedom Party-founder and leader at the time, René Stadtkewitz, justified the withdrawal of his
party from politics by claiming that there is a 90% convergence between the two parties in terms of
the political agenda38. 
    As a consequence of the AfD nearly entering the German Bundestag in the autumn of 2013, he
drew the conclusion that this party has the biggest chances for future success of the entire Euro/
35 Hebel, Christina; Otto, Ferdinand: 'Massenprotest in Sachsen. Fünf Grunde fur Pegidas Erfolg in Dresden', in: 
SPIEGEL ONLINE,  published on 7.1. 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/pegida-fuenf-gruende-fuer-
den-erfolg-in-dresden-a-1011490.html, last accessed on 9.1. 2015
36 'Ausländerfeindliche Hetze bei Facebook: Pegida-Chef Bachmann tritt zuruck', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on
21.1. 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/lutz-bachmann-zieht-sich-bei-pegida-zurueck-a-
1014270.html, last accesed on 10.3. 2015
37 Reinbold, Fabian: 'Danke, Pegida, das war's!`, in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 10.2. 2015, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/pegida-das-ende-der-bewegung-kommentar-a-1017581.html, last accessed
on 10.3. 2015. 
38 Hebel, Christina: 'Die Freiheit' – Anti-Islam-Partei will sich der AfD anschliessen' In: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published
on 1.10. 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-freiheit-stellt-wahlkaempfe-zugunsten-der-afd-ein-a-
925504.html, last accessed on 29.1.2014
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EU-skeptic nationalist-conservative movement in Germany, and should be supported by all means.
Therefore, he even appealed to members of his own party to join the AfD, as they are essentially
fighting for the same cause39. The second important aspect is the actual migration from countless
members of the Freedom Party to the AfD that started to take place even before Stadtkewitz´s
plea.40
    Drawing conclusions from both the historic contextualization of right-wing parties in post-World-
War-II-Germany,  and  the  following  examination  of  more  recent  societal  trends  and  right-wing
group and party formations, we can visualize the phenomenon in a chart displaying the 'family tree'
both  modern,  contemporary right-wing populism and traditional  right-wing extremist  groups in
Germany.  Those  parties  which  have  been  stigmatized  as  Nazis  by  the  mainstream  media  are
highlighted in magenta, those which are frequently covered in a critical fashion in yellow, and those
which are commonly approached neutrally in green.
Chart  1:  Ideological  map of  all  noteworthy  German right-wing  parties  and  groups  after
World War II































Finding the Freedom Party's location within this chart is one objective of the work at hand.
   However, as we can see, of all the German parties commonly associated with a right-wing world
39 Ibid
40 Amann, Melanie: 'Unheimlich gute Freunde', in: DER SPIEGEL 36/2013
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view, only one is an established political actor in the Federal Republic. The CDU/CSU. And even
here it is highly disputable in how far they could even really pass as a nationalistic-conservative
group during the past two decades, regardless of occasional flirts with right-wing populist rhetoric. 
    Other than that,  only two out of six notable German right-wing parties (the Freedom Party
excluded, for this remains to be seen in the cause of this study) escaped the 'Nazi stigma' of the
German media: The Schill-Party and the AfD. The four other parties that sought to reach out for
and represent a nationalistic and immigration-critical  electorate in the parliament,  the NPD, the
DVU, the Republicans, and Pro Deutschland, have acquired a bad reputation media-wise. 
   However, the active polarization against right-wing groups among the German political elite and
media was not limited to opposing traditional fascist groups, but also applies to those parties and
movements whose agenda has a pro-constitutional character: The AfD and PEGIDA. The veteran
Minister  of  Finances,  Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU),  probably the AfD's most  prolific  critic,  even
called the party 'a shame for Germany'41. This demonstrates that the AfD – despite their electoral
successes in several federal states – is not fully accepted as a legitimate part of a pluralistic party
landscape. Interestingly, the AfD itself had initially firmly tried to distance themselves from the
object of my study, the Freedom Party.42 
    On a similar note, despite the initial criticism Merkel expressed of multiculturalism, she made
harsh value judgments on PEGIDA in her New Year's speech 2015, accusing them of 'coldness' and
'hatred' towards asylum seekers.43 In turn, PEGIDA has made active use of the term 'Liar's Press' to
express  the  ant-establishment  feeling  in  a  similarly  harsh  way.  These  mutual  recriminations
underline the deep divide that is existing between parts of the German public and the establishment
in the year 2015. 
    As I stated before, the fronts appear to be hardened in debates on immigration, multiculturalism
and Islam. And this paints quite a bleak picture of the political culture and the democratic debate-
culture in the Federal Republic – 'Hitler's shadow' is distorting the view in such matters, to pick up
Decker's  poignant  statement.  The  controversies  around  how  to  address  right-wing  parties  in
Germany are, as shown before, also part of the academic debate. Regardless of the normative/ non-
41 'Kritik an Protestpartei: Schäuble nennt AfD 'Schande für Deutschland', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 9.10. 
2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/schaeuble-ueber-afd-schande-fuer-deutschland-a-996347.html, last 
accessed on 9.1. 2015
42 'AfD streitet uber Aufnahme von rechten Uberläufern' In: Welt Online, published on 6.10.2013. 
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article120669457/AfD-streitet-ueber-Aufnahme-von-rechten-
Ueberlaeufern.html, last accessed on 9.1. 2015
43 'Neujahrsansprache der Kanzlerin: Merkel prangert Hass bei Pegida-Märschen an', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, 
published on 31.12. 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/merkel-kritisiert-pegida-bei-neujahrsansprache-
scharf-a-1010785.html, last accessed on 10.3. 2015
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normative divide among scholars embodied by two of the leading experts in this field of research,
Alexander Häusler and Frank Decker, a great deal of literature is available on the subject, which I
will go into next, before moving on to outlining the further structure of the thesis.
1.4 Status quo of related studies, sources, methodology and the structure of the thesis 
    Frank Decker's high-profile presence in this thesis reflects his status as a leading researcher on
German  right-wing  populism.  As  such,  he  has  published  a  considerable  amount  of  research
literature on the subject matter, and formulated theses on the reasons for Germany´s 'special case' in
various books and articles for political journals. 
   Some of his main works on the matter include 'Wenn die Populisten kommen – Beiträge zum
Zustand der Demokratie und des Parteiensystems' (Wiesbaden, 2013), 'Populismus – Gefahr fur die
Demokratie  oder  nützliches  Korrektiv?' (Wiesbaden,  2006)  and  'Der  neue  Rechtspopulismus'
(Opladen, 2004).
    Decker's normative-minded counterpart in this research field, Alexander Häusler, has recently
published a detailed account on the AfD, together with Rainer Roeser: 'Die rechten 'Mut'-Bürger:
Entstehung,  Entwicklung,  Personal  &  Positionen  der  Alternative  für  Deutschland' (Hamburg,
2015). In addition to that we was primarily concerned with the Cologne-based right-wing populist
Protest-initiative  'Pro  Köln',  which  later  grew  into  the  small  right-wing  extremist  party  'Pro
Deutschland'. He published an account on new strategies of right-wing extremist actors in Germany
entitled as  'Rechtspopulismus als "Bürgerbewegung": Kampagnen gegen Islam und Moscheebau
und kommunale Gegenstrategien' (Wiesbaden, 2008). 
    Moreover, Florian Hartleb belongs to the most prolific scholars on German right-wing populism,
and he has published books like 'Rechts- und Linkspopulismus. Eine Fallstudie anhand von Schill-
Partei  und  PDS'  (Wiesbaden,  2004)  and  'Populismus  in  der  modernen  Demokratie.  Die
Niederlande und Deutschland im Vergleich' (with Friso Wielanga, Münster, 2011). 
    As I made clear already earlier,  I am following Decker's trail in this study. For one, I do not
approach the object  of my study in a  normative approach that  is  guided by a  'post-Auschwitz'
perspective,  but  treat  the  Freedom  Party  neutrally  as  another  political  actor  representing  a
particular agenda that is actually anchored in growing parts of the German public. Second, I use
his theory as a point of departure for making an own case –  for Decker, right-wing parties' interplay
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with the media has a major standing in his explanation of why right-wing populist parties have been
so unsuccessful in recent German history. 
    However, Decker's theory of the historically grounded bias of the German mainstream media that
is carrying out anti-fascist-reflexes towards new-founded right-wing parties can only be practically
tested validly in my study, if I can make some statements about the nature of the party in question.
If  that  party  was  explicitly  fascist,  one  could  not  speak  of  'anti-fascist-reflexes'  at  all,  but  of
justified,  deliberate  opposition  against  an  anti-democratic  group  (as  in  the  case  of  the  NPD).
Therefore, in my understanding of the case, Decker's theory of the 'reflexes' only applies fully
in its logic if they 'hit' a new party that does not deliberately style itself as extremist or fascist,
but  one  that  is  at  least  located  in  an  ideological  'gray  zone'  or  not  clearly  identified  in
ideological terms.  
   As a consequence, I have decided to analyze key aspects of the party program of the Freedom
Party as a 'prologue' to the analytic main part. This analysis of the party program shall serve as a
compass for assessing if the party has been portrayed accurately or not. Only if we know what
kind of right-wing party (are they extremists/ fascists?) we are dealing with, we can give the party a
fair hearing on its own terms; and reach a solid conclusion on whether or not the party has been
portrayed  objectively  by the  mainstream media,  or,  indeed,  in  a  biased  fashion  of  ideological
opposition, as Decker's thesis of 'anti-fascist-reflexes' implies.
   This approach of mine is especially necessary for this thesis, as I am dealing with a political
culture where immigration-critical parties and movements are entitled as 'a shame for Germany' and
accused of 'hatred for asylum-seekers' by prolific established politicians of the German government.
     In short: I do not intend to let 'Hitler's shadow' cloud my judgment on a) the nature of the
Freedom Party and b) on whether or not the mainstream media has portrayed it fairly.
    The media I have chosen with regard to the portrayal the Freedom Party include the internet-
news-portals of DER SPIEGEL, Süddeutsche Zeitung, BILD and Berliner Zeitung. 
   DER SPIEGEL is the leading political journal in Germany, published nation-wide on a weekly
basis   The German communicologist  Frank Brettschneider  states  that  DER SPIEGEL holds  an
'opinion leadership' in Germany.44 
   Süddeutsche  Zeitung  is  a  supra-regional  daily  newspaper  that  has  a  center-left  political
orientation. The Goethe Institute, one of Germany´s most seminal cultural organizations, terms the
44 Jandura, Olaf: Kleinparteien in der Mediendemokratie, p. 61
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paper 'the flagship of a social-liberal and culturally interested bourgeoisie'.45 
   BILD is a supra-regional daily tabloid,  and is generally considered as the 'newspaper of the
common man'.46 The tabloid claims to speak for the average citizen in advocating 'common sense'
politics,  and  has  traditionally  head  political  leanings  towards  the  CDU and other  conservative
groups.47 While  mostly being  ignored  by intellectuals,  it  is  for  the  popularity  among  common
people that it is considered to be a powerful discourse-leader and opinion-shaper.
    Berliner Zeitung - only circulating in Berlin and the neighboring federal sate Brandenburg - is
chosen because of the local connection to the Freedom Party. In fact, the party was founded in
Berlin and took its first noticeable steps into the public eye in the context of the municipal elections
in Berlin in autumn 2011. As a result, a more detailed media coverage on the Freedom Party by
Berlin´s leading local newspaper can be expected. 
    However, the actual articles I will make use of have partly been published in the printed versions
of these newspapers and journals, and have been added to the digital archives afterwards. Partly,
they have been published online right away. Due to the growing significance of the internet and the
decline of printed editions, I rest my study on digital sources. 
    The actual research process for the sources provided by each newspapers was quite simple: I used
to  internal  search  function  on  each  newspaper's  website.  Given  that  the  German  name of  the
Freedom  Party  'Die  Freiheit'  (simply  meaning  'freedom'  in  German)  is  very  ambiguous  and
disadvantageous for such an online-search, I have typed in the name of the two party leaders the
Freedom  Party  has  had  for  time  period  under  investigation,  René  Stadtkewitz  and  Michael
Stürzenberger.   
    I determined the time frame from July 2010 (when Stadtkewitz was expelled from the CDU) until
November 2013 (when Stadtkewitz appealed to his party members to join the AfD). The Freedom
Party got founded on 27th October 2010, yet I started looking for relevant articles from July onward
already because  Stadtkewitz's  exclusion  from the  CDU is  an  important  prologue  to  the  actual
foundation of the Freedom Party, and news coverage on his persona at that time is highly likely to
reflect his political agenda already – which, in turn, will result in a certain branding of him as a
political actor even before the Freedom Party is officially founded. I went through all the articles
that the internal search brought up, and analyzed them in-depth. Those were  44 articles in total. 
45 Goethe-Institut: Tageszeitungen in Deutschland.
      http://www.goethe.de/wis/med/prj/dzz/tag/sz/deindex.htm, last accessed on 17.3. 2015
46 Brocchi, Davide: 'Die Presse in Deutschland', In: Cultura 21, published on 6.12. 2008. 
http://magazin.cultura21.de/kultur/wissen/die-presse-in-deutschland.html, last accessed on 30.1. 2014
47 Conradt, David P: The German polity. p.66
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     For the sake of clarity, my analysis of the media portrayal of the Freedom Party is divided into
four  sub-chapters,  with  each  of  the  chosen  newspapers/  journals  occupying  one  chapter.
Furthermore, I will translate the headlines of the articles directly into English (the German original
is to be found in the footnotes), and present them in a chart before going into analyzing the content.
     What is more, I have decided to divide the duration news-coverage into four analytic
phases– again for the sake of clarity, and to master the sheet amount of source material better. The
first phase is the 'foundation phase' of the Freedom Party (including the aforementioned 'prologue'
of Stadtkewitz's exclusion from the CDU). It roughly covers the time from July 2010 until February
2011. The second phase, starting of from March 2011, I call the 'consolidation phase', which lasts
until  August  2011.  The  third  phase  is  the  'electoral  campaign for the  municipal  election  in
Berlin' – the first election the Freedom Party ever partook in, which lasts throughout September
2011. The final phase is what I call  'disintegration and radicalization phase' which starts from
October 2011 and stretches until November 2013.
      Admittedly, the way I marked these phases is subjective, yet it serves the purpose of this study
perfectly in enabling me to give a more structured account on the media coverage on the party for a
duration of three years.
    The selection of the media is based on the ambition to give a balanced picture of the news-
coverage  on  the  Freedom  Party.  By  including  publications  in  different  formats,  with  various
political orientations and target groups, this goal is most likely to be achieved. Moreover, all the
chosen media have a wide circulation in common, and can safely be considered to play a prominent
role in shaping public opinion in Germany. Ultimately, the objective of my study rests upon the
conviction that the media acts as the '4th power' in any liberal-democratic state with a free press –
various solid justifications for that approach will be displayed in the following sub-chapter 1.4. 
    The methodology for finding answers to my research question is quite simple: I am conducting a
critical source reading, a critical content analysis on the digital articles on the Freedom Party.
    I am not going to analyze these articles by applying two different analytic frameworks to the
sources.  First  of  all,  my view is  already guided  by a  thesis  of  Frank Decker ('For obvious
historical reasons – 'Hitler's shadow' – The German media has acquired 'anti-fascist-reflexes'
that turn out in disfavor for new right-wing parties'). Most importantly, I approach the sources
with the question in mind whether there is bias towards the Freedom Party, and if 'anti-fascist-
reflexes' can be identified in those articles through, for instance, taken an openly critical stance
on the party, or by using a false terminology for describing and labeling it. 
26
   Hence,  I  try  to  find  out  about  the  role  of  (politicized)  media  discourse  in  reproducing
sociopolitical  dominance.  In  this  particular  case it  is  the possible  sociopolitical  dominance that
critical  attitudes  among  leading  news  publications  in  Germany  are  holding  over  supposedly
nationalist-conservative groups. Is there an unequal relation of power between those two groups to
be  discovered?  Has  the  German  media  played  an  active  political  part  in  suppressing  and
marginalizing right-wing groups with an anti-immigration and anti-Islam-agenda? 
    Instrumental in testing Decker's thesis is an analytic framework that  Teun A. van Dijk has
developed in order to dismantle bias in media publications: The ideological square.
    Van Dijk outlines his approach in greater detail in the chapter 'Opinions and ideologies in the
press'  in  'Approaches to media discourse'  by Allan Bell  and Peter Garrett (ed.).48 One of van
Dijk's basic assumptions is that ideologies in general should not be seen as wrong or right, but as a
tool to promote the interest of a particular group – according to van Dijk, this is their main social
function.49 Nonetheless, the social and political actors that hold on to a particular ideology of course
do believe  it  is  right  and true;  for  ideologies  represent  the  basic  principles  that  govern  social
judgment of individuals and groups.50 As a consequence of the dichotomy right/wrong and true/false
that is tied to every group ideology per definition, many of those involve the representation of Self
and Others, Us and Them.51 
   This representation is often polarized – We are good, they are bad – especially when conflicting
interests are involved. Given that journalists also serve as the 'watchdog of society' (van Dijk)52,
they  are  necessarily  ideological  and  juxtaposed  to  those  movements  they  see  as  potentially
dangerous to their idea of a 'good society' – they are not mere observers, but political actors (more
about that in the next chapter 1.4). In any case, van Dijk continues, ideology is usually expressed
indirectly in (media) discourse, yet the personal opinion/ judgment of the journalist will impact the
semantics.53
   Van  Dijk  mentions  various  semantics  one  can  look  into  in  order  to  dismantle  ideological
connotations in media portal.  However,  due to the sheer amount of primary sources (44 online
articles and news pieces altogether in the main analysis), I have decided to focus on analyzing only
four major elements:
48 Bell, Allan; Garrett, Peter (ed.): Approaches to media discourse, New Jersey, 1998. 
49 Ibid, p. 24
50 Ibid, p. 24ff
51 Ibid, p. 25
52 Ibid, p. 25
53 Ibid, p. 27
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1. Relevance – How much newsworthiness is a phenomenon granted?
Obviously, the amount of articles composed on the Freedom Party does already indicate in how far
a particular media portal is willing to deal with them in the first place.
2. Surface structures  –  headlines, leads of news reports might emphasize negative semantics to
describe a phenomenon/ group.
How are the articles and news pieces reporting on the Freedom Party entitled?
3. Lexical items -  Terms that express values and norms for the sake of a value judgment; e.g.
'terrorist', 'racist'
The analysis of lexical items is of major importance, for they are the primary tool and most explicit
way of branding, labeling and possibly even stigmatizing a political group.
4.  Strategy of polarization/ 'the ideological square'
            I Emphasize our good properties/ actions
            II Emphasize their bad properties/ actions
            III Mitigate our bad properties/ actions
            IV Mitigate their good properties/ actions
   This approach comes down to the question of balanced, fair news coverage. Are the news pieces
composed  in  such  a  fashion,  or  is  the  party  rather  the  despicable  'them',  whose  negative
characteristics and aspects are highlighted in a disproportional manner?
   Since a journalist's emphasis of the us in the ideological square is not to be expected in the news
coverage on the Freedom Party (see chapter 1.4 for more details), I will focus on the portrayal of the
Freedom Party as THEM with the guiding question: Are they portrayed according to van Dijk's
ideological  square  (negative  features  highlighted,  positive  ones  downplayed)  and  is  there  a
significant usage of the rhetoric ploys which were outlined above in order to tackle the Freedom
Party –'THEM' in this concept -- from the perspective of ideological opposition?
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1.5  The  media – a political actor in its own right
    My media-centered approach can be justified on many levels. First, it is noteworthy that publicity
has always belonged to the preconditions of politics. The relatively recently coined term 'media
democracy' and the fact that both political science and communication studies have similar roots
support  that  argument  on  the  semantic  and  respectively  historical  level.54 Indeed,  the  political
relevance of the mainstream media is indisputable and has its roots cause in its fundamental purpose
of informing the public. As Niklas Luhmann put it: 'What we know about society, yes, the world we
live in, we know through the mass media.'55
    Von Alemann and Marschall  point out that the role  of the media exceeds the one of mere
informing purposes – in fact, they are political actors on their own and carry out power in their own
right.56 This is especially so as mass media are the link between the information-seeking public on
the one hand and the parties on the other. In practical terms this gets executed through the media´s
portrayal  of  the  political  scenery,  and,  most  importantly  through  the  way it  is  interpreted  and
commented on. The major significance of the media in shaping a party preference among the public
is also closely tied to the fact that there is relatively little direct contact between the parties and its
potential electorate. 
    As Jandura notes, parties have no claim to a favorable news coverage in Germany. Nonetheless,
both democracy theory and the Basic Law suggest that citizens have a claim to truthful, diverse
and balanced news coverage.  Furthermore,  there is  a right to equality,  which means that  all
political opinions have a similar right to publication, and that these different opinions are
treated  equally  and  fairly  by  the  media.  Finally,  media  coverage  is  supposed  to  be  free  of
economic or political interference.57 
    Non-partisanship is generally claimed by the German media, a certain political orientation of the
editorial staff can, however, easily be identified in various national newspapers.58 This might in
extreme cases lead to the distortion of a party´s image, especially if several major news publications
'join forces' against a party they are not in favor of. 
    Brettschneider remarks that the effect of influencing political opinions among the readership is
54 Von Alemann, Ulrich; Marschall, Stefan (ed.): Parteien in der Mediendemokratie, p.15
55 Ibid, p. 17
56 Ibid, p. 17
57 Jandura, Olaf: Kleinparteien in der Mediendemokratie, p. 42
58 Brocchi, Davide: 'Die Presse in Deutschland', in: Cultura 21 Webmagazin, published on 6.12 2008 
http://magazin.cultura21.de/kultur/wissen/die-presse-in-deutschland.html, last accessed on 13.1. 2015
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most likely to occur when many different news publications cover a political phenomenon or a
party  in  a  similar  fashion.  He  compares  that  impact  with  the  mind-numbing  efficiency  of
propaganda in totalitarian states.59 Moreover, Brettschneider seeks to explain the persuasive effect
of consonant media coverage on a party. He does so by pointing out that under such circumstances
people can hardly inform themselves about competing views.60 
    In any case, media coverage has a huge impact on the party preference among the readership/
electorate, as Brettschneider argues. The way the media coverage is conducted –  its  amount,  its
tendency and its consonance – is fairly decisive for the political success of the parties in question.
In practical terms, one can say that the degree of mobilization of the electorate gets influenced by
the way of the mass media coverage is carried out. Hence, Decker's claim on the media's high
profile position in potentially 'blocking' new right-wing parties' way into the public is absolutely
justified – the power of the media can hardly be underestimated in that matter. This is exactly where
my study takes its relevance from.
2. THE GERMAN MAINSTREAM MEDIA: 'ANTI-FASCIST-REFLEXES' TOWARDS THE
FREEDOM PARTY?                                          
2.1 Prologue: The Freedom Party's party program – what kind of right-wing party is it?
        
    As indicated before, the Freedom Party was formed as a break-away-party of the CDU. René
Stadtkewitz, a CDU-member of many years, ended up founding the Freedom Party because he was
expelled from the CDU. This happened due to his rejection to turn down an invitation to the Dutch
right-wing populist and member of parliament Geert Wilders (PVV/ Dutch Freedom Party). Upon
the  controversy  of  inviting  Wilders  to  Berlin  in  order  to  have  an  open  debate  on  Islam  and
integration, Stadtkewitz commented that the CDU is 'lacking the courage' to tackle that discussion
for real. In Stadtkewitz´ reading, the Islam as such is an 'obstacle to successful integration into the
German society'.
     With regard to the initial ideological positioning of, the political and mental climate the Freedom
Party has been founded it,  it  is safe to say that this party has  not  emerged from the right-wing
extremist end of the political spectrum, but the bourgeois-conservative one. The leadership-troika of
the early days - that declared the formation of the Freedom Party – consisted of the aforementioned
59 Von Alemann, Ulrich; Marschall, Stefan (ed.): Parteien in der Mediendemokratie, p. 61
60 Ibid, p. 61
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René Stadtkewitz, fellow-ex-CDU member Marc Doll and ex-Pirate Party-member Aaron König.
Upon the declaration of the formation of the new party, Stadtkewitz even explicitly said that he
wants to keep right-wing extremists at bay: Whoever applied for membership should confirm that
they have not been members of a right-wing extremist party61. 
     In addition to that, he made clear that the Freedom Party should be firmly rooted on the grounds
of the Basic Law62, and promote a 'healthy' relationship with the German nation; hence, a patriotic
attitude. When Stadtkewitz announced the formation of the Freedom Party, he pointed out that the
party´s primary political  concerns would be immigration and particularly Islam, public security,
family policies, social and economic policies. Without having issued an official party program yet,
demands such as the introduction of all-German plebiscites (designed after the Swiss example), a
halt  of  continuous immigration and a  zero-tolerance-policy towards criminals  were voiced.63 In
quite  a  typical  populist-fashion,  Stadtkewitz  instantly  claimed  that  the  established  parties  had
primarily made policies for minorities in recent years. The Freedom Party, on the contrary, would
make policies for the benefit of the majority.64  What does this declaration of intent entail for the
actual party program then?65
61  Beikler, Sabine; van Bebber, Werner: 'CDU bekommt Konkurrenz von Stadtkewitz'. In: tagesspiegel.de, published 
on 8.9. 2010, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/ex-parteifreund-will-partei-gruenden-cdu-bekommt-konkurrenz-
von-stadtkewitz/1929146.html, last accessed on 30.1.2014
62  The Basic Law is the German constitution. After World War II and upon the division of Germany, it was only 
designed as a temporary constitution for the old Federal Republic, hence the uncommon term
63  'Neue Partei Die Freiheit in Berlin gegrundet.' In: tagesspiegel.de, published on 29.10.2010, last accessed on 19.1. 
2015
64  Beikler, Sabine; van Bebber, Werner: 'CDU bekommt Konkurrenz von Stadtkewitz'. In: tagesspiegel.de, published 
on 8.9. 2010, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/ex-parteifreund-will-partei-gruenden-cdu-bekommt-konkurrenz-
von-stadtkewitz/1929146.html, last accessed on 30.1.2014
65 The version of the party program which is outlined in greatest detail on the party's homepage is the 'party program 
2.0', which was implemented on 23./24.2. 2013. Admittedly, this is long after the time frame of my study, and might 
thereby imply some logical problems when using it as a reference and 'compass' for the Freedom Party's ideological 
orientation between 2010 and 2013. Then again, I have examined the 'political guidelines' on the Freedom Party-
website's archives (starting from September 2010) thoroughly, and those are in perfect harmony with the updated 
party program. There is no indication that core points of the party program have changed significantly over time – 
no 'ideological turn' appears to have taken place. On the contrary, the declarations of intent of Freedom Party-
founder René Stadtkewitz on what the party's agenda shall be like, back in September 2010, the rudimentary extracts
of a party program 1.0 from 29.10. 2010 that are publicly visible, the 'timeless' political guidelines on the website 
(that originate from the foundation phase of the party) and the 'party program 2.0' from February 2013 are 
essentially converging. Therefore it is my personal assessment as a researcher that the current, updated program 
does give a valid image of the Freedom Party's political agenda even back in autumn 2010. The information 
accessible in the digital archives of the Freedom Party's homepage that cover the time period of my study do support
my argument. 
      Political guidelines (from autumn 2010): http://diefreiheit.org/home/wofur-wir-stehen/
                                                                        http://diefreiheit.org/home/politische-leitsatze/, last accessed on 26.3. 2015
      Party program 2.0 (February 2013): http://diefreiheit.org/home/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Grundsatzprogramm-
2.o-Endversion-1.pdf, last accessed on 26.3. 2015
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a) Restrictive immigration policies  
    The party calls for an immediate halt of immigration, as immigration, 'especially from Islamic
countries', has led to countless problems that have to be solved first before more immigration can
take place. Effectively, the Freedom Party wants to close German borders to immigrants, and even
asylum-seekers shall be treated firmly: If they do not submit documents that verifies the rightfulness
of their status, they shall not be granted asylum. On top of that critical, not to say hostile stand that
the party takes against immigrants (particularly from Islamic countries), the Freedom Party wants to
examine the economic usefulness of the various immigrant groups – periodically, studies on that
matter shall be undertaken and published. 
    The radically hostile attitude towards immigration expressed by the party definitely qualifies
them as a right-wing populist political group. It is obvious that immigrants shall serve as scapegoats
and the 'unwelcome Other'. Humanitarian aspects towards asylum-seekers get subordinated under
the idea that immigrants of any kind are rather a burden to Germany than an enrichment. Judging
immigrants  primarily  by  their  economic  use  leads  to  an  unwelcoming  atmosphere;  if  those
immigrants do not turn out to be 'worthy' of the standards proposed by the Freedom Party, Germany
should get rid of them. 
    Consequently, the Freedom Party wants to set the obstacles for immigration as high as possible –
state funding for immigration shall be abolished completely, and those who migrate into Germany
are  supposed  to  fund that  step  all  by themselves.  By that,  the  Freedom Party  wants  to  lower
Germany´s attraction for immigration significantly. 
b) A dynamic model of citizenship on the grounds of cultural assimilation
However, despite their clear favor of a dominant domestic German culture ('Leitkultur'), the party
does  not  express  any racist  views.  In  contrast  to  Nazi-parties,  the  Freedom Party  accepts  the
possibility of foreigners becoming German citizens. 
    The condition for that, however, is a 'successful assimilation' – only after 10 years immigrants
shall be able to apply for German citizenship. 'The economic, mental and cultural adjustment to the
basics of German society' is what the Freedom Party considers as a 'successful assimilation'; and
that means no less than essentially giving up the former identity that ties the immigrant emotionally
and culturally to his/her homeland. So even if there is no racist element in the anti-immigration
agenda of the Freedom Party, a firm rejection of the idea of multiculturalism can be dismantled. 
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    The term 'multiculturalism' largely covers that migrants are welcome to maintain their distinct
cultural backgrounds and habits while adhering to a common constitution and coexisting peacefully
with the 'majority culture'. The idea of multiculturalism is an egalitarian figure of thought that is
juxtaposed to the nationalist-minded model of a strong domestic culture that the immigrants have to
subordinate themselves under. It is safe to say that the concept of a strong domestic culture implies
a superiority of this culture over the immigrants´ culture – in that sense, it is combating the idea of
cultural relativism (the conviction that all cultures are of equal value). 
     Still, if one measures the Freedom Party´s take on 'successful assimilation' against the backdrop
of fascist ideology, the party appears as modern and liberal in that regard. As I mentioned earlier,
the question of how becoming a part of the nation is dealt with, can mark right-wing populists
further off from fascist ideas – if the identity-concept is viewed as a dynamic one. No foreigner is
doomed then to remain outside of the 'community of fate' that is the German people in right-wing
reading. In that sense, the identity-question, one of the central characteristics of right-wing groups is
rather dynamic, modern and liberal, and by no means determinate, discriminating and exclusive as
in fascist ideology.
 
c)  Anti-Islamic policies
    In  any case,  the labeling of  the Freedom Party as  an 'Anti-Islam-Party'  is  justifiable  when
examining the point 'Political Islam'. The Freedom Party claims to have 'the knowledge' that Islam
is 'not only a religion', but mainly 'a political ideology'. This claim covers Islam as a whole – and is
in  accordance with Geert Wilders´ portrayal of the religion as a demonic monolith. 
    The Freedom Party expresses the general suspicion that mosques do not only serve religious
purposes  but  rather  encourage  Muslims  to  remain  among  one  another,  in  so-called  'parallel
societies', that are a tremendous obstacle of integration. Moreover, Islamic organizations per se are
portrayed  as  breeding  grounds  for  enemies  of  the  Basic  Law and  liberal-democratic  societies.
Consequently, the Freedom Party calls for a thorough check of all active Islamic organizations in
Germany – to find out whether or not they adhere to the Basic Law. The implication of that claim is
that a significant number of those organizations is pursuing political goals that work against the
Basic Law. 
     Those who teach the Qur'an are supposed to declare under oath that the Basic Law overrules
Islamic  law (the  Sharia).  In  other  words,  the  Freedom Party  attempts  to  force  Islam into  the
spiritual-private sphere and subordinate certain implications of the religion as such under the Basic
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Law. 
    The general assumption is that the Qur'an and the Basic Law are incompatible. That leads to the
general  suspicion  that  pious  Muslims  who really  try to  live  by the  Qur'an  necessarily  have  to
disrespect the Basic Law. In other words: the Freedom Party portrays every Muslim as a potential
enemy of the constitution, and hence, of the status quo. This (unspoken) criminalization of Muslims
is in its basic implications an aggressive form of horizontal othering that is typical of right-wing
populism. It remains unclear why the Freedom Party chose to use the term 'Political Islam' as their
claims and suspicions cover Muslims in general. The hostility of the party is by no means only
limited to radical-fundamentalist preachers that incite political violence – it stretches over the whole
realm of Islamic belief and practice. Consequently, the party comes out in its true colors at the end
of the paragraph as it states that it does all it can do to object the 'Islamization of Germany'. The
latter is a common combat term in right-wing populist circles66, and is generally disregarded in the
center/left spectrum of politics. In other words: No serious established politician in Germany would
make use of such an offensive and colored expression. 
d) EU-skepticism
     A further clearly right-wing populist view is expressed in the section 'Europe and international
relations': EU-criticism. The party claims that the European Union is flawed by a lack of democratic
legitimization.  As an  appropriate  response to  that,  national  plebiscites  shall  be held  that  allow
Germany to take back legislative powers on to the national level. Any kind of financial support for
EU-member  states  in  economic  crisis  shall  be  undone,  and  ultimately  the  currency  shall  be
abolished. The Freedom Party suggests that either a North-South division of the currency shall be
introduced (in accordance with the economic conditions of the EU-member states in question) or a
return to national currencies shall be prepared. The objection to an ongoing European integration
(or, standardization, as critics would claim) in economic, legal and political terms is in accordance
with the patriotic/ nationalistic world-view of the party . In fact, there is an ideological cohesion in
the Freedom Party´s agenda identifiable, and that cohesion can easily pass as 'right-wing populist'.
     All in all, there is no doubt that the Freedom Party does pass as a representative of the modern
right-wing populist party family. With plainly  populist claims (more  direct democracy, making
policies for the silent majority), aggressive horizontal and vertical Othering against (supposedly
burdensome) immigrants and the European Union, the general  criminalization of Muslims, the
party's attempt of presenting itself as a moderate liberal-democratic one is lacking credibility.     
66 Von Drach; Markus C. Schulte: 'Islamisierung ist ein ideologischer Kampfbegriff', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on
22.12. 2014, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sechs-fragen-zu-pegida-islamisierung-ist-ein-ideologischer-
kampfbegriff-1.2275618, last accessed on 17.3. 2015
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e) Explicit distancing from right-wing extremist groups
    Still, the party tries hard to present itself as a modern political actor whose primary concern is to
defend individual freedoms, hence the party name. The Freedom Party's political program does not
allow anyone to label them as fascist or right-wing extremist. Whenever the kinship of right-wing
populism and fascism comes into play, the makers of the program tried to mark their party off
from 'Hitler´s shadow'. 
    They did so not only by rejecting chauvinist notions of nationalism, but also by highlighting a
dynamic, modern concept of citizenship and national identity that is not determinate by blood and
birth.  The most  explicit  attempt  to  step out  of  the  'historically  contaminated  environment',  the
Freedom Party tied to the matter of Antisemitism. 
    Whereas the NPD and DVU are/ were explicitly anti-Semitic, the Freedom Party pledges itself
explicitly to Israel, which they call 'the only democracy in the middle-East'. Israel is regarded as an
'outpost of the Western world and culture in the Arabic sphere of influence', and shall therefore be
supported  at  all  costs.  Even  a  NATO-membership  of  Israel  is  favored  by the  Freedom Party.
However, the explicit pro-Israel-sentiment is closely tied to the idea that Israel and the West face a
common enemy: The expansionist Islamic culture. 
     In that sense, it is questionable whether or not the Freedom Party is a genuinely pro-Semitic
movement or simply using 'brotherhood' with Israel to both legitimize its own anti-Islam-agenda
and keep sympathizers from Nazi-circles at bay. In fact, a firm pledge to Israel gives the party the
tools to invalidate theories claiming that they are a fascist/ Nazi-movement.
    In any case, the examination of the party program allow us the following conclusions:  The
Freedom Party is a stereotypical modern right-wing populist party. We need to acknowledge
certain links between right-wing populist psychology and the figures of thought making up
the core of fascism; let alone, these ties belong to the realm of political theory. The explicit
democratic acceptability of a contemporary right-wing party can be measured against how it deals
with those elements of its ideology that one might locate in the ideological gray zone bordering
fascism. And in that case, the Freedom Party has explicitly stated various views that are at odds
with traditional fascism.
     This has important consequences for the terminology that is adequate and 'fair' in describing the
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Freedom Party in media accounts.  After investigating key features of the party program, it is
apparent that certain tags that are part of the political-ideological gray zone between right-
wing populism and right-wing extremism cannot be used anymore.
    To clarify in which mindset I will approach the media sources in the next chapter, I will outline
three different rhetoric levels in which right-wing populist parties commonly get framed in public
discourse.
     1. The neutral-descriptive level 
The terms that are covered by the analytic evidence from the primary source of the party-program
are the following:
   Right-wing populist party; right-wing party; Anti-Islam-party; Islam-critical party; protest-
party; Islam-opponents; enemies of Islam
   For the sake of clarity, I will visualize all those analyzed articles that fit into this category in a
green space in the summarizing charts at the end of each chapter.
    2. The slightly tendentious level
   There are other typical tags that get used in debates on right-wing populism which I count to a
'gray zone', meaning that they imply a critical stance on modern right-wing populist parties (they
are tendentious), yet they are still based on what is actually to be found in the party program, only
in an 'amplified interpretation' (e.g. through emphasizing unpleasant emotions like 'fear' or 'hatred'): 
      Islamophobia/ Islamophobes, Islam-haters,
     This one will be portrayed in yellow in my summarizing charts.   
    
     3. The clearly biased level of open ideological opposition & reader-interference
    Finally, there is a level where the analytic work of scholars such as Lewandowsky and Decker
gets undone, because essentially all conservative-nationalistic parties right of the political center get
painted with the same brush. It can happen that stereotypical modern right-wing populist parties as
the Freedom Party get branded as something they are not. In other words: 'Right-wing' as such is a
contaminated term in those accounts, and the 'anti-fascist reflexes' are at full play:
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      Right-wing extremist party, fascist party, Nazi-party, 'brown' party, racists
      This one will be portrayed in magenta in my summarizing charts. 
   However,  these  three  ideal  types  give  me  conceptual  and  rhetoric  orientation  when
examining the primary sources of the media publications I have chosen – and closely follow
Lewandowsky's and Decker's differentiation between modern right-wing populism and traditional
right-wing extremism. 
    
2.2 Süddeutsche Zeitung  
    Süddeutsche Zeitung's website, named sueddeutsche.de, contains twenty-one relevant articles on
the Freedom Party.  The chart below displays them in a compact fashion:
Chart 2: The articles  by  Süddeutsche Zeitung on the Freedom Party within the time frame of
my study
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radicalization phase
    What is striking immediately in the news-coverage of Süddeutsche Zeitung is that there is a
strong focus on both the foundation and the disintegration phase of the Freedom Party, with next to
no material  on the consolidation phase and the party's  first  public election campaign in Berlin.
Interestingly, the archives are not listing a single article or news piece on the party throughout the
entire year 2012. The focus of the newspaper can be displayed as follows: 
Chart 3: Distribution of articles by Süddeutsche Zeitung according to my analytic phases    
Articles in total    Foundation phase    Consolidation phase    Berlin election   Disintegration phase
21 8 (38%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 11 (52%)
  
   Before even going into a deeper analysis, it is already apparent that twenty-one articles on a
political phenomenon/ a party in roughly forty months is not an exactly large amount. In statistical
terms,  and  on  the  average,  every  other  month  the  Freedom Party was  granted  the  status  of  a
newsworthy phenomenon by the editorial staff of  Süddeutsche Zeitung. Hence, if we examine this
particular newspaper's approach to the Freedom Party in mere quantitative terms first, then it is safe
to say that the party did not get a considerably large media exposure during the time-frame of my
research. Then again, in all fairness, we must be reminded that parties in Germany do not have a
claim  to  either  a  particularly  large  or  favorable  news  coverage.  In  other  words:  Simply
acknowledging that a new party has not passed the filter of relevance for the editorial staff of a
particular  newspaper,  does  not  allow  us  any  conclusions  as  to  whether  the  newspaper  is
ideologically opposed to the party in question – and therefore installs a 'Media embargo' on them –
or simply considers the party irrelevant.
    It must be noted though, that in van Dijk's analytic framework of the ideological square, the
concept of 'relevance' is counted as one aspect of the ideological positioning of a given newspaper
to a societal or political phenomenon. To put it differently: For van Dijk, a low news coverage on a
party indicates a rather negative attitude among the editorial staff towards it.
     More important is, however, the actual rhetoric that has been applied in the articles that did take
the Freedom Party as a subject, as well as the themes that were tied to it. Hence, we move from the
quantitative aspect of Süddeutsche Zeitung's news coverage on the Freedom Party to the qualitative
one. Three means especially that are drawn from van Dijk's analytic toolkit are key in identifying
the positive/neutral/negative approaches in the articles: The  surface structures (=headlines), the
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lexical items that are in use (as what does the party get described/ labeled?) and the degree to which
negative qualities of the party are pointed out or emphasized (the ideological square).
2.2.1 The portrayal  of  the Freedom Party during the foundation phase (July  2010-March
2011)
     The eight articles that  Süddeutsche Zeitung published during the foundation phase of the party
vary quite a bit in terms of their stance on the party. Some are openly critical, some are perfectly
neutral  and informative,  and some apply an ideological  opposition to Stadtkewitz's  anti-Islamic
political ideas in a rather subtle fashion.
       Two articles by Constanze von Buillon (Right-wing populism: Geert Wilders divides Berlin´s
CDU' and 'Berlin CDU expels member of parliament) serve as an example of the latter. 
     Both of her accounts take the exclusion of Freedom-Party-founder René Stadtkewitz from the
CDU as a subject, which happened due to his determination to invite Geert Wilders for a plenary
discussion in Berlin. Von Bouillon describes the conflict of interest between Stadtkewitz and the
CDU in an objective fashion,  but  it  is  noteworthy that  no statement  of  Stadtkewitz  himself  is
mentioned.  Only  criticism  of  CDU-local  leader  Henkel  and  representatives  of  SPD  (Social
Democrats) and DIE LINKE (Socialists) is displayed, which suggests that the invitation for Wilders
was unacceptable.67 
     In her second article von Buillon mentions that Stadtkewitz had already previously caused the
CDU trouble' by demonstrating against the building of a new mosque in his home district in Berlin,
alongside  the  right-wing  extremist  NPD.68 This  implies  that  Stadtkewitz  has  rightfully  been
expelled, for his political convictions are partly overlapping with those of the NPD.  
     Even though von Buillon applies neutral surface structures in her two articles on Stadtkewitz's
exclusion, and the the lexical items ('right-wing populism') for covering the case are accurate, one
can argue that she does indicate Stadtkewitz's supposedly 'bad qualities' by linking one of his former
political actions to a like-minded campaign of the NPD. In a subtle manner, the ideological square
(linking the opponent to something bad = the NPD) is, however, inherent in her articles. 
     An example of a perfectly neutral account of the very same subject, published by the same
67 Buillon, Constanze von: 'Geert Wilders entzweit Berliner CDU'. In: sueddeutsche.de, published on 23.7. 2010. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/rechtspopulismus-geert-wilders-entzweit-die-berliner-cdu-1.978523, last 
accessed on 14.1. 2015
68  Buillon, Constanze von: 'Berliner CDU wirft Abgeordneten raus'. In: sueddeutsche.de, published on 27.7. 2010 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/reaktion-auf-wilders-einladung-berliner-cdu-wirft-abgeordneten-raus-1.980114, 
last accessed on 14.1. 2015
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newspaper, is an article by F. Fuchs and M. Kolb ('Between Geert Wilders and Martin Luther'). The
two authors leave it to the reader to come up with his own stance on an Anti-Islamic attitude in
general, for they only explain the context of the conflict of interest between Stadtkewitz an the
CDU.  Introducing  Wilders  as  the  'enfant  terrible  of  Dutch  politics',  they  explain  why  his
uncompromising  Anti-Islamism  has  alienated  the  CDU.  The  authors  shed  some  light  on
Stadtkewitz's  attitudes,  and quote  his  statement  that  he would  like  an  'Islamic  Reformation'  to
happen, but that Muslims are responsible for that themselves.69 That particular article sheds light on
both  parties  involved  in  the  conflict,  and  does  so  in  an  informative,  neutral  manner,  so  the
ideological square cannot be applied to this article. This, however, remains an exception in terms of
how the articles published on the website of Süddeutsche Zeitung, have approached Stadtkewitz and
the his new party until the end of the year.
      An increasingly negative tone and more openly displayed criticism of Stadtkewitz's alignment
with Wilders, and his anti-Islamic agenda was to follow throughout the following months.
    The actual reason for Stadtkewitz's exclusion from the CDU, his invitation for Wilders, resulted
in an event centered around a speech by the Dutch Islam-opponent. The article which covers this
controversial  happening  ('Inflammatory  speech  in  Berlin')  displays  criticism from parts  of  the
German government (Minister of Defense, Minister of Justice) who essentially claim that Wilders is
a 'dubious politician who attacks the integration policies in Germany'. Nonetheless, both opponents
of  Wilders  and  Wilders  himself  are  quoted,  so  a  balanced  coverage  on  the  event  is  given.
Nonetheless, the title of the article indicates a condemnation of Wilders' speech – as a consequence,
Stadtkewitz's political ideas – that are fairly close to Wilders's - get openly opposed once again.70
Jan Bielicki,  who attended the event,  mentions its  initiator,  René Stadtkewitz,  only briefly,  and
focuses his account fully on Wilders. However, Stadtkewitz's goal to form the German Freedom
Party  is  already covered  in  the  article.71 Even  though  Bielicki  correctly  speaks  of  'right-wing
populists' all the time, and thereby labels the recruitment pool for the nascent Freedom Party with
correct lexical items, a negative tone prevails. Not only does he highlight the negative features of
Wilders and his sympathizers by referencing established politicians' criticism of their agenda, also
does he brand the speech as 'inflammatory' in the headline.  This strong negative moral judgment is
69  Fuchs, F; Kolb, M: 'Zwischen Geert Wilders und Martin Luther', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 23.7. 2010 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/cdu-berlin-rene-stadtkewitz-zwischen-wilders-und-luther-1.978765, last 
accessed on 14.1. 2015 
70 'Hetzrede in Berlin', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 2.10. 2010 
       http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/geert-wilders-auf-deutschlandbesuch-hetzrede-in-einem-berliner-hotel-
1.1007501, last accessed on 14.1. 2015
71  Bielicki, Jan: 'Geert, du bist mein Held!', in: suddeutsche.de, published on 3.10. 2010 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/islamkritiker-wilders-auf-berlin-besuch-geert-du-bist-mein-held-1.1007543, last 
accessed on 14.1. 2015 
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the  first  the  reader  encounters  regarding  Wilders  and  Stadtkewitz,  and hence,  the  logic  of  the
ideological square is clearly at play here. 
  A similarly critical article on Wilders and Stadtkewitz,  'The international of hatred'   by Thomas
Kirchner,  was published two weeks before that and rounds up the initially critical,  partly even
openly hostile stance on Stadtkewitz and his sympathizers, that would soon make up the core of the
Freedom Party. In this piece, the not-yet-founded Freedom Party is mentioned as a nascent political
party that is addressing 'Islam-haters', who until that point had only channeled their anti-Islamic
sentiments  through  discussions  in  internet-forums.72 This  way,  the  legitimacy  of  the  party  is
fundamentally called into doubt by the author. 
   It is obvious, that until this point the majority of the articles which did take Stadtkewitz and his
plans to form a new political party as a subject, are rather critical, and very much in line with van
Dijk's logic of the ideological square. At this point it must be noted that at no point any of these
articles tied the foundation of the party as a response to the 'Sarrazin-Debate', and, hence, as a result
of  a  current  discourse  in  the  German society.  By not  pointing  out  this  causal  connection,  one
possible aspect that could generate more interest from readers, or attach more relevance to the party,
was left out.
     Nonetheless, the tone in the online articles of Süddeutsche Zeitung gets noticeably more neutral
in the following months.
     After the actual foundation of the Freedom Party on 27th October 2010, the party planned to hold
its first party congress in a language school in Berlin. With short notice, the principal of the school
had undone the agreement of letting the party use the facilities. As a result, the members of the
Freedom Party were forced to gather outdoors, where they were disturbed by background noise
caused by leftist counter-demonstrators.
    The article 'Homeless right-wing populists' covered this happening, and even though the turn of
events would have invited to apply some mockery in the report, the author chose not to.   However,
sueddeutsche.de itself is using neutral terminology on the Freedom Party in this article. In order to
describe  the  party´s  political  profile,  they  use  the  -  at  that  point  already  commonly  used  -
expressions 'new Islam-critical party' and 'right-wing populists.'73 Even though the headline of the
article contains a hint of irony (the party members are not literally 'homeless'), this article confirms
72  Kirchner, Thomas: 'Internationale des Hasses', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 15.9. 2010 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/islamfeinde-in-europa-und-den-usa-internationale-des-hasses-1.999936, last 
accessed on 14.1. 2015
73  'Obdachlose Rechtspopulisten', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 11.1. 2011 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/partei-die-freiheit-obdachlose-rechtspopulisten-1.1045138, last accessed on 
14.1. 2015
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the trend within the editorial staff of  Süddeutsche Zeitung to cover the Freedom Party in a rather
neutral, descriptive fashion.
    This trend is continued even within the first  proper in-depth article on Stadtkewitz and the
Freedom  Party  by   Süddeutsche  Zeitung:  'Geert  Wilders  light',  composed  by  Jan  Bielicki,  is
centered around the portrayal of René Stadtkewitz. 
    Stadtkewitz´s personal background is covered and individual attributes are highlighted by the
author. Bielicki's key assumption is that Stadtkewitz is unfit for the task of being a 'tribune of the
people'. Furthermore, he should not be considered as the 'German Geert Wilders' – mainly, because
he  is  averse  to  provocative  statements,  which  are  identity-establishing  for  the  controversial
Dutchman. Consequently, Bielicki does not tie Stadtkewitz to any kind of political extremism, but
mentions that the Freedom Party evokes constant negative response from leftist groups.
     Notwithstanding,  Bielicki portrays Stadtkewitz´s efforts to keep right-wing extremists at bay
and build an image of the Freedom Party being located in the political center. After attending a party
convention in a small town in the German federal state Hessen, the author describes a few of the
participants – hence, members and electorate of the Freedom Party – and portrays them as former
FDP- and CDU-members/ electorate, as much as 'frustrated non-voters'. 
     Hence, the author puts lesser emphasis on the right-wing/ nationalistic/ immigration-critical
aspects of the Freedom Party, but rather portrays them as a protest-party of the bourgeoisie-camp
that is averse to political extremism, and consequently presents itself as 'tame'.74 
    Arguably, this last article manifests a culmination point in a development from an initially rather
critical  attitude  towards  Stadtkewitz,  where  is  Anti-Islamic  agenda,  and  the  corresponding
alignment with Wilders are emphasized, to a more balanced one, that emphasizes the party's status
as a new protest party that reaches out for non-voters.
     As far as my first analytic phase, the 'foundation phase' (July 2010-February 2011) is concerned,
there is a 'normalization'  in the nature of  Süddeutsche Zeitung's articles on the Freedom Party
observable. Bielicki's in-depth-account is probably even so close to Stadtkewitz's self-image and the
idea  of  a  perfectly unproblematic,  democratic  reputation  of  the  Freedom Party,  that  one  might
criticize it as too uncritical. 
     However, after examining the first set of articles covering the foundation phase of the party, we
can complement parts of our initial chart as follows:
74  Bielicki, Jan: 'Geert Wilders light', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 1.2. 2011 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/anti-islam-partei-die-freiheit-geert-wilders-light-1.1053605, last accessed on 
14.1. 2015
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Chart 4: The applicability of van Dijk's 'Ideological square'/ strategy of negative polarization
in Süddeutsche Zeitung's articles on the Freedom Party during the foundation phase
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   In total, during the first seven months of René Stadtkewitz promoting his political agenda, and,
eventually founding the Freedom Party, five out of the eight articles investigated have a tendentious
or  negative  tone,  making  van  Dijk's  analytic  framework  of  the  ideological  square  perfectly
applicable.
    Nonetheless, it must be noted that quite a wide array of journalists composed articles on the
Freedom Party for  Süddeutsche Zeitung during that time period, which necessitated a varied range
of opinions – and resulted in a relatively incoherent image on the Freedom Party up to this point.
2.2.2  The  portrayal  of  the  Freedom  Party  during  the  consolidation  phase  (March  2011-
September 2011)
    During the time period that I dubbed 'consolidation phase' only one article is listed in the digital
archives of  Süddeutsche Zeitung. In fact, Kathrin Haimerl's article, 'Comeback of the agitators' was
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published  relatively shortly  after  the  terror  strikes  of  Oslo  and  Utoya,  executed  by right-wing
extremist Anders Breivik.
     Under the impression of these attacks, the author ties the Freedom Party's political profile to the
political convictions of Breivik. Haimerl does so by establishing a link between one of the guest
orators of an upcoming Freedom Party-convention in Berlin – Robert Spencer75 – and Breivik. The
Norwegian terrorist referenced Spencer's ideas in his manifest, that served as his justification of his
cold-blooded mass murder. This leads the author to the conclusion that there are basic similarities in
the political  mindset of Freedom Party-members and Breivik himself.  Executive board member
Felix  Strutting  however,  directly opposes  that  notion,  and seeks  to  portray Breivik  as  a  single
perpetrator, the author continues.
      Haimerl has a fundamentally critical stance on the Freedom Party, yet it is noteworthy, that he
most negative portrayal in the article concerns a competitor of the Freedom Party, the Cologne-
based right-wing party 'Pro Deutschland'. The author uses external authorities to discredit them.
Political  scientist  Richard Stöss  is  quoted  with  calling  'Pro Deutschland'  'right-wing extremism
light'. And yet, being labeled as somewhat of a lesser evil is not exactly beneficial for the Freedom
Party in this article. Political scientist Häusler states that both parties have one essential attitude in
common: hostility towards Muslims, which, in his terms, passes as a 'religiously covered racism'. In
that  sense,  both  the  Freedom Party  and  Pro  Deutschland  try  to  appear  as  'bourgeois  protest-
movements'. 
    Like Häusler, the author of the article essentially paints both parties with the same brush. As a
consequence, the Freedom Party, being mentioned in one breath with the 'right-wing extremist light'
Pro Deutschland and – through Robert  Spencer – indirectly being connected to mass murderer
Anders Breivik appears as 'a wolf in sheep´s clothing'. 
     The attempt of the party to portray itself as a moderate, conservative force in the political
center, is portrayed as a means of deception.  This negative judgment of Kathrin Hainerl gets
more weight through the references to external authorities on right-wing populism. Felix Strübing's
unwillingness to deal with Breivik´s deed is used against the party. This is done in so far as this
fairly ignorant attitude is portrayed as a missed chance to clarify ideological matters within the
party – at whose end a truly credible reputation of being a moderate protest-party could emerge.
Since the party is unwilling to get engaged in a self-critical discussion on a possible ideological
kinship with Breivik, this can be interpreted as the Freedom Party being 'found guilty on ideological
75 Spencer is a US American author and blogger running a website named jihadwatch.com. He does not differentiate 
between peaceful Muslims and religious fanatics, but rather regards Islam as a demonic monolith. On top of that, 




    All  in  all,  the  Freedom Party is  portrayed  as  a  political  group that  is  antidemocratic  and
dangerous at the core, and all the more so as they camouflage themselves as something they are not
– a respectable, democratic alternative to the CDU and FDP. In a sense, this makes the Freedom
Party come across as perfidious. Whereas, for instance, the NPD is openly nationalistic (to say the
least) and hostile to foreigners, the Freedom Party is portrayed as a deceiving, more subtle player in
the political arena – by representing something they do not openly admit. The true danger in that
would be that people end up sympathizing with and voting for a party who they would not support
if the party had come out in its true colors. In that sense, the article inherently claims an educational
purpose as its ambition is to 'warn' people about the – supposedly unacceptable, antidemocratic –
agendas of the Freedom Party and Pro Deutschland.76 
     As a consequence, it is safe to say that Haimerl's article is composed from an angle of fierce
ideological  opposition  to  the  Freedom Party.  The  entire  article  is  strongly  built  on  van  Dijk's
ideological square and aims at portraying the Freedom Party as an enemy of the 'good society'.
Certainly, relevance is granted to the party, yet this is done in the context of Breivik's terror attacks,
and this context necessarily gives the account a negative connotation.
Chart 5: The applicability of van Dijk's 'Ideological square'/ strategy of negative polarization
in Süddeutsche Zeitung's articles on the Freedom Party during the consolidation phase
           Headline                              Author                   Date of publication      Ideological opposition?
'Comeback of the
agitators'









     
   It is noteworthy, however, that Kathrin Haimerl is yet another 'new voice' within the editorial staff
76  Haimerl, Kathrin: 'Comeback der Hetzer', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 5.8. 2011 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/rechtspopulismus-in-deutschland-comeback-der-hetzer-1.1127643, last accessed
on 14.1. 2015 
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assigned to compose accounts on the Freedom Party. In that sense, one can conclude, that until this
point  there  has been no coherent picture of  the Freedom Party  that  has  been painted by
Süddeutsche Zeitung.  After  initially depicting Freedom-party-founder Stadtkewitz  as a 'trouble
maker' for the CDU who has some ideological convergence with the NPD, it then appeared as if a
'normalization',  hence,  a  more  balanced,  neutral  nature  of  the articles,  was on its  way.  On the
contrary, in this latter article's case – the most openly hostile so far – a contemporary event at the
time, a politically motivated right-wing terror strike by a single perpetrator, turned out to a 'game
changer' in terms of approaching the Freedom Party.
2.2.3 The portrayal of the Freedom Party during the Berlin electoral campaign (September
2011)
    The openly ideological opposition to the Freedom Party within the staff of Süddeutsche Zeitung
intensified during the electoral campaign for the municipal election in Berlin.
    The Freedom Party organized an event that can be termed as 'a party convention behind closed
doors', for the general public had to purchase pricey tickets in order to listen to several speeches of
like-minded guest orators, among them Geert Wilders.
     Thomas Denkler attended the event for Süddeutsche Zeitung and composed an article ( 'Lessons
for the 'finally-someone-speaks-up'-fraction') that continues on a similar note as Haimerl's previous
one.
     Denkler dismisses the nature of the event by summarizing it as  'dumb speeches, simple answers
to complex issues and many empty chairs in the hall'. What comes to framing the Freedom Party
itself for the reader who is unaware of its existence or does not know what it is all about, the author
finds not exactly flattering attributes. In fact, Denkler labels the Freedom Party as a 'small, gray
party'. He highlights this by contrasting its status sharply with that of its 'star guest' Wilders – who
holds a considerable amount of political  power in the Netherlands – at  that time his PVV was
tolerating a national-liberal minority government. The author states that Stadtkewitz wishes to copy
that success in Germany. Let alone, Stadtkewitz is 'no Wilders, but a small, gray man with minor
rhetoric skills, who used to be a backbencher'. Moreover, the attendants of the event get painted
with the same brush: 'Most of them are as gray as the party-leader.' 
    The motif of the 'wolves in sheep's clothing' that Haimerl has applied in her previous article,
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resurfaces  in  Denkler's  account  as  well.  In  fact,  he  draws  a  parallel  between  the  misleading
terminology that  the  former  German Democratic  Republic  (GDR) used to  describe  itself  (they
called themselves democratic, yet were a dictatorship) and and the one of the Freedom Party. On
that note, Denkler calls their official self-labeling 'citizen rights party' fundamentally into doubt.  
   Furthermore, he argues that the enthusiastic response that Wilders receives from the attendants is
reminiscent to 'the gatherings of cults'. Hence, a lack of seriousness and credibility of the party and
its electorate is implied.
  Given that  Stadtkewitz  crosses  the  blurry lines  between anti-Islamism and sheer  xenophobia
several times in his speech at the event, the author asks whether or not the Freedom Party and its
sympathizers are fascists, right-wing extremists or Nazis. This explicit question touches upon the
core of my study, and this author's conclusions are quite clear.
   The author remarks ironically that the Freedom Party's firm commitment to Israel and its cause
'should suffice' to clear up doubt on the party's democratic attitude. Clearly, the author´s doubts
remain.  Nonetheless,  Denkler  mentions  Stadtkewitz's  attacks  on  the  media  for  portraying  the
Freedom Party unfairly labeling (by labeling them as something they are not). 
   The climax of Denkler's doubts on the Freedom Party's democratic nature is reached by using a
statement that Wilders makes in his speech against the party. The Dutchman claims that the Western
culture is 'far superior to other cultures', and Denkler links this statement directly to the 'supremacy
fantasies' of the National Socialist ideology. 
    By making the border between Wilders and the Freedom Party on one hand, and committed Nazis
on  the  other,  fall  like  that,  the  author  prepares  one  final  verbal  attack:  He  claims  that  'This
movement wants to wipe out Islam in Europe'.
    This martial, violent choice of words (that has a fascist-connotation) clearly frames the Freedom
Party as a quasi-fascist group that tries to lead the public astray by building up a misleading image
of itself. All in all, Denkler makes his disapproval of the Freedom Party abundantly clear. He mixes
efforts  to  demonize  the  party  by comparing  one  specific  figure  of  thought  –  Western  cultural
supremacy – to the National Socialist  ideology, and thereby tries to answer the aforementioned
question whether or not the Freedom Party is at its core fascist group. 
   Moreover, the lack of charisma of the party's top candidate Stadtkewitz would create a further
obstacle for electoral success. As a result, the reader is left with the impression that the Freedom
Party is a 'small gray party' that essentially is 'a wolf in sheep's clothing'. The party is portrayed as
holding on to a cult mindset ('this Holy Mass of right-wing populists') which gets manifested in the
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leadership-principle  towards  and  'worship'  of  Wilders,  and  fascist-elements  as  much  as  dumb
xenophobia are plainly attached to the party. 
    Eventually, a reader who had previously been unaware of the party's existence is provided with
two profound reasons to dismiss it from his memory – for one, it is introduced as a quasi-fascist
group, and second of all, they are so 'gray' and marginal that they do not stand a chance in the
oncoming election  anyway.  Regardless  of  the  rather  neutral  surface  structure  of  the  article,  its
author's ideological opposition to the Freedom Party is obvious due to the aforementioned reasons.
Especially Denkler's linkage of the Freedom Party to fascist ideas and National socialist supremacy
fantasies dismantles that van Dijk's ideological square is at play here: the author highlights negative
features constantly, and successfully writes the party down. This journalist's mindset can be seen a
considerable obstacle for the party´s efforts to gain positive, or at least neutral, publicity.77
Chart 6: The applicability of van Dijk's 'Ideological square'/ strategy of negative polarization
in Süddeutsche Zeitung's articles on the Freedom Party during the electoral campaign for the
municipal election in Berlin













2.2.4 The portrayal of the Freedom Party during the disintegration and radicalization phase
2.2.4.1 'The Anti-constitutional Turn' of Michael Stürzenberger
    The Freedom Party failed to win any seats in the parliament of Berlin (Senat) in September 2011,
and  with  this  defeat,  the  party's  status  of  newsworthiness  instantly  collapsed  altogether  for
Süddeutsche Zeitung. There is one more article listed in their archives that was published relatively
77  Denkler, Thorsten: 'Lektionen fur die 'Endlich sagt es mal jemand'-Fraktion', in: sueedeutsche.de, published on 5.9. 
2011. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/geert-wilders-in-berlin-lektionen-fuer-die-endlich-sagt-es-mal-jemand-
fraktion-1.1138801, last accessed on 14.1. 2015
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close to the defeat in Berlin (October 2011), yet after that, there is a nearly one-and-a-half-year-
absence of the Freedom Party in the digital archives of the newspaper.
    The  Freedom Party surfaces  again  in  the  paper's  news coverage  the  context  of  their  local
activities in Munich. Apparently, the resurgence of the party is tied to Michael Stürzenberger, a
highly controversial figure within the party. Already in October 2011, the local association of the
Freedom Party in Munich, led by Stürzenberger, started rallies for a petition against the building of
a new Islamic center in the city78. 
   These  petitions  of  the  Freedom Party in  Munich  carried  on  throughout  the  following year.
Ultimately, these activities and the public speeches of Stürzenberger led the interior ministry of the
federal  state  Bavaria  (whose  capital  Munich  is)  to  label  this  particular  local  delegation  of  the
Freedom Party as anti-constitutional. 
     It is noteworthy in this context that Bavaria was the first federal state to attach that label to the
party, even though only five persons are explicitly referred to, with Stürzenberger being the most
high-profile one among them.79
    In order to understand this radicalization of the local delegation of the Freedom Party in Bavaria,
the key role of Stürzenberger in this process needs to be emphasized. In fact, a controversy around
his person on the first major nationwide party conference of the Freedom Party (which took place in
Frankfurt in December 2011) had a major disintegrating effect on the party as a whole. 
   However, a fundamental factional dispute occurred when Stürzenberger was voted into the party
executive. Whereas the moderate wing of the party wanted the Freedom Party to get rid of its image
as an 'Anti-Islam-party', the radical one was all the more pushing for a fierce Anti-Islamic agenda.
Stürzenberger – now a high-profile representative of the party – personified that factional dispute in
so far, as he had published a highly controversial text online which was supported by the radical
wing and rejected by the moderate one. 
    In that text, the freshly elected member of the executive board had demanded that Muslims who
do not publicly denounce their faith, should be forcefully deported. Moreover, he suggested that a
law should be introduced which forces all German citizens to read the Qur'an. Understandably, the
moderate  party wing called  these  ideas  as  'unworthy of  a  liberal  party',  and  it  was  noted  that
bourgeois  sympathizers  of  the  party would  be  shying away because  of  Stürzenberger´s  voiced
extremism. As a consequence of the controversy around Stürzenberger and the factional dispute,
78  'Rechtspopulistische Partei will Unterschriftenaktion starten', in: suddeutsche.de, published on 13.10. 2011 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/anti-islam-kampagne-rechtspopulistische-partei-will-unterschriftenaktion-
starten-1.1161620, last accessed on 11.3. 2015
79  Kastner, Bernd: 'Die Freiheit und PI gelten in Bayern als verfassungsfeindlich', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 
12.4. 2013. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/einstufung-des-bayerischen-innenminsteriums-die-freiheit-und-pi-
gelten-in-bayern-als-verfassungsfeindlich-1.1647727, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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several federal associations of the Freedom Party quit the party.80
2.2.4.2 Local news-coverage on the Freedom Party's activities in Munich
   
   In terms of the news coverage of the anti-constitutional Bavaria-delegation of the Freedom Party,
three things need to be acknowledged. 
   First  of  all,  even  though Süddeutsche  Zeitung  is  published nation-wide,  it  also  has  a  local
dimension in its news coverage: stories from Munich – where the publisher's house is located. After
the Freedom Party's failure in Berlin and Stadtkewitz's loss of power, Stürzenberger's rise shifted
the power and activities of the party most visibly to Munich. Hence, the Freedom Party became a
local phenomenon again for a – on some level – local newspaper. This led to a set of relatively
trivial local stories complied in the paper's digital archives, that would not be of much interest to a
citizen not residing in Munich.
   Second, it is noteworthy that Stadtkewitz's early Berlin-based Freedom Party and Stürzenberger's
Munich-based delegation of the party differ. The early Freedom Party was closely associated with
several  former  members  of  Berlin's  CDU  (and,  to  some  degree,  Geert  Wilders),  whereas
Stürzenberger's Freedom Party delegation was labeled as extremist, and therefore monitored by the
Office  for  the  Protection  of  the  Constitution  in  Bavaria.  Consequently,  different  images  and
semantics could be expected in Süddeutsche Zeitung's portrayal of the Freedom Party.
   The third point is picking up upon just that: Whereas the first three analytic phases were marked
by journalistic  accounts  composed by a  relatively wide array of  authors,  the  last  phase  of  my
analysis is almost exclusively covered by one particular journalist: Bernd Kastner.
   This  is  important  in  so far  as  the portrayal  of the Freedom Party up to  here was relatively
heterogeneous, ranging from depicting them as a conservative-bourgeois protest-party to presenting
them as quasi-fascist 'wolves in sheep's clothing'.
   Given Kastner's relatively monopoly position in terms of news coverage on the Freedom Party
from here onward, his ideological positioning towards the Freedom Party is decisive in what kind of
coherent picture is given throughout the year 2013.
   As it turns out, Kastner has a fairly open ideological opposition to the Freedom Party, which is
obviously sanctified by the its official change in status to 'anti-constitutional'. The judgment of the
Office  for  the Protection of  the Constitution in  Bavaria  is  backing Kastner  up,  and moves the
Bavaria-delegation  of  the  Freedom Party (and,  hence,  the  whole  party name)  from early 2013
80  Klarmann, Michael: 'Zerfall einer Splitterpartei', in: heise.de, published on 17.12. 2011 
http://www.heise.de/tp/news/Zerfall-einer-Splitterpartei-2010188.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015 
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onward closer to the Nazi-party NPD.
   Kastner is accusing the Freedom Party of evoking broad-brush fears of Muslims, and of spreading
Islam-hostile propaganda. Furthermore, the motif of partial ideological convergence between the
Freedom Party and the NPD is applied again, once more in the context of their rallying against the
new building of a new Islamic center in Munich.  Hence, the Freedom Party is tied to Nazism one
more time, and this trend clearly continues in Kastner's articles.
     Not only does he term Stürzenberger's public speeches in Munich as 'propaganda' and refers to
his anti-Islamic agenda as  'the dangerous venom of hatred'.81 Moreover does Kastner repeatedly
refer to the Freedom Party as 'extremists'. 
    For his article 'The great agitator' Kastner visited one of Stürzenberger's rallies in the pedestrian
zone  of  Munich,  and  termed  it  'scary'.  Countless  counter-demonstrators  and  Freedom  Party-
members vilified one another in a rough language: While  Stürzenberger degrades his  critics as
'leftist  lunatics'  and accuses  Chancellor  Merkel's  CDU, the country's  biggest  catch-all  party,  of
'treason against the people', counter-demonstrators demand the Freedom Party-spokesman to 'shut
the fuck up'. Consequently,  Kastner, as an observer of the scenario, reaches the conclusion that
'there is no dialogue, only confrontation' between the two camps. 
   Moreover, Kastner implies that Stürzenberger appear as someone who is in denial of reality -
while his party is officially labeled as anti-constitutional, he portrays himself as a defender of the
constitution. Accordingly, he distributed copies of the Basic Law in the end – the very constitution
they claim to defend against 'the Islamic threat'. 
  Stürzenberger's out-of-touch-with-reality-feature gets highlighted even more by emphasizing  his
dramatic and alarmist rhetoric, which make him appear to be obsessed with his opposition to Islam
and the established parties.82 Indeed, Stürzenberger is portrayed as an  extremist politician whose
rhetoric and conduct go far beyond the limits of what the public is used to by respectable, moderate
politicians. The confrontational nature of his slogans and the tirelessness with which he held the
rally give Stürzenberger a passionate, radical air. Consequently, one can attest to Stürzenberger, that
he has a very emotive take on the subject 'Islam'. This supposedly irrational, 'noisy' and alarmist
nature  of  Stürzenberger's  anti-Islam activities  led  Kastner  to  call  him  'The  great  agitator' and
resulted in a very negative framing, to say the least.
   The following articles by Kastner on the subject are centered around further rallies in the streets
81  Kastner, Bernd: 'Das gefährliche Gift des Hasses', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 14.4. 2013, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/rechtspopulisten-der-freiheit-und-pi-das-gefaehrliche-gift-des-hasses-
1.1648379, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
82  Kastner, Bernd: 'Der grosse Agitator', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 21.4. 2013. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/islamgegner-michael-stuerzenberger-der-grosse-agitator-1.1654428, last 
accessed on 19.1. 2015
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of Munich, executed by Stürzenberger and his associates, and pass rather as 'trivial local news'. 
   Once, the Freedom-Party-leader used a poster of SS-leader Heinrich Himmler in one of his rallies
- for the sake of linking Islam directly National Socialism. The photograph of Himmler included the
quote by the high-profile Nazi ('The Islam is very similar to our ideology'), and was, according to
Stürzenberger, used for the sake of its 'shocking effect'. The purpose of the Himmler-poster, the
Freedom Party-member argued, was to educate the public about the 'parallels  between National
Socialism and Islam'. However, showing photographs of popular members of the Nazi-regime is
disputable in legal terms in Germany.83 
   Consequently, Stürzenberger and his fellow party members who partook in the rally were taken to
court, were the party-leader was reported to have defended his cause passionately. Ultimately, the
trial ended with a verdict of acquittal, as the Himmler-photograph was shown only briefly in public,
and was clearly not meant as a promotion of National Socialism.84
    The conflict of Stürzenberger's methods of promoting his agenda with the German law and
officials, led to a series of defeats for the party-leader, which were all covered. In July 2013 he, got
sentenced  to  a  fine  because  of  insulting  a  police  officer.85 Later  on,  a  court  decided  that
Stürzenberger  was  not  allowed  to  keep  on  photographing  counter-demonstrators  nor  was  he
permitted to keep on using the megaphone constantly during his rallies – every ten minutes he had
to  lay  it  down  for  ten  minutes.  In  other  words:  The  alarmist  nature  of  Stürzenberger's  rally,
essentially built upon attracting attention in a noisy fashion, got diminished through the sentence.86
Another defeat followed for Stürzenberger in September 2013, as two private bank accounts of
Stürzenberger, who by now had been repeatedly referred to as 'Munich´s noisiest Islam-opponent',
got terminated one-sidedly. The banks official explanation for that step was the 'incompatibility' of
Stürzenberger´s political  agenda with the bank´s basic principles of the peaceful coexistence of
people and religions.87 
83  Kastner, Bernd: 'Hetzen mit Himmler', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 27.4. 2013.
       http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/prozess-gegen-islamfeind-stuerzenberger-hetzen-mit-himmler-1.1659838,   
       last accessed on 19.1. 2015
84  Kastner, Bernd: 'Keine Strafe fur Himmler-Plakat', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 13.5. 2013.  
       http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/prozess-gegen-stuerzenberger-keine-strafe-fuer-himmler-plakat-1.1671618, 
       last accessed on 19.1. 2015
85  Rost, Christian: 'Ach, leck mich doch am Arsch', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 15.7. 2013. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/rechtspopulist-beleidigt-beamten-ach-leck-mich-doch-am-arsch-1.1722140, 
last accessed on 19.1. 2015
86  'Niederlage fur Islamgegner Sturzenberger', in: suddeutsche.de, published on 25.7. 2013. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/entscheidung-gegen-rechtspopulisten-niederlage-fuer-islamgegner-
stuerzenberger-1.1730693, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
87  Kastner, Bernd; Muller-Jentsch, Ekkehard: 'Banken kundigen Sturzenbergers Konten', in: sueddeutsche.de, 
published on 30.9. 2013. 
      http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/rechte-partei-die-freiheit-banken-kuendigen-stuerzenbergers-konten-
1.1784508, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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   In October 2013, a Turk attacked Stürzenberger during one of his rallies, whose glasses got
broken. The Turk got arrested and Stürzenberger filed a charge of personal injury and criminal
mischief against him. Once the perpetrator was arrested, Stürzenberger carried on with his rally.88
   In the final article within the time period of my research that is to be found in the digital archives
of Süddeutsche Zeitung (from October 2013), Kastner proclaims that 'Islam-haters carry on', yet he
voices  doubt  on  whether  the  Freedom  Party  will  still  be  existent  and  functional  at  Munich's
municipal elections in spring 2014. Kastner underlines this speculation by referencing the plentiful
migration of Freedom Party-members to the AfD. On top of that, Freedom Party-leader Stadtkewitz
had just recently resigned89. 
   Regardless of the nature of these articles as rather trivial local news coverage which a) is not
aimed at a nation-wide public and b) hardly contains any deeper political analyses on the Freedom
Party, their sheer amount must be acknowledged. Within my four subjectively analytic phases, the
'disintegration and radicalization phase' is most extensively covered by Süddeutsche Zeitung, due to
its  partially local-newspaper character in Munich,  and the massive shift  of the Freedom Party's
activities there after its crushing defeat at the Berlin election.
  The  official  change  of  status  of  the  Bavaria-delegation  of  the  Freedom  Party  into  'anti-
constitutional' by the German authorities has, in any case, sanctified a harsher and more critical
language use for journalists in portraying it. This was, as it turns out, not continuously applied.
   However, this chart summarizes the shift towards an ever-increasing polarization of the editorial
staff of Süddeutsche Zeitung against the Freedom Party from 2011-2013:
Chart 7: The applicability of van Dijk's 'Ideological square'/ strategy of negative polarization
in  Süddeutsche  Zeitung's  articles  on  the  Freedom  Party  during  the  disintegration/
radicalization phase










88  'Islamfeind Sturzenberger attackiert', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 24.10. 2013. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/kundgebung-gegen-moscheeprojekt-islamfeind-stuerzenberger-attackiert-
1.1803130, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
89 Kastner, Bernd: 'Islamhasser machen weiter', in: sueddeutsche.de, published on 24.10. 2013, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/rechtspopulistische-partei-die-freiheit-islamhasser-machen-weiter-
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   As the chart above indicates, even in the process of the Bavarian Freedom Party's radicalization to
an anti-constitutional group, where a negative media framing was indeed backed-up by the German
authorities, there is no coherent picture painted within the staff of the newspaper.
   Then again, it must be noted that the majority of the local-news-accounts are relatively short,
and do not – with a few exceptions- elaborate in greater depth on political or ethical questions.
On the average, in these articles, events involving actors from the Freedom Party get covered in a
mere reporting fashion, and varying tags for the group get applied. The only exception in these local
news  in  terms  of  analytic  depth  is  Kastner's  'The  great  agitator' which  depicts  the  author's
experience on one of the Freedom Party's rallies in a rather detailed fashion.
   Interestingly, this journalist, Kastner, who has a monopoly position in reporting in the Munich-
based Bavarian delegation of the Freedom Party, has not even used the same terminology or degree
of polarization against the Freedom Party consistently throughout his articles either. In the more
extensive, detailed accounts he did choose to speak up against them quite plainly by, in van Dijk's
terms, applying a strategy of polarization against them, and highlighting their negative features,
accusing the party of 'agitation', 'propaganda' and 'hatred'. In shorter accounts, he refrained to only
label them as either 'right-wing populists', 'enemies of Islam' or  'Islam-opponents' . 
   Hence, this inconsistent terminology-use by Kastner in particular also represents the incoherence
in portraying and framing the Freedom Party in  general  at  Süddeutsche Zeitung.  In so far,  we
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cannot identify clear patterns in the media portrayal  of  this  particular newspaper,  on the
contrary,  a  relatively wide array of journalists  composed accounts  on the party,  which partially
differed significantly from one another. On one hand, there are a few articles that label the party as a
bourgeois-conservative protest  party that  seeks to attract  those 'homeless conservatives'  that  the
'Social-democratization'  of  the  CDU has  alienated .  On the other  hand,  there is  a  considerable
amount  of  accounts  that  label  the  party  as  quasi-fascists,  link  them to  either  the  NPD or  the
Norwegian right-wing terrorist Anders Breivik, and accuse the Freedom Party of being 'wolves in
sheep's clothing'.
2.2.5  Süddeutsche  Zeitung's  accounts  on  the  Freedom  Party:  A relatively  wide  array  of
authors and opinions 
    The total result for Süddeutsche Zeitung in terms of the applied terminology looks as follows:
Chart 8: The distribution of neutral-descriptive, tendentious and openly critical terminology
in the articles by Süddeutsche Zeitung on the Freedom Party within the time frame of my
study.
                       Lexical item                                              Appearances (Articles altogether)
Right-wing populist 9 (21)
Anti-Islamic 2 (21)
Islam-critical 2 (21)





Agitators/ extremists 5 (21)
Fascism-references 1 (21)
Racism-references 1 (21)
'Wolves in sheep's clothing' 2 (21)
   By applying van Dijk's analytic framework of the strategy of polarization (the ideological square;
emphasizing the opponent's negative features), my analysis has brought to light that out of twenty-
articles, nine have been neutral-descriptive, three have been tendentious (applying criticism in
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a rather subtle manner), and nine have been composed out of an ideological opposition to the
Freedom  Party,  portraying  it  in  a  plainly  disadvantageous  fashion,  by  emphasizing  its
negative features.
    In conclusion,  the neutral-descriptive,  'fair'  accounts  are slightly  outnumbered by the
tendentious or clearly hostile ones. Apparently, the deep division over how to deal with right-wing
populist parties is not only one among scholars and politicians, but also among the journalists of
Süddeutsche Zeitung.
   However, as stated before, the nature of the paper's coverage of the Freedom Party is neither
particularly extensive nor especially coherent in its degree of polarization.
   The one coherent aspect is, however, the theme that the party gets connected to all the time – its
anti-Islamic agenda. Yet this is perfectly understandable and legitimate, as my analysis  of main
parts of the party program has shown: Anti-Islamism is one, if not  the key characteristic of the
Freedom Party's ideology.
   All in all, Decker's thesis of the 'anti-fascist-reflexes' of the German media can certainly be
applied to some of the authors reporting on the Freedom Party, such as Thomas Denkler and
Kathrin Haimerl, and partially Bernd Kastner and Constanze von Bouillon. Nonetheless,  a good
amount of other articles I have analyzed do not support Decker's thesis.
    In conclusion of the accounts of Süddeutsche Zeitung on the Freedom Party, one can speak of
ambiguous results and an absence of coherence.
2.3     DER SPIEGEL/ SPIEGEL ONLINE
2.3.1 Articles during the foundation phase (July 2010-March 2011)
As he have seen, Süddeutsche Zeitung has not elaborated on the causal connection between the
Social-democratization  of  the  CDU  (which  generated  a  considerable  amount  of  'homeless
conservatives'), the Sarrazin-Debate (which started a controversial discourse on the role of Islam in
German society), and the actual foundation of the Freedom Party.
   Rather, these processes and discourses were reported on as independent happenings, in 'bits and
pieces'.  In  other  words:  The  paper  did  not  pick  up  a  certain  political  climate  at  a  time  (an
increasingly clearly expressed nation-wide criticism of Islam and multiculturalism), and did thereby
avoid to 'boost' a new party which could have ridden on that sociopolitical wave. This party could
have been the Freedom Party.
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   I  am pointing  this  out,  because  DER SPIEGEL actually did  portray the  causal  connections
outlined above and the sociopolitical climate at the time in greater clarity.  
   Consequently, the paper paid quite close attention to the early stages of the Freedom Party's
history.  In fact, Stadtkewitz had already said three days after his exclusion from the CDU, that he
wanted to form the Freedom Party, and SPIEGEL ONLINE covered his declarations of intent, while
introducing him as an 'Islam-critic' to the readership. The Freedom Party-founders Stadtkewitz, Doll
and König are quoted with their goal of founding a party that is 'less social-democratic than the
CDU, much more liberal than the FDP90 and more Anti-establishment party than the Green Party'.
Consequently, SPIEGEL ONLINE calls the nascent Freedom Party a 'protest-party'.91
   Indeed, SPIEGEL ONLINE takes Stadtkewitz and his ambitions in terms of the aforementioned
political climate more into account than the paper discussed previously. Both the 'Sarrazin-Debate'
and  the  identity-crisis  of  Merkel´s  CDU  have  lead  to  various  speculations  about  the  possible
foundation of a new right-wing party. SPIEGEL ONLINE  actively takes part in these speculations
and  portrays  numerous  potential  leaders  of  such  a  new-party.  Under  the  title  'Provocateurs,
frustrated ones, procrastinators', also Stadtkewitz is portrayed in an own sub-section. There, the ex-
CDU-politician and Freedom-Party-founder is depicted as a somewhat frustrated political actor who
solidarizes with the controversial social-democratic multiculturalism-critic Sarrazin and condemns
the public 'hounding' that has taken place towards him. 
    Moreover,  Stadtkewitz  is  characterized  as  a  'poignant  Islam-critic'  whose  new party –  not
officially founded yet – is about to speak up against bureaucracy, the EU and political Islam and
promote  more  direct  democracy  on  all  possible  levels.  In  the  end,  the  author  questions  the
likelihood of the Freedom Party getting over the 5%-threshold in the municipal elections in Berlin
2011. As a root cause for his skepticism, he refers to the leftist-liberal orientation of Berlin. His
speculations turned out as prophetic, as he predicted an erosion of the party in case no success
would be gained in these municipal elections – the party´s first ones, after all. Not only did the
author style the Berlin elections in September 2011 as the fateful ones for the Freedom Party that
they actually turned out to be, also did he point out Stadtkewitz´s lack of charisma and renown. In
that sense, the author has anticipated the Freedom Party´s evolution quite correctly in this short
article – pointing out that the party´s fate would be closely tied to Stadtkewitz degree of endurance
90  The traditional German Liberal Party that was in a coalition with the CDU/CSU from 2009-2013, and in 2013, got 
voted out of the Bundestag (and several other federal parliaments) altogether. 
91  'Islamkritiker Stadtkewitz will Protestpartei grunden', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 10.9. 2010   
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ex-cdu-politiker-islamkritiker-stadtkewitz-will-protestpartei-gruenden-a-
716851.html, last accessed on 14.1. 2015 
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for his political cause.92 
   In  terms  of  the  over-all  amount  of  Freedom-Party-related  articles  in  the  digital  archives  of
SPIEGEL ONLINE, my research, carried out by the website's internal search engine, has brought
six accounts between July 2010 and November 2013 up to the front.
    In a chart, they can be summarized as follows: 
Chart 9: The articles  by  DER SPIEGEL/ SPIEGEL ONLINE on the Freedom Party within
the time frame of my study
            Headline                           Author                         Published                     Analytic phase?
'Islam-critic
Stadtkewitz wants to
found a protest-party' 
Not explicitly
mentioned






14.9. 2010 Foundation phase
'The German Geert' Martin Gutsch 3.1. 2011 Foundation phase
'Disaster for Islam-
opponents – Freedom




11.1. 2011 Foundation phase
'Mr. Wilders from the
far Right gets involved'









10.11. 2011 Disintegration and
radicalization phase
92  Gathmann, Florian; Wittrock, Philipp: 'Fuhrungsprsonal fur Protestpartei – Provokateure, Frustrierte, Zauderer', in:  
SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 14.9. 2010
      http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fuehrungspersonal-fuer-protestpartei-provokateure-frustrierte-zauderer-a-
717143-7.html, last accessed on 14.1. 2015 
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Chart 10: Distribution of articles by DER SPIEGEL/ SPIEGEL ONLINE according to my
analytic phases 
   Articles in total    Foundation phase    Consolidation phase  Berlin election   Disintegration phase
6 4  (66,6%) 0 (0%) 1 (17%) 1 (17%)
   It  is  obvious  that  SPIEGEL ONLINE initially  granted  the  Freedom  Party  the  status  of  a
newsworthy phenomenon.  Given the causal  linkage that  the paper  has  established between the
Sarrazin-Debate and the Social-Democratization of the CDU/CSU on one hand, and Stadtkewitz's
ambition  to  found  a  new  Islam-critical  protest-party  on  the  other,  one  can  conclude  that  this
relatively close attention SPIEGEL ONLINE has paid to an unestablished small party is tied to its
objective to respond to a peculiar sociopolitical climate adequately.
    In other words: Apparently, the Freedom Party appeared to be exactly the new right-wing party
that would a) address the sympathizers of best-selling author Thilo Sarrazin and his immigration-
critical and anti-Islamic theses and b) those CDU/CSU-voters who felt alienated by the course the
party has taken in recent years.
   However, as the chart above indicates, that interest of SPIEGEL ONLINE in the Freedom Party
declined rapidly throughout the first half year of the party's existence.
   Nonetheless, SPIEGEL ONLINE is listing one remarkably in-depth-article on the Freedom Party
and Stadtkewitz in particular in its digital archives, which was first published in the printed edition
of DER SPIEGEL. The account, composed by Martin Gutsch and entitled as 'The German Geert', is
especially remarkable in so far as its sheer length of seven pages emphasizes the attention the paper
has paid to the new party as the possibly significant manifestation of the recent societal phenomena
of the CDU/CSU's identity-crisis and the fierce anti-Islamic debates of the early autumn 2010.
   In his article,  the author gives detailed background information on the personal and political
development of Stadtkewitz. Hence, one might very well call the article a portrait of the politician.
As it appears, Gutsch has accompanied Stadtkewitz on his various trips to political meetings in the
foundation phase of the Freedom Party, all over Germany, and even one conference of the Islam-
critical 'Free Press Society' in the Danish capital Copenhagen. 
   The author describes Stadtkewitz as 'calm, hefting and no Nazi', and utters the assumption that
this might be enough to address frustrated center-right voters who no longer feel loyalty towards the
CDU/ CSU –  this is a direct link to the Social-democratization of the party that served as one
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'midwife' of the Freedom Party.
   Furthermore, Gutsch points out that at this point the Freedom Party was in a fast growing-process,
and quotes Stadtkewitz regarding the municipal elections in Berlin in September 2011: 'Those will
be decisive.  If  we fail  to enter parliament,  the party will  be practically dead.' Hence,  the high
degree of  fatefulness  of  these particular  elections  was not  only an assumption  of  a  SPIEGEL-
journalist, but an assessment shared by Stadtkewitz himself. 
   Moreover, the author sheds light on the ambivalent relationship between Stadtkewitz and Wilders.
On one hand, he is not ashamed of admitting his admiration for the Dutch Islam-critic ('He is not a
right-wing populist. Geert Wilders is a great democrat and liberal.'), on the other hand he clearly
feels uncomfortable with the Dutchman´s extreme rhetoric ('Sometimes Wilders exaggerates a little
bit, but one should be allowed to intensify things for better understanding.') Stadtkewitz claims that
the 'internal rejection of Islam' is a 'majority opinion' in Germany, and justifies that argument by
referring to the intensity of the Sarrazin-Debate. In other words: Stadtkewitz appears to believe
whole-heartedly in the rightfulness of his (and Sarrazin´s and Wilders´s) cause: Radical criticism of
Islam and a firm anti-immigration agenda,  particularly with regard to  immigrants from Islamic
countries. But Stadtkewitz is averse to poignant and provocative statements in Wilders´s fashion –
such as comparing the Qur'an with Hitler´s 'Mein Kampf' and the call for outlawing the Holy Book
of Islam in Western societies.
   For most parts, the author portrays Stadtkewitz in a neutral, and almost empathetic fashion, and
makes clear that the Freedom Party-founder is not an extremist, but rather a patriotic and
multiculturalism-critical actor within the bourgeois middle-class spectrum. His lack of media
literacy and charisma in general are as much highlighted as the author's assessment that there is
no justification for demonizing Stadtkewitz and his party with the Nazi-stigma. 
   Nonetheless, the article contains also critical and partly even sarcastic undertones with regard to
Stadtkewitz´s  political  convictions.  For  one,  the  author  analyzes  that  the  Freedom Party wants
'some kind of Switzerland in Germany – only with less mountains.' This assessment is based on the
party´s calls for a  'firm stand on immigration',  'fast alien´s deportation',  'outlawing of minarets',
'direct  democracy  through  more  plebiscites' and  the  vision  of  a  Germany that  is  'EU-critical',
'Christian-occidental', 'with only a small minority of Muslims', 'patriotic', 'secure' and 'rich'. This is
the author´s reading of the Freedom Party´s party program, and in quite a sarcastic manner he adds:
'They  want  to  seal  the  country  –  since  seldom any good comes  from abroad.  Only  European
bureaucracy, globalization, Islamists and foreign welfare cheaters.' Eventually, Gutsch judges that
Stadtkewitz's mindset (and the one of like-minded right-wing populist actors all over Europe) quite
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negatively:
'They are sitting in their worldview as if they sit in a parallel society of defense and fear. But they
believe that they are fighting for a good cause: For the sake of freedom, for the sake of modernity,
for the values of the West. They regard themselves as opponents to the dark danger from the Orient.
This makes their Islamophobia electable for many fearful voters.'93
   The use of the term 'Islamophobia' is, against the background of the rather empathetic portrayal
of Stadtkewitz, surprising in so far, as it is located on the level of combat terms that brands an anti-
Islamic  attitude  as  a  pathological  illness.  For  that  reason,  as  a  term in  debates  on  right-wing
populism, multiculturalism and Islam in the Western world, I have counted it to the tendentious
terms,  alongside  'Islam-haters'.  An  equivalent  of  a  combat  term  within  the  camp  of
multiculturalism-critics or opponents of Islam would be 'Islamization'.  Hence, I deem both terms
highly  problematic  in  contemporary  discourses  on  the  aforementioned  (admittedly  very
controversial) topics.
   However,  even  though  Gutsch  applies  certain  sarcastic  undertones  and  the  combat  term
'Islamophobia',  his  in-depth-article  on  the  foundation  phase  of  the  Freedom Party is  all  in  all
perfectly neutral, and mostly merely descriptive. It sheds light on Stadtkewitz´s motivation for his
patriotic  and  anti-Islamic  cause,  and  takes  into  account  that  the  Freedom  Party  is  a  growing
movement. Hence, it is exactly the kind of news-coverage that a) one might have expected in the
aftermath of the Sarrazin-Debate,  the Wilders-controversy and Stadtkewitz´s exclusion from the
CDU and b) the kind of article, that Stadtkewitz himself might have wished for at the time (as a
publicity-platform).
   The author acknowledges the causal connection between the Sarrazin-Debate, the CDU/CSU's
identity-crisis, and thereby provides the recipient picture of a new political right-wing force gaining
ground in Germany. Moreover, Gutsch points out that the Freedom Party is ideologically closely
linked to other right-wing populist parties all over Europe, such as the Dutch Freedom Party, the
Dansk Folkeparti and the Sverigedemokraterna, which, makes it 'modern', and, in turn, marks it off
from 'old' German right-wing parties such as the NPD, the DVU and the Republicans. 
   What is more, the article manifests a stark contrast to the strategy of active polarization against
93  Gutsch, Jochen-Martin: 'Der deutsche Geert', in: DER SPIEGEL 1/2011, p. 44-54, original quote:
     'All die Leute im Saal, die Redner, die Parteien, Stadtkewitz - sie sitzen in ihrem Weltbild wie in einer 
Parallelgesellschaft der Abwehr, der Angst. Aber sie glauben, sie kämpften für das Gute: die Freiheit, die Moderne, 
die Werte des Westens. Sie sehen sich als Kämpfer gegen die dunkle Gefahr aus dem Morgenland. Das macht ihre 
Islamophobie für viele Ängstliche wählbar.' 
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Stadtkewitz  that a considerable amount of previous journalists have applied  –  Gutsch's  account
embodies quite the contrary, actually.  
    The final account by SPIEGEL ONLINE that is covering the foundation phase of the Freedom
Party is on the cancellation of the Freedom Party's first party convention that took place with short
notice. Not surprisingly, it essentially contains the same facts as the one published by Süddeutsche
Zeitung  ,  but  additionally  sheds  light  on  who  initiated  the  counter-demonstration:  a  civic
organization  called  'Bündnis  Rechtspopulismus  stoppen'  ('Pact  to  stop  right-wing  populism').
Posters with the slogan 'This agitation does not come out of nowhere' are explicitly mentioned in
the article and linked to a series of arson attacks on mosques. Demonstrators are quoted with the
words 'The Freedom Party is launching a racist smear campaign against Muslims and immigrants'.
The inclusion of this figure of thought by the demonstrators suggests that the Freedom Party is a
party inciting violence – or at least one whose agenda threatens the societal peace. Stadtkewitz,
however,  is  also  quoted  with  the  claim  that  the  Freedom  Party  was  planning  on  declaring  a
resolution  against  such  arson  attacks  on  the  party  convention  –  only  that  the  convention  was
prevented from happening in the first place.94 
   In conclusion of the articles published by SPIEGEL ONLINE during the foundation phase of the
Freedom Party, it is safe to say that they are significantly more neutral, or even favorable than those
composed by Süddeutsche Zeitung.
   First of all, the party's foundation is more than once depicted as a possibly significant one due to
the  explicitly  acknowledged  'prologue'  that  led  to  it  (the  Sarrazin-Debate,  the  Social-
Democratization of the CDU/CSU). To put it differently: Unlike the other paper's accounts, the ones
published  by  SPIEGEL  ONLINE  and  DER  SPIEGEL  do  not  portray  the  Freedom  Party's
emergence as random, or without a 'larger societal context'.
   Second, the strategy of tying Stadtkewitz's former anti-Islamic activities (mainly demonstrations
against the building of new Mosques), is not applied by SPIEGEL ONLINE-authors at this stage at
all; on the contrary, Gutsch called the Freedom Party-leader 'calm, hefting and no Nazi', and also
former  SPIEGEL  ONLINE-articles  tied  Stadtkewitz  and  his  nascent  party  to  the  bourgeois-
conservative segment of society.
   In terms of van Dijk's ideological square, the following chart suggests rather favorable results for
94  'Pleite fur Islam-Gegner: Die Freiheit muss Parteitag absagen', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 11.1. 2011 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/pleite-fuer-islam-gegner-die-freiheit-muss-parteitag-absagen-a-
738994.html, last accessed on 14.1. 2015 
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the Freedom Party with regard to SPIEGEL ONLINE's articles during the foundation phase.
Chart 11: The applicability of van Dijk's 'Ideological square'/ strategy of negative polarization
in  DER  SPIEGEL's/  SPIEGEL  ONLINE's  articles  on  the  Freedom  Party  during  the
foundation phase
           Headline                            Author                   Date of publication      Ideological opposition?
'Islam-critic
Stadtkewitz wants to
found a protest-party' 
Not explicitly
mentioned















































2.3.2 Articles during the Berlin electoral campaign (September 2011)
   One of the articles displaying the fiercest opposition to the Freedom Party was the account by
Thorsten Denkler who attended the 'party convention behind closed doors'  featuring a Wilders-
speech on 3rd September 2011.
   Yassin Musharbash attended the same event SPIEGEL ONLINE, and the more balanced take of
this paper on the Freedom Party is continues after a half-year-absence of the party from the digital
archives. The contrast between Denkler's and Musharbash's accounts is a shining example of how
differently different journalists that are assigned for the same task can interpret and cover an event.
   Whereas Denkler's polarization against the Freedom Party was abundantly clear, yes, polemic in
its extent, Musharbash's criticism on the party's agenda is applied rather in the ways of irony. For
once, Musharbash terms the main topics of the event as 'Getting the creeps from the Islamization'
and 'hard-bitten EU-skepticism'. The author ironizes the language use of the orators by pointing out
that, in other parties, fellow party members would be addressed as 'comrades' or 'friends', whereas
everything  would  be  'one  size  bigger'  among  the  right-wing  populists  –  'freedom  fighters'  or
'resistance fighters' are the terms commonly used by them. The organizers´ claim that the attendants
had risked to get physically harmed by counter-demonstrators when getting to the venue, is used to
justify this solemn terminology. Musharbash judges that as a 'enormous exaggeration' and points out
that very few demonstrators had gathered hundreds of meters away.
   Musharbash points out that Stadtkewitz made exhaustive references to  Thilo Sarrazin in his
speech  –  because  the  controversial  best-selling  author  had  already 'written  down the  truth',  as
Stadtkewitz put it. This 'truth' essentially covers the conviction that Islam and the Western liberal-
democratic  world  are  'incompatible'.  Since  in  a  broader  sociopolitical  context,  nothing  had
happened since the 'Sarrazin-Debate', Stadtkewitz claims, the Freedom Party is needed to 'force the
establishment  to  take  action'.  Musharbash  identifies  the  vertical  Othering towards  the  German
political elites and the European Union as the second big motif of the event. The author concludes
that 'one notices quickly that the EU is regarded as an almost equally big threat as Islam here'.
Wilders even references the EU and Islam as 'two powers who we need to resist against'.     
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    Musharbash analyzes that the combining element in the audience´s mindset is the feeling of
powerlessness towards these 'two powers' – the general impression that they are subordinated under
something they disapprove of.
   In contrast to Denkler, the SPIEGEL ONLINE-author tries to offer a psychological approach for a
better understanding of the event's attendants (and, hence, the German electorate of modern right-
wing  populist  parties).  Neither  does  he  judge  the  attendants  by  their  appearance  nor  does  he
explicitly  try  to  write  Stadtkewitz  down  –  Musharbash´s  opposition  to  the  Freedom  Party  is
employed in a more subtle manner. In addition to the aforementioned ironizing of the Freedom
Party´s self-image and language use, the author attempts to disenchant Wilders on the grounds of
logical flaws in his speech. Hence, one can say that Musharbash expresses his criticism towards the
party in a very calm way. For one, Musharbash acknowledges Wilders´s brilliant rhetoric skills, and
– on a non-normative, merely technical level – speaks in rather high terms of them. As an example
serves Wilders´s comment on the Norwegian mass-murderer Anders Breivik, who essentially shared
the  same  fiercely  anti-Islamic,  anti-multicultural  and  anti-establishment  mindset  with  Wilders,
Stadtkewitz and their sympathizers. Wilders claimed that Breivik is none of them, and dismissed
him as a psychopath. Despite similar concerns on the 'Islamization of Europe', one crucial dividing
line between them and Breivik must be acknowledged: 'We are democrats, we believe in peaceful
solutions'. And this self-image is used to attack Islam once again – 'That´s why we reject Islam,'
Wilders continued, 'because of its violent nature'.
   In spite of acknowledging Wilders´s remarkable rhetoric and populist skills and his confident,
calm  appearance,  Musharbash  dismantles  the  rhetoric  'trick'  that  makes  the  Dutchman  so
convincing.  According to  the  author,  Wilders  simplifies  contemporary matters  according to  his
reading, and coherence appear logical because Wilders 'fudges' them. These simplifications cover
the unwillingness to differentiate between Islam and Islamism and between Islam as a religion and
Muslims as actual human beings. Moreover, immigrants in Europe (which per se are exposed to
Western influence) and the domestic policies in Islamic theocracies are painted with the same brush.
This lack of differentiation,  this  radical simplification,  makes Wilders´s claims and anti-Islamic
agenda appear as logically coherent, and the Dutchman comes across as a sheer know-it-all.
   Nonetheless, Musharbash chooses not to outspokenly oppose Wilders, or to even demonize him.
Instead, the author chose to unexcited dismantle the reasons for his persuasive power and leaves it
to the readers to draw their own conclusions. 
   The Freedom Party is  not demonized by the author,  but  he rather  implies  that  the group is
unintentionally hilarious (due to the emotive language use and the radically simplified black-white-
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world-view). Essentially, the author portrays the Freedom Party as a marginal party built on
emotive populist rhetoric who attracts people that feel politically powerless. 
    Musharbash does not highlight the xenophobic element in the party agenda, nor does he muse on
any possible fascist implications in the party´s anti-Islamism. Of greater significance to the author is
the populist anti-establishment dimension of the Freedom Party that is centered around a
strong sense of nationalism. This nationalism is juxtaposed by the 'two powers' EU and Islam, and
ultimately,  the article portrays the party not so much in moralistic-normative dimensions but in
abstract-descriptive ones. 
   In other words – the Freedom Party is illustrated as a group that embodies a political concept that
opposes other political concepts. They are not portrayed as aggressive agitators or xenophobic
hotheads that border fascist rhetoric, but as yet another marginal actor in the political arena
that works with the 'cheap tricks' of radically simplifying populism. One gets the impression
that the Freedom Party is not worth getting upset about it, as their flawed operational mode (due to
the lack of differentiation) makes the party a caricature of itself anyway. Hence, the calm, subtle
criticism that Musharbash applied to the Freedom Party appears rather sophisticated.95 
   Notwithstanding the rather sophisticated, subtle criticism of the Freedom Party (that appears all
the more so when comparing it to Denkler's account on the very same event), it remains criticism
nonetheless. Hence, we can conclude that SPIEGEL ONLINE's take on the party – after its initially
neutral,  partially almost  favorable  news coverage – has  become more  oppositional;  the critical
distance to Stadtkewitz and his party has become greater.
    It is noteworthy at this point that this might have been affected by Breivik's terror-attacks on 22 nd
July  2011,  which  had  increased  the  pressure  on  European  right-wing  populist  parties  due  to
significant ideological convergence between them and the Norwegian terrorist and mass murderer.
   However, this logic of opposing the party due to ideological similarities to obvious enemies of
democratic  societies  (or  sheer  criminals,  as  in  Breivik's  case),  has  been  applied  before  by
Süddeutsche Zeitung in linking Stadtkewitz to NPD-positions.
   After Breivik, this same logic could be used all the more easily, for Breivik has even explicitly
aligned his own ideology with Wilders, after all the great role model of Stadtkewitz and his party.
  However, given that Musharbash's ironic, subtle and sophisticated criticism of the Freedom Party
leaves it mainly to the reader to draw conclusions, an active polarization against the party cannot be
95  Musharbash, Yassin: 'Berliner Wahlkampf: Herr Wilders von rechts außen greift ein', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, 
published on 3.9. 2011. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/berliner-wahlkampf-herr-wilders-von-rechts-
aussen-greift-ein-a-784243.html, last accessed on 30.1. 2015
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satisfactorily identified, yet the article is still tendentious:   
Chart  12:  The  applicability  of  van  Dijk's  'Ideological  square'/  strategy  of  negative
polarization in DER SPIEGEL's/ SPIEGEL ONLINE's articles on the Freedom Party during
the electoral campaign for the municipal election in Berlin
             Headline                          Author                    Date of publication      Ideological opposition?
'Mr. Wilders from the
far Right gets involved'










   However, the Freedom Party's local activities in Munich and the radicalization of the party that
are tied to them, have, as I have shown, had quite a high profile presence in Süddeutsche Zeitung's
news coverage on the party. This is, as mentioned before, in vast parts explicable through the papers
partial  character  as  a  local  newspaper  in  Munich.  Consequently,  the  Hamburg-based  DER
SPIEGEL, which incorporates no local stories into its editions, has not covered these rather trivial
Munich-related news.
   Therefore,  only one article is  listed from the 'disintegration phase'  (October 2011-November
2013). A further one from November 2013, reporting on the Freedom Party's 'member migration' to
the AfD has been used as a secondary source in my introduction already, and is excluded here for its
focus rests upon the AfD.
2.3.3 Articles on the Freedom Party during the disintegration/ radicalization phase (Oct 2011-
Nov 2013)
    The last article in SPIEGEL ONLINE's digital archives that concerns the Freedom Party  – and
that  was  composed long before  the  emergence  of  the  AfD and its  eventual  outflanking of  the
Freedom Party – was published in November 2011, and continues SPIEGEL ONLINE's trend to
polarize more openly against the party.
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     The article takes right-wing populist networks on the internet as its main subject, entitled as
'Online-research on right-wing populism: Brown front at Facebook'. In that news piece, the author
presented the results of a research undertaken by the British think tank Demos. In that research,
right-wing populist sympathizers from all over Europe were interviewed on their motivations and
backgrounds.96 Even though the Freedom Party as such is not highlighted in the text, it is included
in the outline of the parties the research is  referring to.  And in that sense,  the party is  labeled
negatively by SPIEGEL ONLINE. Not only does the term 'Brown front' (which refers to the online-
sympathizers of the right-wing parties) have a militaristic ring to it, also does 'brown' as a 'political
color' represent fascism. Accordingly, the photo illustrating the article shows a skinhead who shouts
aggressively  towards  the  observer.  All  in  all,  the  way  the  right-wing  parties  in  question  are
presented in the headline and the visual  ways,  is  one-sided and firmly grounded in ideological
opposition to them, The polemic imaging is surprising in so far, as the parties' multifacetedness in
the transnational context is mentioned in the article. However, this article marks the culmination of
two developments in disfavor of the Freedom Party at SPIEGEL ONLINE: First, the continuing
marginalization  and  decrease  of  newsworthiness  of  the  party,  and  second,  the  more  critical,
polarizing way in which the group is depicted.  
Chart  13:  The  applicability  of  van  Dijk's  'Ideological  square'/  strategy  of  negative
polarization in DER SPIEGEL's/ SPIEGEL ONLINE's articles on the Freedom Party during
the disintegration/ radicalization phase















96  'Online-Studie zum Rechtspopulismus: Braune Front auf Facebook', in: SPIEGEL ONLINE, published on 10.11. 
2011. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/online-studie-zum-rechtspopulismus-braune-front-auf-facebook-a- 
      796928.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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2.3.4 DER SPIEGEL's/ SPIEGEL ONLINE's accounts on the Freedom Party: From neutral-
descriptive acknowledgment to a mixture of ignorance and opposition
The total result for DER SPIEGEL/ SPIEGEL ONLINE in terms of the applied terminology looks
as follows:
Chart 14: The distribution of neutral-descriptive, tendentious and openly critical terminology
in the articles by DER SPIEGEL/ SPIEGEL ONLINE on the Freedom Party within the time
frame of my study.
  Lexical item                                              Appearances (Articles altogether)
Right-wing populist 2 (6)
Anti-Islamic 0 (6)
Islam-critical 3 (6)





Agitators/ extremists 0 (6)
Fascism-references 1 (6)
Racism-references 0 (6)
'Wolves in sheep's clothing' 0 (6)
   In conclusion of my analysis of SPIEGEL ONLINE's accounts on the Freedom Party, it must be
noted that in quantitative terms, the paper has not given much weight to the party. Six accounts in a
time period of roughly three years speak volumes in that regard.
   Then again, it is remarkable that the foundation phase of the party has a high profile presence
in the paper's digital archives. This can be interpreted as  a deliberate response of Germany's
leading political journal to the sociopolitical climate at that time which was first and foremost
expressed through the Sarrazin-Debate.  The Freedom Party was, in that reading, a potentially
important new political actor who wanted to pick up where Sarrazin had left off with his
controversial best-selling book 'Germany abolishes itself.' 
   The articles from that time are marked by a predominantly neutral-descriptive tone, yet this tone
got increasingly critical after Breivik's terror attacks in July 2011.
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   All in all, the initially rather favorable approach of SPIEGEL ONLINE (including increased
attention to the Freedom Party and the acknowledgment of its possible future significance)
turned  into  ignorance  and,  when  the  party  passed  the  filter  of  relevance  after  Breivik,
opposition.
   Hence, we can speak of ambiguous results in terms of DER SPIEGEL's/ SPIEGEL ONLINE's
accounts as well, yet there is more of a pattern identifiable in the case of this paper – a gradual
ideological  shift  from neutral  (and relatively detailed)  news coverage on the Freedom Party to
opposing and ignoring the party.
2.4 BILD
BILD, Germany's biggest tabloid, and usually referred to as 'the paper of the common man', covered
the Sarrazin-Debate in a sensationalist fashion. Often, Sarrazin was rather portrayed as a brave actor
who dared to voice the concerns of the 'silent majority'. BILD's exhaustive coverage on the hostile
response by the German intelligentsia and political elite that Sarrazin was confronted with after the
publication of his controversial immigration-and Islam-critical book, made him rather appear as a
victim of the circumstances.  In that sense, a rather sympathetic stance towards Sarrazin can be
identified.97 
   Clearly, Stadtkewitz explicitly tried to associate himself and the Freedom Party to Sarrazin and his
controversial theses. Stadtkewitz claimed that the Freedom Party is 'the party to (Sarrazin´s) book'98.
When taking this into account, a rather exhaustive and possibly even favorable news-coverage of
BILD could be anticipated. 
   This, however, is not the case. In contrast to the benevolent portrayal that the Springer Publisher's
house (where BILD us published)  conducted for the right-wing populist  Roland Schill  and his
Schill-Party in 2001, the Freedom Party apparently did not pass the 'filter  of relevance'  for the
editorial staff of BILD. This is remarkable in so far, as BILD is a sensationalist tabloid that has the
reputation of having leanings towards right-wing attitudes and primarily attracting lower-middle
class and working-class readers.99 One can argue that this would have been exactly the potential
electorate of the Freedom Party.
97  'Sarrazin: Meine Frau wird gemobbt, weil ich prominent bin', in bild.de, published on 20.1. 2011 
http://www.bild.de/politik/2011/schule/hetzjagd-auf-meine-frau-15380286.bild.html, last accessed on 17.3. 2015
98  Gutsch, Martin: 'Der deutsche Geert', in: DER SPIEGEL 1/ 2011
99  Goethe Institut: Tageszeitungen. 
       http://www.goethe.de/wis/med/pnt/zuz/de8418130.htm, last accessed on 28.1. 2014
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   In fact, the BILD-archive is only listing four articles in total with relevance to the object of my
study, most of them centered around the Wilders-scandal caused by Stadtkewitz as a CDU-member,
hence a time preceding the actual existence of the Freedom Party. 
     On 29th October, BILD published a brief article covering the foundation of the Freedom Party. In
fact, the editorial staff only used a composition by the German press agency (dpa). Stadtkewitz is
termed as an 'Islam-critic', and is supposedly trying to 'offer frustrated non-voters a political home
and compete with the outermost right-wing of the CDU'.100 
   On 11th January, the day when the party convention had to be canceled with short notice, BILD
published a news piece prior to the cancellation, reporting on the change of location. Again, the
piece has not been composed by a member of the editorial  staff  of BILD, but is a text by the
German  press  agency (dpa).  The  Freedom Party  is  labeled  as  'a  new Islam-critical  party'  and
Stadtkewitz as a politician who 'sympathizes with the Dutch right-wing populist Geert Wilders who
is widely considered as an Islam-hater'.101 
    The actual cancellation of the party convention is covered on the very same day in yet another
brief news piece composed by the dpa, yet the demonstration surrounding the failed event and
Stadtkewitz's hostile statements towards the demonstrators are not covered at all.102 
    In fact, no other articles taking the Freedom Party as the subject are surfacing at BILD until the
actual electoral campaign in the municipal elections in Berlin in September 2011, where in one brief
news piece it is soberly stated that 'the Islam-critical Freedom Party left the Berlin voters cold'.103
BILD did not have the ideological square in the works at all, for the news coverage they published
on the Freedom Party was neutral, yet in van Dijk' terms,  relevance  was the key issue here: In
contrast to SPIEGEL and Süddeutsche Zeitung, BILD did not grant the party any significant news
worthiness at all.
   The results of my study with regards to BILD's digital archives can be summarized in a  compact
fashion like this:
100 'Berliner Ex-CDU-Mitglied grundet neue Partei', in: bild.de, published on 29.10. 2010 
http://www.bild.de/regional/berlin/berlin-regional/berliner-excdumitglied-gruendet-neue-partei-14473822.bild.html, 
last accessed on 14.1. 2015
101 'Partei Die Freiheit tagt im Prenzlauer Berg', in: bild.de, published on 11.1. 2011 
http://www.bild.de/regional/berlin/berlin-regional/partei-die-freiheit-tagt-in-prenzlauer-berg-15443852.bild.html, 
last accessed on 14.1. 2015
102 'Sprecher: Parteitag 'Die Freiheit' fällt aus', in: bild.de, published on 11.1 2011
       http://www.bild.de/regional/berlin/sprecher-parteitag-die-freiheit-faellt-aus-15448038.bild.html,
       last accessed on 15.3. 2015
103 'Islamkritische Partei Die Freiheit lässt Wähler kalt', in: bild.de, published on 18.9 2011
       http://www.bild.de/regional/berlin/islamkritische-partei-die-freiheit-laesst-20030902.bild.html, last accessed on 
15.3. 2015
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Chart  15:  The  applicability  of  van  Dijk's  'Ideological  square'/  strategy  of  negative
polarization in BILD's articles on the Freedom Party in all analytic phases








































































   There is no speak of 'Islamophobia', 'Islam-hatred' or other tendentious terms in the articles on the
Freedom Party published  by BILD,  yet  none  of  those  has  an  analytic-in-depth-angle,  they are
exclusively brief news pieces. They are essentially lacking any political-ethic positioning, and are
rather superficial. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the only term for labeling the Freedom Party in
political-ideological terms was 'Islam-critical'.
   This does surely imply a rather neutral-descriptive, possibly even favorable take on the party (as
there  is  no  opposition  to  it  identifiable  whatsoever),  let  alone,  the  articles  were  so sparse  and
insignificant, that it did not really matter how the party was portrayed in the first place.
2.5    Berliner Zeitung
2.5.1 Articles during the foundation phase (July 2010-March 2011)
   
   Given that the Freedom Party was founded in Berlin,  a closer investigation of the digital
archive of a local newspaper will be useful. As mentioned before, Stadtkewitz himself styled the
Freedom Party's first electoral campaign – the municipal one in Berlin – as a fateful milestone of
the  party  right  away,  as  its  result  would  determine  whether  or  not  the  party  could  carry  on
afterward.   Consequently, the fourth news-platform to be examined is the online-archive of the
local daily newspaper 'Berliner Zeitung'.
   Indeed, the total amount of articles on the Freedom Party is the second-highest among the chosen
media, righter after Süddeutsche Zeitung, listing fourteen accounts altogether:
Chart 16: The articles  by  Berliner Zeitung on the Freedom Party within the time frame of
my study
             Headline                          Author                    Date of publication             Analytic phase
'Right-wing party after
Dutch design'
Sebastian Höhn 11.9. 2010 Foundation phase
'Geert, we love you!' Sabine Rennefanz 4.10. 2010 Foundation phase
'Muslims feel chased' Sabine Rennefanz 14.10. 2010 Foundation phase
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'The outsider' Sabine Rennefanz 16.11. 2010 Foundation phase
'The Freedom Party in
the open air'
Jan Thomsen 12.1. 2011 Foundation phase
'No more beer for right-
wing extremists'
Birgitt Eltzel 28.1. 2011 Foundation phase
'Politician of the
Liberal Party defects to
the Islam-critical
Freedom Party'
Sabine Rennefanz 15.4. 2011 Consolidation phase
'Fighting against Islam
in a suit'
Thomas Rogalla 16.5. 2011 Consolidation phase
'Electoral campaign
with Wilders'
Sabine Rennefanz 30.8. 2011 Electoral campaign for
the municipal election
in Berlin
'Mr. Wilders and his
pale disciple'












Steven Geyer 21.9. 2011 Electoral campaign for
the municipal election
in Berlin
Chart 17: Distribution of articles by Berliner Zeitung according to my analytic phases 
   Articles in total    Foundation phase    Consolidation phase  Berlin election   Disintegration phase
12 6 (50%) 2 (16,7%) 4 (33,3%) 0 (0%)
   The nature  of  the  accounts  on  the  Freedom Party published by Berliner  Zeitung  combines
elements of those in DER SPIEGEL and those in Süddeutsche Zeitung. 
     For  once,  very  much  like  DER SPIEGEL,  Berliner  Zeitung  has  mainly  focused  on  the
foundation  phase  of  the  Freedom Party.  Whereas  in  DER SPIEGEL's  case,  this  can  be  most
plausibly explained through approaching the Freedom Party as a possibly important future political
actor due to its  self-proclaimed status as 'the party to Sarrazin's  book',  one must take the local
dimension of Berliner Zeitung into account.
     Hence, the trivial-descriptive aspect of merely covering local political phenomena that could be
observed in Süddeutsche Zeitung's news coverage on the Freedom Party's activities in the streets of
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Munich, does surface in Berliner Zeitung's accounts as well.  Simultaneously,  there are in-depth
articles on the Freedom Party in general and Stadtkewitz in particular (essentially, a portrait) as
DER SPIEGEL had published them as well.
    Another striking similarity with Süddeutsche Zeitung in Berliner Zeitung's accounts is, however,
that  one  particular  journalist  has  quite  a  high  profile  presence  in  covering  the  Freedom Party.
Whereas Bernd Kastner composed a great deal of the local news on the Freedom Party in Munich,
in Berliner Zeitung's case the monopoly on articles on the party is with Sabine Rennefanz.
   This could indicate a higher degree of coherence in the portrayal of the party, yet this could be
assumed in Kastner's case as well, and yet, it did not apply. It remains to be seen what it will be like
in the case of a Sabine Rennefanz and Berliner Zeitung.
   On 11th September, Sebastian Höhn contributed a news piece entitled as 'Right-wing party after
Dutch design', Stadtkewitz's declarations of intent regarding the nascent new party are extensively
quoted.  Stadtkewitz stated that his party is not supposed to be 'a copy' of Wilders´s party – despite
the  similar  name,  and  that  Sarrazin's  notions  on  immigration  –  primarily,  it  should  be
(economically) useful for Germany, and not be steered by humanitarian or idealistic principles – are
key principles of the party program. Islam, in Stadtkewitz´s reading, is 'rather an obstacle' for that
mode of – in the party´s reading – reasonable immigration and successful integration. Ultimately,
Stadtkewitz´s ambitions of passing the 5% threshold in the municipal elections are expressed, as
much as his 'dream' to run electoral campaigns with the Freedom Party nationwide.104 Regardless of
Stadtkewitz alignment with Wilders and the scandal that had culminated in his exclusion from the
CDU, the article is perfectly neutral,  and introduces the nascent Freedom Party as a potentially
relevant new actor in Berlin's political landscape.
   The aforementioned Sabine Rennefanz – assigned for most of the articles on the Stadtkewitz and
the Freedom Party – attended both the first Wilder-event in Berlin that Stadtkewitz had organized
and lost his CDU-membership for, and conducted an in-depth-interview with the Freedom Party-
leader within roughly one month (October/ November 2010).
   Her account on the Wilders-event is marked by a skeptical tone. For one, it  'feels a bit like a Pop-
concert' to her, and she mentions that the event took place in a windowless room, which she links to
a clandestine mindset of Stadtkewitz, the organizer – firmly isolated from the general public. This
attempt to  attach  a  certain  obscure  tone to  the convention is  reminiscent  of  SPIEGEL-reporter
104 Höhn, Sebastian: 'Rechtspartei nach holländischem Vorbild', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 11.9. 2010. 
http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/ex-cdu-mann-stadtkewitz-gruendet—die-freiheit--rechtspartei-nach-
hollaendischem-vorbild,10810590,10742054.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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Gutsch's assessment that the new right-wing populists 'are sitting in their world-view of fear like in
parallel societies'. 
   In accordance with her assessment of a deliberate isolation, Rennefanz argues in her article that
the audience 'does not want to learn anything new', that it  'does not want to reflect'  upon what
Wilders claims – it only 'wants to be re-assured'. 
    Interestingly, the author includes a quick analysis of the audience as such – and states that out of
the 550 people the vast majority consisted of males between 30 and 60 years of age. Most of them
had a sophisticated middle-class clothing style – which leads Rennefanz to the judgment that 'fear
and a lack of orientation among white middle-class men of middle age appears to be so great that
they are longing for figures like Wilders and Sarrazin'. 
    In a manner quite reminiscent to the one already shown by several journalists from the papers
analyzed  previously  (Denkler,  Musharbash),  Rennefanz  includes  a  normative  element  into  her
article. Not only does she portray the convention as a clandestine happening, also does she take a
critical  stance  on  Wilders  –  and  judges  the  entirety  of  the  audience  as  'fearful'  and  'lacking
orientation'. This way, the convention in itself comes across as some obscure gathering where a
demagogic, rather unsympathetic politician ('cold glance') is circulating dangerous ideas. The event
is described as something dubious ('windowless room', 'pseudo-scientific speech', 'the audience does
not want to reflect, only be re-assured') that hardly passes as a convention presenting the personnel
and voters of a new party that would offer a serious alternative to Stadtkewitz´s ex-party, CDU.
   Consequently, Rennefanz ends her article on a neutral yet somewhat skeptical note: She states that
Stadtkewitz is 'no Pop-star like Wilders, but he is riding on a wave of euphoria' – now he has to
prove whether or not his new-founded Freedom Party does really represent the 'silent majority'.105 
   In her two following accounts, Rennefanz in sending somewhat contradictory signals regarding
the  Freedom Party to  the  readership.  In  one,  'Muslims  feel  chased',  she  acts  as  a  protector  of
Muslims and subtle opponent to critics of multiculturalism.
   The author does so in claiming that the Sarrazin-Debate has led to a climate where it is 'en vogue'
to  label migrants as 'lazy,  averse to learning and useless'.  In response to that unpleasant  trend,
Rennefanz has interviewed several Muslims with German citizenship on their personal perceptions
of  being  eyed suspiciously or  being  discriminated  against.  She  justifies  the  emphasis  on  these
105 Rennefanz, Sabine: 'Geert, wir  lieben dich!', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 4.10. 2010. 
      http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/eine-gruppe-gleichgesinnter-feiert-in-berlin-den-rechtspopulisten-geert-
wilders—ein-deutscher-ableger-soll-den-erfolg-seiner-freiheitspartei-kopieren--geert--wir-lieben-
dich-,10810590,10746600.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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subjective contributions of a few Muslims by the results of a poll initiated by the Friedrich-Ebert-
Foundation, a political NGO with leanings towards the Social Democratic Party (SPD).106
   The result expresses a noticeable resentment towards migrants, and particularly Muslims, among
the German population. For one, 33% of the ones partaking in the survey, believed that migrants
only want to exploit  the German Welfare system, and 58% wanted to cut down the amount of
freedom of practicing Islamic faith in Germany. Probably most alarmingly, 10% of the participants
expressed a longing for a 'leader' who would rule the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants.
    Rennefanz ties Stadtkewitz and the Freedom Party to that political climate by musing that they
might benefit from that atmosphere. The article was published on 14th October 2010, prior to the
actual foundation of the Freedom Party,  and hence prior to any concrete party program –  yet,
Rennefanz labels Stadtkewitz's planned political project already an 'Anti-Islam-Party'. However, the
party is implicitly introduced as some kind of threat to Muslims – which are, according to the
structure and the logic of this article, victimized and needy.107 
   Hence,  it  is safe to say that the Freedom Party is already filled with a negative connotation
because of having a supposedly 'inhumane agenda'. The article is composed in a way that would
raise sympathy for Muslims and perceive the nascent party as nasty and xenophobic.
    This active polarization against the party does, however, not continue in the next article by the
very same author. Quite contrarily, Rennefanz gives an empathetic portrait of Stadtkewitz whose
tone is reminiscent of that published by Martin Gutsch for DER SPIEGEL two months later.
   In her account, Rennefanz characterizes Stadtkewitz as the one who carries the hopes of 'the new
right' in Germany. Notwithstanding, she mentions that he 'speaks with a soft voice', and from there,
draws the conclusion, that he 'by no means wants to appear as radical'. 
   Nonetheless, Rennefanz's previous article had somewhat portrayed the nascent Freedom Party as
an  inhumane  threat  to  Muslims.  This  does  not  correlate  with  the  picture  she  is  painting  of
Stadtkewitz now. In an attempt to dissolve the seeming contradiction between the party's agenda
and Stadtkewitz's balanced, calm appearance, Rennefanz examines what events had led Stadtkewitz
on his anti-Islamic path. 
   She points out three events that are supposedly meant to explain an irrational, emotional take on
106 'Politische Stiftungen', in: Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung. 
http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/40359/politische-stiftungen, last 
accessed on 19.1. 2015
107 Rennefanz, Sabine: 'Muslime fühlen sich verfolgt', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 14.10. 2010. 
http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/studie-belegt-wachsende-islamfeindlichkeit-muslime-fuehlen-sich-
verfolgt,10810590,10748552.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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Islam. For one, the Mosque-building project in his home district in Berlin was met with his fierce
resistance, and Stadtkewitz felt like 'a star, a hero of the people', as he gave voice to anti-Islamic
sentiment of  the majority of the residents in that particular area – and, consequently, those people
cheered for him. The second event is an arson attack on his house whose perpetrators never get
caught. Stadtkewitz, however, assumed that there was a connection between the arson attack and his
engagement against the mosque. 'He turned into a martyr,' as Rennefanz put it. As a consequence,
he 'buried himself in the topic' and 'did self-studies on Islam'. 
    The third event was a robbery conducted by a presumably Turkish or Arabic perpetrator on his
nephew, who thereby got severely injured in the face. Stadtkewitz tried to investigate the case and
find the perpetrator on his own, but did not succeed in doing so. Stadtkewitz´s ex-fellow party
members  came  to  the  conclusion  that  Stadtkewitz  had  become  obsessed  with  Islam,  and
Rennefanz's portrayal of the past events make Stadtkewitz´s anti-Islamic agenda rather appear
as a personal crusade than a reasonable, balanced figure of thought. 
   Even though no explicit dislike is expressed towards the Freedom Party-founder by the author,
she applies a subtle criticism of Stadtkewitz. In fact, the subtext implies that Stadtkewitz is driven
by personal motives that lie beyond the rational, and therefore he passes as a political actor that
should not necessarily be taken seriously.108 This strategy of empathetic explanation in order to
dismantle logic flaws of the opponent's argument, and to attach a certain lack of seriousness to him,
has been used successfully by Musharbash for SPIEGEL ONLINE in his account on the second
Wilders-speech in Berlin already.  Rennefanz is  making use of a similar strategy here.  In short:
Stadtkewitz is not portrayed as a serious, trustworthy politician by the author. 
   The forced cancellation of the first party-convention in January 2011 got covered in greater detail
by journalist Jan Thomsen than by his aforementioned counterparts of Süddeutsche Zeitung, DER
SPIEGEL and BILD. For one, Thomsen includes more statements of Stadtkewitz clearly indicating
his outrage on the last-minute cancellations of the rights to use the school premises. 
   Stadtkewitz is quoted with 'What is wrong with our country? How far is the Left taking this?'  The
demonstrators are described as 'young people', and they were shouting slogans like  'Germany –
never again!' and 'Nazis, Freedom Party, CDU – no rest for racists!'. Such statements, Stadtkewitz
is reported to have said, dismantled the opponents of his party quite clearly. Though the term 'left-
108 Rennefanz, Sabine: 'Der Aussenseiter', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 16.11. 2010. 
       http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/ren--stadtkewitz-hat-eine-eigene-partei-gegruendet--damit-fangen-die- 
schwierigkeiten-erst-an-der-aussenseiter,10810590,10754804.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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wing extremist' was not used, one might rightfully ask which politically educated person would put
Nazis and Germany's biggest and historically most influential post-war party, the catch-all party
CDU, into the same context  and label  them as 'racists'.  After  all,  the CDU is a  party that  has
traditionally represented the majority of the German electorate. Despite this revealing portrayal on
parts of the Freedom Party-opponents that were present on that occasion, they do not get mocked on
by the author, yet the supporters of Stadtkewitz do. The response to the demonstrators shown from
the Freedom Party-camp get emphasized: They were holding up Thilo Sarrazin´s book 'Germany
abolishes itself' in a fashion 'how exorcists do it with the Bible'.
   The final note by the author, however, highlights again the importance of the coming municipal
election in Berlin. Since the German capital´s societal reality served as Sarrazin´s main example on
the failure of immigration policies, the city´s German electorate should be predestined to embrace a
party picking up those issues.109  
   The subtle element of ideological opposition against the Freedom Party is identifiable in the
different ways the author describes the two camps: Whereas he mocks people from the Freedom
Party-camp  as  irrational  laughingstocks  (comparing  their  gestures  to  those  of  religious
fanatics), the slogans of the demonstrators do not get commented on ('Germany – never again!', the
accusation to the CDU of being racist). In that sense, there is an implicit solidarity with or least
leaning towards the anti-Freedom-Party-demonstrators noticeable. 
   In  another  local  news piece,  entitled  as  'No more beer  for  right-wing extremists',  from 28th
January, the subtly expressed antipathy towards the Freedom Party in the editorial staff of Berliner
Zeitung continues. The party gets mentioned only briefly, yet is aligned to the activities of the NPD
once  again.  In  substance,  the  article  covers  the  goal  of  the  parliament  of  Berlin  district
Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf to discharge a waiter employed in the district's city hall. The waiter in
question had rented out premises of the city hall's  restaurant  to members of the NPD for their
gatherings. The local delegation of the Freedom Party had been founded in the very same premises,
and at that point was planning on holding their frequent gatherings in the very same location in the
future as well. A local politician of the Green Party, which had started the initiative against the
waiter alongside the Social Democrats (SPD), essentially put the Freedom Party and the NPD into
the same category by declaring them both something that needs to be opposed -  'Security personnel
of the NPD, agitation against immigrants and Islam – we don´t want something like that – and
especially not in our city halls.' He continued, that it is a 'fundamental question of sensitivity' that
109 Thomsen, Jan: 'Die Freiheit im Freien', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 12.1. 2011.
        http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/anti-islam-partei-muss-ersten-parteitag-nach-zwei-raumkuendigungen- 
        absagen—die-freiheit—im-freien,10810590,10765324.html, last accessed on 19.1 2015
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'right-wing extremists and demagogues are not permitted space in public premises'.
   By declaring both the NPD and the Freedom Party as unacceptable, the Green Party politician
aligns the latter to a significant degree to the former. In that sense, the Green politician made an
attempt of tainting the reputation of one (new and yet relatively unknown) political opponent by
tying him to a commonly despised party. The author of the news piece, Birgit Eltzel, reinforced that
undifferentiated view of the Green Party-politician by only making use of the term 'right-wing
extremists' in the headline.110 Consequently, it contains a strong negative judgment that relates to
the Freedom Party, and the terminology used by the leftist politicians in the article ('demagogues',
'agitation against immigrants and Islam') are not filtered or commented on by the author.  This
might not be necessarily an example of a journalist's deliberate polarization against the Freedom
Party, yet it is bad journalistic work, and the result is similar to applying the  ideological square
actively. 
   However, In terms of van Dijk's ideological square, the following chart suggests mixed results for
the Freedom Party regarding Berliner Zeitung's articles during the foundation phase:
Chart  18:  The  applicability  of  van  Dijk's  'Ideological  square'/  strategy  of  negative
polarization in Berliner Zeitung's articles on the Freedom Party during the foundation phase
             Headline                        Author                      Date of publication       Ideological opposition?
'Right-wing party after
Dutch design'
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2.5.2 Articles during the consolidation phase (March-August 2011)
   So far, a pattern reminiscent of the one identified in DER SPIEGEL's accounts can be observed in
the articles  of  Berliner  Zeitung:  A gradual  increase in  polarization against  the party over  time.
Another feature dismantled in the local-news pieces by Süddeutsche Zeitung surfaces in this case
again as well: The absence of a coherent labeling of the Freedom Party by one and the same author.
   Sabine Rennefanz expressed a fairly critical  stance on the party before,  yet  also approached
Freedom  Party-founder  Stadtkewitz  in  an  empathetic  fashion  in  her  portrait  of  him.  These
contradicting signals towards the readership continue in a brief news piece from 15th April, again
contributed by Sabine Rennefanz, the Freedom Party is not portrayed as arousing suspicion of being
a particularly right-wing or even extremist political group – on the contrary, they are termed as
'Islam-critic', and are called a 'melting pot for frustrated CDU- and FDP-members'. The context of
the article is about  a local politician of the Liberal Party (FDP) – at that time a government party
after all – changed sides and would run an electoral campaign for the Freedom Party now.111 
   The absence of a coherent image of the Freedom Party continues throughout the spring and
summer  of  2011.  In  a  further  in-depth  article  by  Thomas  Rogalla,  'Fighting  Islam  in  a  suit',
published  on  16th May,  it  gets  emphasized  that  many  politicians  of  the  Freedom  Party  had
previously been members of the CDU, the party's press spokesman had even been a member of the
German Communist Party (DKP) in the 1970s. Using the label 'Anti-Islam-Party' and reporting on a
party convention  that  he  attended,  the  author  portraits  the  Freedom Party  as  a  political  group
consisting of a 'primarily male, well-off membership between 30 and 60 years of age'. Rogalla also
mentions  that  the  party  convention  he  reports  on  has  provoked  'the  usual  leftist  counter-
demonstration', but all in all the state of affairs was 'quiet'. In fact, the event had the air of a meeting
of 'a sailors´ club or automobile club', according to the author. 
111 Rennefanz, Sabine: 'Politiker der Liberalen lauft zur islamkritischen Freiheit uber', in: berliner-zeitung.de,  
       published on 15.4. 2011. 
       http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/fdp-fraktion-in-friedrichshain-kreuzberg-wird-aufgeloest-politiker-der-  
       liberalen-laeuft-zur-islamkritischen-freiheit-ueber,10810590,10782352.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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   Interestingly, Rogalla shares Stadtkewitz's statements expressed at the convention without a filter,
and thereby paints a genuine picture of the Freedom Party's political agenda. Stadtkewitz stated that
'German policies have to sort immigrants, depending on whether they are willing to integrate or
not'. At Berlin schools, 'the conquest of political Islam must be stopped', and 'we have to part ways
with foreign families who let their children become criminals'. Moreover, the Freedom Party-leader
shared his personal experience of visiting Turkish tea rooms in Berlin, where he had encountered
Islamic 'religious guardians' who controlled if people lived according to Islamic law, the Sharia.    
   Moreover, Stadtkewitz attacked the 'tax-financed integration industry in Berlin' which should be
'profoundly looked into'. In fact, the author chose to not filter these statements or comment on them
in any way, and hence the political convictions of the Freedom Party speak for themselves and are
left for the reader´s personal judgment. Nonetheless, Rogalla paints the picture of a strongly leader-
centered,  male-dominated  small-party  that  is  highly  immigration-critical  and  per  se  provoking
negative response from 'leftist counter-demonstrators'. Thereby, the author indicates the hardened
fronts between leftist pro-multiculturalism citizens and immigration-critical ones. In any case, the
Freedom Party does by no means appear as an extremist party in this news piece, but rather as a
relatively marginal political group. The party is portrayed as an association of well-off males with
an immigration-critical,  but  no final  judgments  are  made.  None but  one:  The Berlin  municipal
election will determine the future of the Freedom Party.112 
   An equally in-depth, yet fundamentally differently colored article was published on 17th June 2011
by Jörg Schindler, entitled as 'The true Germans'. The headline is a clear hint at the Finnish right-
wing populist party 'Perussuomalaiset', at that time internationally referred to as the 'True Finns'. 
The title has two implications: First, the Freedom Party is directly counted to the same party-family
that also Perussuomalaiset belongs to. Second, and more importantly, in the context of Germany's
political culture – that in many ways has been impacted by the collective memory of the horrors of
the Third Reich – the labeling of a party as 'The True Germans', implies that party is a nationalistic,
possibly even elitist/ fascist group that practices an aggressive form of ethnicity-based Othering. In
short: When taking Germany's political culture into consideration, the very title of the article is a
stigma in itself.
   However, the article is informative, yet composed in quite a skeptical manner. As his colleagues
Sabine Rennefanz and Thomas Rogalla have done it before him, Schindler attended an event of the
Freedom Party and built his article on the grounds of that experience. In fact, the author was present
112 Rogalla, Thomas: 'Kampf gegen den Islam im Anzug', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 16.5. 2011, 
       http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/partei—die-freiheit--hofft-auf-acht-prozent-bei-der-wahl-kampf-gegen-den-  
       islam-im-anzug,10810590,10787424.html, last accessed on 13.1. 2015
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at the foundation of the Freedom Party´s regional delegation in Hamburg. He describes the area
where the premises of that party convention are located, and states: 'There is actually very little one
could be afraid of here.' In a scornful fashion, Schindler then portrays the party personnel that has
gathered, and states 'fear wears suit and a tie here'. The author makes it abundantly clear that  he
does not  take the  political  concerns of  the Freedom Party-sympathizers-  and members in
question seriously:  For one, a military officer in the group sees himself 'encircled by 'criminal
immigrants'  and another one in the audience is 'passionately afraid of the Islamization as if the
Taliban were  right at the door'.
   Regardless of expressing mockery towards these Freedom-Party-sympathizers' political concerns,
Schindler is quoting parts of Stadtkewitz´s speech without a filter. The party's top candidate stated
that  it  is  'unbelievable  that  German Euros  are  getting  transferred  to  Athens while  potholes  are
growing at home'. Starting from this refusal of German financial aid for Greece, he then expressed
that  Turkey must  not  become a EU-member  state,  as  it  does  not  belong to  Europe.  The same
applies, according to Stadtkewitz, to Islam, and if its expansion in Europe does not get stopped,
'won´t have any say in anything anymore in two or three generations'.  At the end of his speech,
Stadtkewitz expressed the hopes of being able to change the political landscape in Germany in a
similar manner as the Green Party did in the 1980´s – forcing political issues onto the agenda that
had been previously disregarded. Stadtkewitz, however, also uttered a fundamental condition for the
possibility of such an evolution of the Freedom Party: 'We have to keep lunatics and idiots at bay.'
Given that right at the start of the party´s history, he expressed the necessity to keep a distance to
right-wing extremists and people with Nazi-ties, he probably first and foremost meant those with
'lunatics and idiots'. 
   Furthermore,  the  author  underlines  that  the  Freedom Party-members  see  themselves  as  'the
defenders of the Occident that are firmly rooted in the grounds of the Basic Law'. Other anti-Islamic
groups in Germany, such as 'Pro Deutschland', had reached out to join forces with the Freedom
Party, but Stadtkewitz had turned them down. Due to the fact that these groups had members with
past right-wing extremist affiliations, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, had
been  monitoring  them  already  –  which  was  an  unacceptable  flaw,  an  exclusion  criterion  for
Stadtkewitz.
   Despite the dividing line between the Freedom Party and right-wing extremists being drawn
repeatedly by Stadtkewitz, the author does either put no effort into differentiating or does not
buy into Stadtkewitz's claims. Schindler states that 'the Freedom Party wants to 'fill the blank spot
(= Germany) on Europe´s brown map'. The term 'brown' in that context, however, is offensive, as
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brown as a political color is commonly associated with Nazism/ Fascism. This is due to the fact that
the Sturmabteilung (SA) in the Third Reich, the original paramilitary wing of Hitler´s NSDAP, was
called  'brown-shirts'.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  author  of  the  article  paints  all  new  right-wing/
nationalist parties with the same (fascist) brush by speaking of the 'brown map of Europe', and he
clearly counts the Freedom Party to that family. 
Apparently,  the author opposes anything that he labels as 'right-wing',  since he claims that
'right-wing actors  are  trying  to  find their  electorate  in  the borderland of  the liberal-democratic
constitutional order, sometimes even beyond it'. It is clear that the author ties a right-wing political
attitude per se to a dubious gray zone that is on the very margins of the constitution – as it appears,
'loyalty  to  the  constitution'  and  'right-wing  policies'  are  rather  opposite  concepts  in  the
author's reading. As a consequence, he continues his scornful portrayal of the Freedom Party. He
sarcastically states that it is 'the honorable task of every true German to fight against Eurabia', and
that this battle takes place 'in the name of human rights against the evil Mussulmans'.
    Based on the semantics and choice of words by the author, it is safe to say that he takes a very
critical stance on the Freedom Party and is willing to disqualify them by both scorn and polemic
semantics. Schindler colors his article with his own political orientations, which appear to be leftist-
liberal and pro-multiculturalism. Unwilling to grant the Freedom Party the status of being a group
that voices a legitimate political opinion – no matter if it is an opposite one – he openly tries to
write the party down and stigmatize it. After highlighting 'fear' as the prime mover of the party´s
electorate, Schindler ties the party to a xenophobia and fascism, and, finally, quotes the already-
introduced,  normative  German  scholar  Alexander  Häusler  to  justify  his  characterization  of  the
Freedom Party: 'This is a movement that intensely threatens intercultural peace by evoking enemy
stereotypes in a racist fashion.'
   This normative assessment  leaves the reader with the impression that the Freedom Party
represents an unacceptable political agenda that is to be located in the borderland of racism
and fascism.113 In that sense, it is Berliner Zeitung's most openly hostile article on the Freedom
Party so far,  and its  assumptions and tones  are  reminiscent  of the one by Thorsten Denkler  in
Süddeutsche Zeitung.
113 Schindler, Jörg: 'Die wahren Deutschen', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 16.6. 2011
        http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/newsticker/die-wahren-deutschen,10917074,10923412.html, last accessed on 16.3. 
        2015
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Chart  19:  The  applicability  of  van  Dijk's  'Ideological  square'/  strategy  of  negative
polarization in Berliner Zeitung's  articles  on the  Freedom Party  during the  consolidation
phase 
              Headline                         Author                    Date of publication      Ideological opposition?
'Politician of the
Liberal Party defects to
the Islam-critical
Freedom Party'





























2.5.3 Articles during the electoral campaign for the municipal elections in Berlin (September
2011)
    Not surprisingly, as a local phenomenon of Berlin, the municipal election in Germany's capital
90
got covered most extensively by Berliner Zeitung among the four newspapers I have chosen. 
   In its role as one of Berlin's leading local newspapers, Berliner Zeitung had initiated a poll in the
run-up to the municipal elections in order to find out how strong the right-wing potential among the
electorate was. Between 20th June and 29th June, the polling body 'Forsa' interviewed 1001 Berlin
residents on matters such as xenophobia, Antisemitism, Chauvinism, Social Darwinism and playing
downplaying National Socialism. As Karin Schmidl, Thomas Rogalla and Sabine Rennefanz state in
their news piece  'Every 8th Berliner wishes for a Führer', the result of the poll suggests a strong
potential of right-wing attitudes in Berlin. 
   The authors of the article introduced the right-wing parties competing for this electorate's votes as
the  Freedom  Party,  the  NPD  and  Pro  Deutschland.  Berlin's  potential  right-wing  electorate's
convictions expressed in the poll, however, were mostly in accordance with the agenda of the NPD
(e.g. claiming that National Socialism has good aspects and that Germany needs a string leader
again). Quite oppositely, the Freedom Party is least extreme party among these three. In that sense,
the  dismantled  10%  of  right-wing  (extremist)  attitudes  among  the  Berlin  population  do  not
necessarily suggest a strong standing of the Freedom Party with regard to this electorate, even if the
party had been well-known among these voters.114 
   On one  hand,  it  is  certainly justified  to  count  the  Freedom Party to  the  right-wing parties
competing for votes for roughly the same electorate. On the other hand, the content questions of the
poll that was the article's main subject rather aimed at revealing right-wing extremist attitudes. In
that  sense,  the  Freedom Party,  arguably,  got  aligned  way further  to  the  right  than  its  political
program would actually call for.
   The more detailed approach and extensive news coverage of Berliner Zeitung around the Berlin
electoral campaign is also reflected through the fact that Sabine Rennefanz contributed even two
articles on the second Wilders-speech in Berlin. One was published in preparation of the event,
('Electoral campaign with Wilders'), and one covered the event afterwards ('Mister Wilders and his
pale disciple').
   It is noteworthy that Rennefanz, who holds the monopoly on Freedom-Party-related articles at
Berliner Zeitung, had already attended the first Wilders-speech in Berlin in October 2010, and one
of her main conclusions – deeming the the nature of the event as 'clandestine' – is picked up in her
new articles again. This time she calls the oncoming Wilders-event 'a highly conspiratorial meeting'.
114 Rennefanz, Sabine; Rogalla, Thomas: 'Jeder Achte wunscht sich einen Führer'. In: berliner-zeitung.de, published on
8.7.2011. http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/forsa-umfrage—vier-prozent-der-berliner-wollen-rechtsextrem-
waehlen-jeder-achte-wuenscht-sich-einen-fuehrer,10810590,10942386.html, last accessed on 14.1. 2015
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due to the fact that the venue would only be sent via an SMS to registered attendants 24 hours prior
to the beginning of the event – out of security concerns. 
   Rennefanz then sheds light on the reason for Wilders´s second visit in Berlin within one year.
Whereas his first appearance served the purpose of helping the Freedom Party to get publicity and
establish its  name in the media,  the Dutchman now attempts to get involved with the electoral
campaign. This is, according to Rennefanz, especially necessary, as the electoral campaign has not
gone  smoothly  so  far  for  the  Freedom  Party.  One  of  the  reasons  the  journalist  offers  as  an
explanation  is  the  'invisibility'  of  top  candidate  Stadtkewitz.  As  the  leader  of  a  party  under
development, he had been traveling across the country to steer the formations of state associations
of the Freedom Party in various federal states. 'The relative inconspicuousness of the Anti-Islam-
Party,'  as  Rennefanz puts  it,  is  partly also explained through the personality of Stadtkewitz.  In
contrast to 'the blonde Wilders with the cold eyes', Stadtkewitz is averse to 'poignant statements'. As
a result of that obstacle, the Freedom Party´s own expectations of the election results of '8 % + x'
have been lowered to at least breaking the 5%-threshold.
    Rennefanz objects that even that goal is difficult to reach due to the competition among the right-
wing parties. The author points out that both the NPD and Pro Deutschland try to attract a 'similar
electorate'  as the one the Freedom Party is reaching out for. Regardless of the Freedom Party´s
urgency to gain more publicity in the wake of the oncoming elections, the organizers tried to portray
the event as something bigger than a mere pre-election party. According to the Freedom Party, the
event was first and foremost about the limits of free speech, which are supposedly confined within
the boundaries of political correctness. On a similar note, the author highlights, that the right-wing
populists 'want to in-scene themselves as an international movement', as the guest list including
Spanish,  Swedish and Australian people suggests.  Interestingly,  no one from Norway had been
invited,  Rennefanz continues, and thereby includes Anders Breivik into the picture.  Stadtkewitz
stated that 'this case should not get too much space, but would certainly be mentioned'. According to
him, the Freedom Party needed to emphasize that 'criticism of the system and violence have nothing
to do with each other'.  The last  say in the article, however,  has the author, who soberly states:
'Breivik was a fan of Wilders too.'
   Quite  similarly to  Musharbash's  DER SPIEGEL-article,  Rennefanz  conducted  a  descriptive-
informative style and took no polemic stance against the the Freedom Party. As the journalist of
Berliner Zeitung who had conducted an in-depth-interview with René Stadtkewitz half a year ago,
she has  a  descriptive and explanatory angle in  her article.  In her covering of the actual  event,
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however, Rennefanz chose to be more outspoken.115 
   In Rennefanz's following account on the actual event, entitled as  'Mister Wilders and his pale
disciple',  she  questions  the  self-image  of  the  Freedom  Party  as  a  citizen  rights  party  ('who
supposedly wants to be as citizen rights party'), and mocks the practical security regulations on the
spot.  The  fact  that  the  event  is  not  sold  out,  gets  highlighted,  and  then  Rennefanz  references
Freedom Party-members' and sympathizers' criticism of the electoral campaign's operational mode.
– the only big pre-election party was held behind closed doors and there were hardly any posters to
be seen on the streets. Stadtkewitz opposed this criticism by stating that the electoral campaign
should be entirely focused on September. Motorcades with loudspeakers were planned to spread the
Freedom Party's message throughout Berlin in a mobile fashion. Afterwards, Rennefanz emphasizes
the huge contrast between Wilders and Stadtkewitz (as the article's title hinted at already). The duo
gets characterized as 'the hero and his admirer, the teacher and his disciple'.
  Regardless of Stadtkewitz's  apparent shortcomings as a top candidate of a populist  party,  the
atmosphere in the hall has a populist air: It resembles the one of Thilo Sarrazin's public readings.
Notwithstanding, the author points out that  there are converging agendas between the Freedom
Party and right-wing extremist parties – which Wilders and the Freedom Party do not want to be
linked to at all.  Wilders's remark on the supposed superiority of the Western culture over other
cultures  leads  Rennefanz  to  the  comment:  'The  National  Socialists  used to  speak  in  a similar
fashion.' 
After elaborating on Wilders's critical stance on the European Union, Rennefanz draws the final
conclusion that 'Sarrazin´s spirit was omnipresent' at the event. Not only had Stadtkewitz during his
30-minutes-speech constantly given praise to the controversial best-selling author. On top of that,
Rennefanz claims, Stadtkewitz believes that the book had touched upon the zeitgeist in Germany,
and  that Germany would need a party 'to save it from its abolition through Islam' . The Freedom
Party, the author argues, was meant to be the party to the book. 
    Polls suggested, Rennefanz continues, that 24 % of the electorate would vote for an Anti-Islam-
party. Right after that she sharply contrasts those old figures with current ones: Only 2% of the
Berlin electorate were planning on voting for the Freedom Party. The international guests at the
event, Rennefanz continues, did not understand why Wilders´s winner´s formula – soft in social
policies, yet tough against immigrants – does not appeal to the German electorate. A British guest of
the event is reported to have pointed out 'the German guilt complex' (about National Socialist Rule,
115 Rennefanz, Sabine: 'Wahlkampf mit Wilders', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 30.8. 2011. 
      http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/der-umstrittene-hollaendische-islamgegner-unterstuetzt-den-deutschen-
ableger-seiner-partei-wahlkampf-mit-wilders,10810590,10951374.html, last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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World War II and the Holocaust) as a possible explanation. 
   Rennefanz, on the contrary, wonders if it all had been 'a misunderstanding'. She suggests that a
great deal of Sarrazin's readers were satisfied with 'expressing their uneasiness through the purchase
of a copy'. In any case, 'a right-wing populist of Wilders´s format' would not be in sight in Germany,
Rennefanz argues, and he/ she would have a hard time to gain ground anyway, according to her.116
   Obviously,  Rennefanz has written off  the Freedom Party already. Not only does she sharply
contrast past polls of a more abstract nature (24% would vote for a new right-wing party) with
current  ones  directly  linked  to  the  concrete  party  Freedom  Party  (2%).  Rennefanz  also  puts
emphasis on Stadtkewitz's lack of charisma, leadership skills and media literacy.  Moreover,  the
operational mode of the electoral campaign (too few posters in the streets, the one big pre-election
party behind closed doors, the planned use of motorcades with loudspeakers) gets portrayed in a
rather critical fashion.  One gets the impression of a disorganized, chaotic small party that is
lacking professionalism in its electoral campaign. More importantly, the author suggests that
the wide-spread assumption that there is need for such a party after the 'Sarrazin-Debate' was
'merely a misunderstanding'. All in all, the reader is led to believe that there is no point in
voting for the Freedom Party at all – slightly fascist-rhetoric (the supposed supremacy of the
Western  culture),  bad  pre-election  poll  results  of  only  2%  and  a  disorganized,  unprofessional
electoral campaign are three key-points of the negative portrayal. 
   The author's eventual questioning of the Freedom Party´s purpose in Germany and her thesis on
the absence of the party's necessity for life – an actually significant electorate – weighs probably
heaviest in the final conclusion. Ultimately, the Freedom Party is portrayed as an inauspicious
political actor who is fighting for a lost cause. 
   On Monday following the election Sunday (  18th  September),  Karin Schmidl's  article on the
election outcome of the three right-wing parties NPD, Pro Deutschland and the Freedom Party was
published  (Losses  despite  attrition  warfare  and  dumb  rallying  cries')  –  which  have  received
'significant  defeats'  in  all  parts  of  Berlin.  The  author  states  that  the  Freedom  Party  had  put
'extremely much effort to distance themselves from the other right-wing parties'. However, after
rather detailed and pictorial portrayals of the campaigns by NPD and Pro Deutschland, the part on
the Freedom Party is quite short in comparison. Schmidl merely mentions that 'anti-Muslim racism
was the main subject', and that the conservative-bourgeois milieu was the party´s main target group.
As  a  consequence  of  the  aversion  towards  provocative  slogans,  the  electoral  campaign  of  the
116  Rennefanz, Sabine: 'Herr Wilders und sein blasser Schuler', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 4.9. 2011.
        http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/newsticker/herr-wilders-und-sein-blasser-schueler-,10917074,10929334.html, last   
        accessed on 19.1. 2015 
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Freedom Party was 'quite colorless' in Schmidl´s judgment.117 
   As before in the case of Berliner Zeitung, there has been an account of ideological alignment of
the Freedom Party with the right-wing extremist NPD. Even though the Freedom Party is accurately
labeled as a 'right-wing populist'/ 'right-wing party' have been used to label the Freedom Party, the
author  aligns  them  ideologically  the  NPD  (in  a  broader  perspective)  and  calls  both  parties'
electorate 'racist'.
    Two days later, a more profound article on the election outcome for the three right-wing parties,
contributed by Steven Geyer, was published in Berliner Zeitung. The news piece, entitled as 'Crisis
among  Islam-haters:  Fierce  competition  among  right-wing  actors',  covers  the  actual  election
outcome and the responses  from members  and supporters  of  the parties  in  question.  The NPD
reached 2,1 % of the votes, Pro Deutschland 1,2% and the Freedom Party merely 1%. The author
remarks that even all right-wing votes combined – 4,3% – would not have been sufficient to pass
the 5% threshold to enter the Berlin parliament (Senat). 
    The devastating result for the right-wing parties gets highlighted by Geyer's reference to the high
hopes that they had nursed prior to the election. The author argues that the right-wing scene had
tried to equal Geert Wilders's success in the Netherlands, and that 'a nation-wide victory march' was
planned to be started in Berlin. By means of 'anti-Muslim agitation' and 'the usurpation of Sarrazin´s
theses', the author continues, the right-wing parties had wanted to get 8 % of the votes. Given the
desolate outcome, the Freedom Party´s state association in the federal state Hessen, had left the
party collectively. Geyer states that 'despair and depression are reigning among the Islam-haters in
Germany,'  as both the Freedom Party and Pro Germany are 'stone-dead'  after  the election.  The
author  is  grounding his  judgment  in  the  responses  he  analyzed  in  common internet-forums of
Germany´s anti-Islamic scene.
   According to the sources that Geyer incorporates in his account, the enmity between the parties
was centered around different understandings of the necessity to explicitly distance oneself from
Nazi-movements. Whereas the Freedom Party had put much effort into not being linked to fascist
groups, Pro Deutschland had run the election with candidates formerly associated with the NPD,
DVU and the Republicans. The divide that had opened between PRO-Deutschland and the Freedom
Party on that issue, had manifested itself in mutual refusal of possible cooperation. 
   Freedom Party-members accused PRO-Deutschland of harming 'the Islam-critical  project'  by
117  Schmidl, Karin: 'Verluste trotz Materialschlacht und dumpfer Parolen', in berliner-zeitung.de, published on 18.9. 
2011. http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/newsticker/materialschlacht-und-dumpfe-parolen,10917074,10930268.html, 
last accessed on 19.1. 2015
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allowing ex-NPD members to run elections  for their  party,  and by using symbols that imply a
'broad-brush agitation against Muslims'. According to the Freedom Party-sympathizers at politically
incorrect,  these  two  factors  alone  had  damaged  the  'Islam-critical  scene  as  much  as  Anders
Breivik'.118 
   All in all, Geyer's account is informative and does shed light on the different shades of right-wing
attitudes among the parties,  yet  ultimately they are rather depicted as akin to one another than
different  in  key  aspects  (like  their  stance  on  right-wing  extremists).  Hence,  this  article  again
manifests an attempt to align the Freedom Party with the far right, and the author's accusation of all
parties  using  'anti-Muslim agitation'  continues  the  motif  of  portraying  the  party as  harmful  to
society due to its  'inhumane agenda'. 
All  in  all,  Berliner  Zeitung's  take on the  Freedom Party during the  electoral  campaign for  the
municipal election in Berlin and shortly after it can be summarized as follows:
Chart  20:  The  applicability  of  van  Dijk's  'Ideological  square'/  strategy  of  negative
polarization  in  Berliner  Zeitung's  articles  on  the  Freedom  Party  during  the  electoral
campaign for the municipal election in Berlin
             Headline                          Author                     Date of publication      Ideological opposition?
'Electoral campaign
with Wilders'
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118 Geyer, Steven: 'Hauen und Stechen unter Rechten', in: berliner-zeitung.de, published on 21.9. 2011.    
       http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/neue-rechte/krise-bei-islamhassern-hauen-und-stechen-unter-  






























2.5.4 Berliner Zeitung's accounts on the Freedom Party: The most outspoken critic
The total result for Berliner Zeitung in terms of the applied terminology looks as follows:
Chart 21: The distribution of neutral-descriptive, tendentious and openly critical terminology
in the articles by Berliner Zeitung on the Freedom Party within the time frame of my study.
Lexical item                                              Appearances (Articles altogether)
Right-wing populist  3 (12)
Anti-Islamic 3 (12)
Islam-critical 1 (12)






Agitators/ extremists 2 (12)
Fascism-references 4 (12)
Racism-references 2 (12)
'Wolves in sheep's clothing' 0 (12)
   
    As my analysis has shown, a somewhat similar pattern between the trends of news coverage on
the  Freedom Party by DER SPIEGEL and Berliner  Zeitung can be identified.  Differing in  the
extensiveness of their news coverage, both papers have become more critical towards the Freedom
Party over time. One peculiar feature in the case of Berliner Zeitung is, however, due to the focus
on the municipal election in the German capital, the recurrent alignment of the Freedom Party to
its  competitors  for  right-wing-votes,  the  NPD  and  PRO-Deutschland. Even  though
Stadtkewitz's explicit distancing from these more extremist groups (and the growing mutual enmity
growing from it) is repeatedly mentioned, the three parties, and especially their supposedly 'racist'
electorate get frequently painted with the same brush by various journalists writing for Berliner
Zeitung.
   In the more in-depth, detailed accounts that seek to explore and explain the phenomenon of the
Freedom Party, a similarly wide array of opinions is present in the editorial staff of Berliner Zeitung
as  in  the  case  of  Süddeutsche  Zeitung.  They  range  from  neutral,  empathetic  accounts  ('The
outsider',  'Fighting Islam in a suit') to polemic open opposition that accuses the party of being
quasi-fascist ('The true Germans'). Hence, we can speak of ambivalent results, and an absence of
coherence altogether in terms of the Freedom Party's portrayal. Nonetheless, it must be noted
that the journalist with the highest profile presence in reports on the party, Sabine Rennefanz, has in
large parts applied an explanatory, analytic angle in her accounts. She often was seeking to grasp
the psychology that is at work behind the party program, yet in doing so, she often used a partly
subtle, partly open mockery of the party (similarly to DER SPIEGEL's Yassin Musharbash). 
   In conclusion, and regardless of a few more empathetic accounts,  the image of the Freedom
Party shaped was often rather negative, and as a frequent reader of the paper one was led to
perceive the party as small, unprofessional, disorganized, 'invisible' in the electoral campaign,
and promoting an 'inhumane agenda'  of  'anti-Muslim agitation',  that  made it  potentially
attractive to racist voters – let alone, that those probably found the party to 'tame', and might be
alienated by it due to Stadtkewitz's tireless distancing from right-wing extremism.
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3.  CONCLUSION:  THE IMAGE(S)  OF THE FREEDOM PARTY THAT WAS  (WERE)
CREATED  BY  THE  GERMAN  MAINSTREAM  MEDIA BETWEEN  JULY  2010  AND
NOVEMBER 2013
The main objective of my study was to test the validity of Frank Decker's thesis of the 'anti-fascist-
reflexes' of the German media towards a small stereotypical right-wing populist party that entered
the political stage in the autumn of 2010: The Freedom Party. Decker's thesis covers the assumption
that  the  political  culture  of  contemporary  Germany  is  built  upon  the  normative  post-
Auschwitz perspective, and the effect are 'anti-fascist reflexes' in media and the elite alike.
Quite frankly, Decker is accusing the German media of a biased approach towards national right-
wing parties; which is at odds with the claim of a nonpartisan news-coverage.
   I  have  incorporated  four  significant  German  newspapers  into  my  study,  varying  both  in
publication mode (weekly political journal –  DER SPIEGEL; daily tabloid –  BILD; daily nation-
wide  newspaper  –  Süddeutsche  Zeitung;  and daily local  newspaper  –  Berliner  Zeitung)  and in
political  orientation,  in  order to avoid a one-dimensional  picture of the German media,  and do
different segments of German society justice. Moreover, I argue, this broadening of scope has given
my study more validity and significance.
    Even though the Freedom Party has in large parts been portrayed as what it is by the standards of
numerous prolific German scholars – namely a modern stereotypical right-wing populist party – it
was impossible to identify one truly coherent image that was created by the newspapers.
    In what follows, I will summarize the results of my study in a conclusive manner.
    First of all, there is a great deal of variation in terms of how much  relevance Süddeutsche,
SPIEGEL, BILD and Berliner Zeitung granted the Freedom Party as a new political phenomenon
worth reporting. At first sight, it seems that BILD more or less ignored the party entirely, whereas
DER SPIEGEL had a relatively low coverage as well. In contrast to that, Süddeutsche Zeitung and
Berliner Zeitung had a significantly higher news coverage on the new party. Judging these results,
however, solely in quantitative terms, is of course gravely insufficient.
   It is safe to say that BILD indeed did ignore the Freedom Party for the most part, for neither the
quantitative  (four  articles  in  three  years)  nor  the  qualitative  dimension indicate  any interest  in
reporting on the party: All BILD-articles were brief news-pieces without any ambition for in-depth-
coverage. That is quite surprising if one takes three aspects into account:
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1. BILD´s editorial staff is generally considered to be a rather conservative/ right-wing with
leanings  towards  the  CDU,  after  all  the  party that  is  Stadtkewitz's  ideological  point  of
departure.
2. The  news  coverage  of  BILD  on  the  'Sarrazin-Debate'  was  very  exhaustive  and  often
appeared to be sympathetic towards the persona of Thilo Sarrazin himself.119
3. The editorial house of BILD – Springer Verlag AG – conducted a favorable news coverage
on right-wing populists in the past. This was the case when Roland Schill and his Schill-
Party stepped onto the political stage in Hamburg back in 2001.
   However, a possible continuation of coverage on the immigration-critical controversy caused by
Sarrazin could have been to focus on the activities of the Freedom Party, the self-proclaimed 'party
to the book'. As my analysis has shown, this did not take place.
   DER SPIEGEL, in any case, might not have reported much on the party in quantitative terms, but
all the more in qualitative terms. 66 % of its news coverage was focused on the foundation phase of
the  Freedom  Party.  One  can  argue  that  this  evident  focus  on  the  origin  of  a  new  political
phenomenon is in accordance with DER SPIEGEL's status as Germany's leading political journal.
In other words: In the wake of the Sarrazin-Debate and the controversy around Stadtkewitz's ties
with Wilders, the Freedom Party appeared as a noteworthy political phenomenon. In the cause of
the year 2011, this news-worthiness decreased and died down entirely after the party's disastrous
results in the municipal election in Berlin in September 2011. 
  Süddeutsche Zeitung and Berliner Zeitung are leading the chart  with twenty-one respectively
twelve articles on the Freedom Party. There is, however, a great difference in terms of the temporal
focus of reports: Whereas Berliner Zeitung focused its reports – just like DER SPIEGEL – on the
foundation phase of  the party,  Süddeutsche gave more relevance to  the party as  a  newsworthy
phenomenon  after  its  radicalization  under  Stürzenberger.  As  mentioned  before,  this  opposite
orientation  of  these  two  newspapers  can  be  explained  through  their  local  character.  Since  the
Freedom Party was founded in Berlin and since the Berlin-election was styled to be a fateful one by
the party leadership, the party had initially a significantly higher presence in Berlin than anywhere
else in the Federal Republic. As one of the leading local newspapers in Berlin, Berliner Zeitung
treated the Freedom Party as a local phenomenon – which has naturally a higher importance for a
119 Approximately 600 news pieces on Sarrazin in the weeks surrounding his book´s publication speak volumes: 
http://www.bild.de/suche.bild.html?type=article&query=Thilo+Sarrazin&resultsStart=340&resultsPerPage=10
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local newspaper than for a nation-wide one. 
   With Süddeutsche,  it  was exactly the other way around. Even though the paper is published
nation-wide, it also has a local dimension in its news coverage: stories from Munich – where the
publisher's house is located. After the Freedom Party's failure in Berlin and Stadtkewitz's loss of
power, Stürzenberger's rise shifted the power and activities to Munich – hence, the Freedom Party
became a local phenomenon again for a – on some level – local newspaper.
   In  this  context,  it  is  noteworthy  that  Stadtkewitz's  early  Berlin-based  Freedom  Party  and
Stürzenberger's Munich-based delegation of the party differ in several ways. The early Freedom
Party was closely associated with several former members of Berlin's CDU (and, to some degree,
Geert Wilders), whereas Stürzenberger's Freedom Party delegation was labeled as extremist, and
therefore  monitored  by the  Office  for  the  Protection  of  the  Constitution  in  Bavaria.  To put  it
differently: Berliner  Zeitung focused on the Freedom Party in a time when Stadtkewitz tried to
firmly distance his political project from extremists, and rather tried to appeal to the bourgeois-
middle class camp, whereas Süddeutsche Zeitgeist's focus lies on a local delegation of the party that
had gotten  radicalized  by Michael  Stürzenberger.  Consequently,  relatively different  images  and
semantics could be expected in the chosen media's portrayal of the Freedom Party. Yet, is this the
case after all? 
   Two conclusive charts  on the applicability of van Dijk's  analytic framework 'the ideological
square'/ the strategy of polarization, holds the ultimate answer to this question, and summarizes the
empirical results of my study: 
Chart 22: The distribution of neutral-descriptive, tendentious and openly critical articles on
the Freedom Party within the time frame of my study.
Degree of polarization     SZ            SPIEGEL           BILD            Berliner  Zeitung                Total




9 1 0 4 14
Tendentious
news coverage
3 1 0 6 10
Neutral news
coverage 
9 4 4 3 20
Chart 23: The distribution of neutral-descriptive, tendentious and openly critical terminology
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on the Freedom Party within the time frame of my study.
Term                    Süddeutsche      SPIEGEL             BILD        Berliner          Total (Articles in total)
Right-wing
populist
9 2 - 2   13 (44)   
Anti-Islamic 2     -  -    4 6 (44)
Islam-critical 2 3 2 2 9 (44)
Right-wing - - - 7 7 (44)
Protest-Party 1 2 - 2 5 (44)
Islam-
opponents
3 - - - 3 (44)
Fascism-
references
1 1 - 4 6 (44)
Racism-
references
1 - - 1 2 (44)
Agitators/
extremists
5 - - 1 6 (44)
Clandestine 1 - - 2 3 (44)
Islamophobic 1 2 - 2 5 (44)




2 - - - 2 (44)
These two charts reinforce in a compact fashion my main research result: The German mainstream
media has not painted a coherent picture of the Freedom Party between July 2010 and November
2013. Hence, the media-critical notion of Brettschneider that a coherent media coverage is akin to
the 'mind-numbing propaganda in totalitarian states' can certainly (and luckily) not be applied in
case of the Freedom Party.
   Regardless of Decker's thesis of 'anti-fascist-reflexes' of the German media, one cannot identify
a collective,  politically motivated effort of journalist acting as 'the watchdog of society' to
stigmatize the Freedom Party as Nazis, and thereby marginalize it on purpose.
   Certainly,  occasionally there have been such normative,  yes,  polemic accounts where a very
obvious polarization against the Freedom Party has occurred.  These rather  extensive articles of
ideological opposition were, however, limited to both Süddeutsche Zeitung and Berliner Zeitung.
BILD – regardless of its tiny news coverage in quantitative terms – has been neutral towards the
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Freedom Party all along (and thereby continued its tradition of having right-wing political leanings
in its  accounts),  and DER SPIEGEL has applied any kind of criticism in a non-polemic,  more
sophisticated manner that never explicitly crossed the line of labeling the Freedom Party as fascist
or  right-wing  extremist.  Germany's  leading  political  magazine  played  its  role  as  'watchdog  of
society' by analyzing and dismantling the programmatic and rhetoric shortcomings of the party in a
rather in-depth-fashion. Interestingly, the persona of Stadtkewitz got highlighted quite a bit, and his
political goals were clearly put in the wider context of him being a firm opponent to the 'social-
democratization' of his former party, the CDU. In that sense, DER SPIEGEL has taken into account
that the Freedom Party has emerged from a conservative-middle class point of departure, and not a
right-wing extremist one. Still, the editorial staff's overall-judgment of the party remains critical and
rests upon the conviction that the Freedom Party is a group driven by fear of Islam. 
     The most critical and openly stance on the Freedom Party was taken by Süddeutsche Zeitung
(57% opposition in van Dijk's terms) and Berliner Zeitung (77%), revealing an inherent ideological
opposition to the party's political agenda. Berliner Zeitung in particular has in its articles on the
municipal  election  in  Berlin,  frequently  tied  the  Freedom Party  to  the  far  right.  The  effect  is
obvious: Those right-wing extremists who the newspaper has portrayed as the potential electorate
for the Freedom Party have most likely felt alienated from the party program due to its pro-Israel
agenda and the 'tame' politically correct rhetoric. At the same time, the electorate that the Freedom
Party  actually  sought  to  appeal  to  (Sarrazin-sympathizers,  frustrated  CDU-voters,  politically
frustrated  citizens  without  party  affiliation)  was  either  ignorant  of  the  existence  of  the  party
(especially he BILD-readership) or was lead to perceive it as 'too far right' as it was repeatedly
mentioned in the same breath as the NPD. By repeatedly being counted to the 'right-wing camp'
(that, in addition to the Freedom Party, was made up by right-wing extremist parties NPD and Pro
Deutschland)  by Berliner  Zeitung,  a  whole  different  image of  the  Freedom Party than the  one
intended by Stadtkewitz was manifested in the public eye. As a consequence, it is safe to say, that
the Freedom Party fell between the cracks and failed to attract the voters it first and foremost sought
to  attract.  With  the  benefit  of  hindsight,  one  can  easily  conclude  that,  in  this  configuration,
Stadtkewitz's ambition to establish the Freedom Party as a more right-wing alternative to the CDU
(and hence, as a respectable democratic party) was bound to fail. 
   At this point, it must also be noted, however, that some journalists in particular were apparently
'assigned' to media coverage on the party. Hence, the individual opinions of these journalists came
into play more significantly and influenced the overall-image a particular newspaper created of the
party. The most articles on the party were indeed composed by Sabine Rennefanz (Berliner Zeitung)
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and Bernd Kastner (Süddeutsche Zeitung), each contributing seven accounts on or related to the
Freedom Party. Interestingly, Rennefanz – who also met the Freedom Party-founder-and first leader
for a personal in-depth-interview – revealed at times a rather empathetic take on the party, and on
Stadtkewitz  in  particular,  and  at  times  a  normative  opposition.  However,  ultimately  one  can
probably summarize her stance on the party as a 'mild opposition', for she chose to both mock the
nature of the party conventions and to apply fascism-references to one of her accounts, but all in all
tried to explain and analyze rather than to condemn.
     Kastner's stance on the party, however, was more openly critical, and to his contributions, it was
in vast parts  possible to apply van Dijk's  ideological square.  Then again,  it  must be noted that
Kastner's accounts were exclusively written on the radicalized Munich-delegation of the Freedom
Party after Michael Stürzenberger had taken over. In that sense, both journalists were reporting on
the party on two different stages of its history, and I argue that those two development stages of the
party  almost  equal  two  different  parties.  Whereas  the  initial  Freedom  Party  was  closer  the
conservative-bourgeois camp and represented a response to the social-democratization of the CDU
under Angela Merkel, the late Freedom Party under Stürzenberger was closer to the extremist image
of former right-wing parties like the Republicans or the DVU.
   In conclusion, it is safe to say that, in substance, the way the German media has reported on the
Freedom Party is just as pluralistic as the opinions to be found in German society. Certainly, there
have not been any truly favorable accounts of the Freedom Party, no positive 'media hype'
occurred around the party.  In so far,  one can argue,  that  Decker's  thesis  of  the reserved
attitude of the German media towards new right-wing parties was valid on some level at all
times. Indeed, a possible alternate scenario (and one closer to the liking of Freedom Party-founder
Stadtkewitz) would have been to give an image of the new-founded party as a serious alternative to
those 'homeless conservatives' that had been alienated from the CDU/CSU through its process of
'Social-democratization' under Angela Merkel's leadership.
   In theory, it could have been possible to frame the Freedom Party as a mere new conservative
protest-party  that  closes  a  gap  in  the  political  spectrum  between  the  CDU/CSU  and  openly
nationalist or Nazi parties. Let alone, as my analysis of the party program has shown, this would
have been a too euphemistic take on the party. The political agenda and rhetoric of the Freedom
Party identified it at all times as a modern stereotypical right-wing populist  party. Hence, this was
the most accurate terminology to label it, even in academic terms.
   Interestingly, this scientifically accurate term 'right-wing populist' was indeed the most used  in the
forty-four articles I analyzed: Thirteen articles in total made use of the term explicitly to introduce
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the Freedom Party to the readership. Even though this term is on the pole position in then chart
above, one has to acknowledge that we speak about only approximately 29,5 % of the articles here.
    Other than that,  'Islam-critical' (20%),  'right-wing-party' (16%), and  'Anti-Islam-Party' (14%)
were the most used lexical items to label the party; their  neutral-descriptive character perfectly
covered by the actual party program. On the other hand, 14% of the articles on the Freedom Party
had explicit or implicit  references to fascism/ right-wing-extremism, by either aligning it  to the
NPD in some way, or accusing it of a quasi-fascist agenda (which is not justified).    
   Nonetheless,  with the exception of  a few polemic articles,  the political  agenda of  being
immigration-critical and anti-Islamic was not constantly met with open hostility throughout
the  three  years  of  my  analysis.  At  the  same  time,  a  significant  amount  of  (possibly  even
favorable?) media coverage – especially during the foundation phase of the party – could not be
observed either. 
   Ultimately, my study certainly has given some kind of indication to why the Freedom's Party
enterprise  in  German politics  was  rather a  short-lived and ill-fated  one. Nonetheless,  the
failure of a party can of course never be fully explained by the relationship it has or has not
established with the mainstream media. Certainly, publicity and media exposure are useful in
reaching out for an electorate, yet blaming the media for a party's failure in establishing itself in a
pluralistic democracy, would be short-sighted and unfair.
   Hence,  I am fully aware that this  study does not offer any extensive answers as to why the
Freedom Party turned out to be another failure in German right-wing populism. Addressing such
questions was beyond the scope of my study, as the term 'political culture', which in the German
case is claimed to be such an obstacle for the success of new right-wing parties, covers much more
than just the media's role as a 'watchdog of a given society'.
   In fact, 'political culture' covers the electoral system of a state as much part as the collective
political memory of elites and voters, and the degree of pluralism in the party landscape. These are
factors I did not look into, and hence, I cannot claim to fully offer an explanation to why events
took such an unfavorable cause for the Freedom Party.
   Then again, some other researcher might just pick up where I left off, and looking into these
factors can be the point of departure for yet another in-depth-study of the phenomenon.
   For one thing seems to be certain: With the AfD having entered several federal and the European
parliament throughout the last year, the phenomenon of German right-wing populism should draw
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